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ABSTRACT

Dangerous Exhibitions: Erotic Justice and Comparative Constitutional Law
by
Elena L. Cohen

Advisor: Leonard Feldman

The beginning of the 21st century is widely seen as a time of great progress for LGBTQ
people. Gay marriage, gay sex, adoption by same sex couples, and gay people serving in
militaries have all been legalized in many countries in the past two decades, often through the
decisions of constitutional courts. However, these constitutional protections of sexuality have
been found in limited contexts and applied to a limited class of people, such that many are still
vulnerable to repression by governments and majoritarian politics. In order to resist this sexual
oppression, I widen the focus from gay and cisgender couples to other sexual acts and actors
often left out of typical gay rights advocacy- namely BDSM, strip clubs and nudity in public. I
analyze the promises and dangers of using privacy, freedom of expression, and dignity in the
constitutional courts of the U.S., South Africa, India, Canada and England to protect sexuality. I
show how courts reinforce the oppression of sexual acts and actors who fall outside of what
Gayle Rubin calls the “charmed circle of sexuality,” often through unsubstantiated appeals to the
public interest. Looking to recent Indian case law which is open to a wide range of legal and
theoretical sources and which centers those outside of normatively valorized sexuality, I propose
that this type of robust constitutional inquiry could be a model for other polities and provides
courts with the tools to help achieve erotic justice through the law.
iv
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CHAPTER 1:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BAD SEXUALITY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EROTIC
JUSTICE

I.

An Introduction to Bad Sexuality
The beginning of the 21st century is widely seen as a time of great progress for

LGBTQ people. Gay marriage, gay sex, adoption by same sex couples, and gay people
serving in militaries have all been legalized in many countries in the past two decades,
often through the decisions of constitutional courts. A recent U.S. news article
proclaimed that “The Struggle for Gay Rights is Over,” arguing that the U.S. is now in a
“post-gay society” (Kirchick 2019). Yet there is also a strong contemporary movement
to re-criminalize the lives of LGBTQ people, and to remove protections that have been
granted by courts (Krause-Jackson, 2019; Gal & Collman, 2019; Feder 2019). In 2019
alone, Kenya’s high court upheld laws criminalizing gay sex; a new law in Brunei
punishes gay sex with the death penalty; China stopped allowing LGBTQ groups to
freely register as NGOs; there has been major violence by Russian police against LGBTQ
people; several countries in the European Union have removed LGBTQ protections; and
Donald Trump’s administration in the U.S. has worked closely with homophobic groups
and transphobic groups to undo pro-LGBTQ actions of Barak Obama’s presidency (Feder
2019).
Advocates for LGBTQ rights must learn new approaches to counter this global
backlash- and to provide erotic justice to those who never even felt the initial gains.
When sexuality is afforded constitutional protection, it is primarily done under the
umbrellas of freedom of expression, rights to privacy, and dignity rights. This trio of
1

rights has been applied in limited contexts and to a limited class of people, such that
many individuals are still vulnerable to repression by governments and majoritarian
politics- or, in Gayle Rubin’s words, to “erotic injustice” and “sexual oppression” (Rubin
1984, 148). For example, one year after the passage of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers
Act (SESTA)/ Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) in the U.S., voluntary sex
work has become significantly more dangerous while it has become harder for law
enforcement to investigate actual sex trafficking (Markowicz 2019; Gullo and Greene
2019; Roux 2019). In the supposedly ultra-liberal New York City, Black trans women
are arrested every day under laws meant to curb prostitution, for simply “walking while
trans” or being outside wearing skirts, crop tops or leggings or standing on a street not at
a bus stop (McKinley 2019; Assunção 2019). A court decision in California, intended to
combat the over-classification of workers as “independent contractors” without benefits
or job stability, resulted in strip club owners charging dancers steep new fees and
drastically cutting shifts. Hair, makeup and clothing expenses that were all tax-deductible
by the worker have been replaced by an $11 a month “show allowances” paid for by the
club. This has led to debate amongst dancers as to whether they were better off under the
previous exploitative practices and insecurity (Buhl 2019;
https://soldiersofpole.com/misconceptions/). None of the celebrated LGBTQ wins of the
past decade have addressed any of this repression.
In order to truly resist this sexual oppression, we must shift the focus from gay
and cisgender couples, to a wider focus on those who also face injustice stemming from
their sexual acts yet are left out of typical gay rights advocacy. To do so, this dissertation
comparatively analyzes constitutional court decisions on BDSM, strip clubs and nudity in
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public. Protecting a robust spectrum of sexuality and its manifestations can move us
closer to a lasting erotic justice for all.

II.

Erotic Justice

Gender is widely accepted as political. Yet sexuality is also political (Foucault 1978;
Millet 1969; Osmond 1983; Rubin 1984). As Michel Foucault explained in his History of
Sexuality, the Seventeenth Century marked the start of an age of sexual repression that
continues today. Before the 1600’s, sex was marked by censorship. Sex was an area of
silence- not to be named or discussed. Even this prohibition on discussing sex was not
explicitly articulated (Foucault 1978, 17). Over the past three centuries, this drastically
changed. Sex is still restricted, with formal and informal rules dictating where sex can be
talked about, how it can be discussed, and between whom (for example, between students
and teachers in schools or between parents and children). Yet at the same time, since the
18th century there has been a proliferation of specific discourses around sex- all as part of
exercising power. In Foucault’s words, there was “an institutional incitement to speak
about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of agencies of power to
hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly
accumulated detail” (1978, 18 [italics in original]). Under this new impetus, everything
had to be told, under an infinite pressure to tell and re-tell, with no obscurity allowed and
no respite. Foucault’s primary example is the confessional for Catholics, where every sin
of the flesh and every desirous thought had to be laid out in minute details to a priest.
Yet this compulsion to speak every detail of sex, and its accompanying exercises of
power, moved from Christianity into the larger population through the mechanism of the
public interest. In the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, there emerged political,
3

economic and technical incitements to speak about sex. Sex had to be analyzed,
classified, and quantified, all for the public good. The disgust and hesitation to speak
about sex had to be overcome, such that sex could be administered and managed in a
rational manner for the greater good. Sex became a police matter, where sex needed to be
regulated through these useful public discourses. The “population” became an economic
and political problem, with sex at the heart of it. The entire future and fortune of a
country became tied to how every person used their sex. The sexual conduct of the
population therefore needed to be analyzed and intervened with. Sex became a constant
preoccupation, and still is (Foucault 1978, 23-30). Even where it isn’t explicitly spoken
about, sex is always on our minds, as will be seen in the case studies in the following
chapters.
One area in which sex is regulated for the public interest is criminal justice. Before
the Nineteenth century, criminal justice in Western Europe and the United States had
been concerned with major and violent crimes, such as murder. In the middle of the
Nineteenth century, criminal codes in many of these jurisdictions were expanded to
include petty and minor offenses. Such petty offenses included everyday sexuality and
“inconsequential bucolic pleasures,” which became collectively intolerable and
appropriate for judicial (and medical) intervention (Foucault 1978, 31). For example,
many laws against consensual oral and anal sex were passed in the Nineteenth Century,
including the first anti-obscenity law in the United States (Rubin 1984, 144). “Antisodomy” laws remained in effect in many parts of the United States until 2008. Antiobscenity statutes are still the law in the United States, and have been denied protected by
the U.S. Constitution, as discussed in the next chapter. “Sex offender” laws also began to
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be passed- and applied to rapists and to gay people alike (Rubin 1984, 145). As Gayle
Rubin summarized in the 1980’s,
A person is not considered immoral, is not sent to prison, and is not expelled from her
or his family, for enjoying spicy cuisine. But an individual may go through all this
and more for enjoying shoe leather. Ultimately, of what possible social significance is
it if a person likes to masturbate over a shoe? It may even be non-consensual, but
since we do not ask permission of our shoes to wear them, it hardly seems necessary
to obtain dispensation to come on them. . . . There is systematic mistreatment of
individuals and communities on the basis of erotic taste or behaviour. There are
serious penalties for belonging to the various sexual occupational castes. . . . Specific
populations bear the brunt of the current system of erotic power, but their persecution
upholds a system that affects everyone (Rubin 1984, 171).
Alternate sexual practices, labelled as “deviant,” continue to be a cause of alarm for the
United States. Non-marital sex, paid sex, and gay sex have all been alleged in the
Twentieth Century to be linked with a decline in U.S. political power (Rubin 1984, 14648). Further, sexual vices are alleged to lead to other crimes (“secondary effects,” in the
words of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence discussed in Chapter 2). Because of this,
people practicing these perceived vices need to be saved from their own self-destruction,
and it must be ensured that their sexual perversion does not hasten the decline of society.
As such, “victimless” crimes of engaging in cursed sexuality are appropriate for legal
intervention (Rubin 1984, 161). The chapters in this dissertation explore- and confirmhow, despite alleged legal and constitution evolution, today sexuality remains a site of
punishment, justified by appeals to the public interest and exercised through the criminal
justice system.
In order to complete this analysis, this dissertation builds on Rubin’s concept of
how sex operates within this punitive framework through multiple ideological
formations. These formations include sexual essentialism, sex negativity, misplaced
scale, a domino theory of sexual peril, the lack of a concept of benign sexual variation,
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and the hierarchical valuation of sex (Rubin 1984, 150). For Rubin, this hierarchical
ordering of sex occurs through a “Charmed Circle” and its “outer limits,” which positions
specific categories of sex acts within a contemporary and Western hierarchical system.
Within the “charmed circle” is “Good, Normal, Natural, Blessed Sexuality” heterosexual, married, monogamous, procreative, non-commercial, among only two
people, in a relationship, the same age generation, in private, without pornography, using
only bodies, and without BDSM. The “outer limits” of “Bad, Abnormal, Unnatural,
Damned Sexuality” includes sex acts that are homosexual, unmarried, casual,
promiscuous, commercial, alone or in groups, cross generations, in public, with
pornography, with manufactured objects, and sadomasochistic (Rubin 1984, 153; Figure
1).
These hierarchies of sexual value function more like a system of oppression, such
as racism and sexism, than as a true ethics. “Virtue” is granted to privileged groups and
“vice” to groups that lack this access to power (Rubin 1984, 153). Sex is “a vector of
oppression,” where wealth, whiteness, and being cisgender male all mitigate this
oppression. Yet even the most otherwise-privileged people who cross into cursed
sexuality are still sorted, identified, and punished under this system of sexual oppression
(Rubin 1984, 160-61). Sex laws function to oppress and keep in fear those who engage in
bad sex acts. Laws against oral sex, anal sex, gay sex and sex work have rarely been
strictly enforced in any country. Yet people engaging in these criminalized sexual acts
always remain vulnerable to arrest and prosecution, especially in times of social panic.
As Rubin writes, the “occasional arrest for sodomy, lewd behavior, solicitation, or oral
sex keeps everyone else afraid, nervous and circumspect” (1984, 159).
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And while these prosecutions may be few in number during most periods,
penalties for violating sex laws can be incredibly harsh. For example, “sex offenders”
may be subject to public registry and required notification for their entire lives, excluding
them from careers and communities. The severity of these laws is not proportional to the
harm done to others, as is clear from the case of child pornography. As of 2019, people
convicted of solely having child pornography images on their computer- not producing
the images or assaulting or abusing anyone- are sentenced to an average of eight years in
prison in the United States. Indeed, Congress has passed legislation recommending a
mandatory minimum of five-years in prison for anyone who receives or distributes child
pornography, rising to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for someone who has been
convicted of certain sexual offenses in the past or who engages in more than one
violation of the law. This means that in the U.S., people who have child pornography on
their computers serve longer prison sentences than people who actually rape others.
Under the U.S. federal sentencing guidelines, someone with no criminal history who has
a small number of child pornography images in their email and has swapped photos one
time would be recommended for a 15 to 20-year prison sentence. This is contrasted with
someone who actually met a 13-year-old online, enticed her to meet in person, and had
sex with her would qualify for no more than four years in prison (Sullum 2019). Child
pornography laws today confirm Rubin and Foucault’s hypothesis above- sexuality is not
accorded punishment based upon ethical concerns, but because of panics and the use of a
faux sexual ethics to exert power.
Once arrested and charged with crimes, people engaging in bad sex are not
pushed out of view and ignored by courts. Instead, as Foucault hypothesized and the next
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chapters show, these cursed sexual actors are compelled to discuss their crimes in minute
detail to be recorded, adjudicated, and commemorated in jurisprudence. The highest
courts of many countries have studied BDSM and stripping in lengthy and popular
decisions. In these decisions, the court’s published opinions are replete with in-depth
explorations of the “facts” - the specifics of the sex acts engaged in by the defendants,
down to the sandpaper and scrotums, as well as the specific types of pasties and G-strings
exotic dancers in the cases wore. All of these observations were released to the public,
with pronouncements of guilt or innocence. In Foucault’s words, this is “not a movement
to push rude sex back into some obscure and inaccessible region,” but “a process that
spreads it over the surface of things and bodies, arouses it, draws it out and bids it speak;
implants it in reality and enjoins it to tell the truth” (Foucault 1978, 72). As such, the law
functions to produce this sexual stratification of charmed versus cursed sexuality. The
law forces people to identify their bad sexual acts in detail and thereby transform cursed
sexual acts into “dangerous exhibitions,” in the words of a British High Court (R. v.
Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 5, citing Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981]
QB 715).
People engaging in cursed sex acts are marked by their participation in bad sex
acts, often through the construction of their identity as a “pervert” (Beckmann 2009;
Stockton 2011, 388-89; Dollimore 1991). As Lacan explained, one is not a pervert
because they engage in specific sex acts on a regular basis, but because they occupy a
place outside of the location of the favored others. Many of these locations identified by
Lacan are on the outside of Rubin’s Charmed Circle and form the subjects of this
dissertation, including fetishism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and BDSM (Lacan 1956,
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Seminar IV).1 This construction of sexual deviants as “perverts” coincided with the 19th
century changes to how sex was used within frames of power discussed above (Foucault
1978, 118-119). Engaging in activities outside of the charmed circle leads to the
assignment or assumption of other identities- for example prostitute, sex worker, lesbian
or pedophile. As such, although this dissertation is primarily concerned with specific sex
acts, the identities that are constructed at least in part based upon engaging in those acts
will also be discussed.

Figure 1. The sex hierarchy: the charmed circle v. the outer limits (Rubin 1984, 153)

Classification as a pervert is not limited to sexual actors. See, for example, Jabir Puar’s (2007)
discussion of the terrorist as a pervert.
1
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Further, one act (or identity) moving into the Charmed Circle does not
deconstruct the sexual hierarchy or aid in resistance to this hierarchical structuring
overall. As Rubin noted even in 1984, presaging Obergefell v. Hodges by over 30 years,
some homosexual acts may have been allowed to cross over to the “Good” side of the
Charmed Circle. Yet in order to be accorded the benefits of blessed sexuality, these
homosexual acts must also be coupled, monogamous, of the same generation, etc. (Rubin
1984, 152). The recent admission of some homosexual acts to the charmed circle has
largely been through the legalization of same-sex marriage. Although gay marriage has
now, by many accounts, moved into the charmed circle, the hierarchy and division
between bad and good sexuality has not broken down (Spade & Wilse, 2013). If
anything, the circle has been reinforced: now that “everyone” (with everyone meaning
adult, not-related, couplings of two people) can get married in the U.S., those who do not
are further subject to penalization, as discussed in depth in Chapter 4. Those who marry
are rewarded with literally thousands of government benefits, including health insurance,
tax breaks and legal immigration. People who organize their relationships, families, and
sex life outside of marriage do not get any of these awards, and are instead stigmatized
and criminalized for their bad sex (see Ghosh 2018, 278, citing Warner 1999; Yoshino
2002; Young 1990; Fraser 1995; Ghosh 2013).
This critique of marriage is part of a larger criticism of assimilationist politics
offered by queer theory. Queer theory has long been attuned to how “normifying” one
sexual act or identity further marginalizes those who have not or cannot join into the
charmed circle (Ghosh 2018, 276-77, using Erving Goffman’s 1963 term). Among queer
theory’s foundational principles is a resistance to allowing governments to give
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legitimacy and respectability to the sexual practices of some but not of others. As
discussed above, sexual “morality” is a cover for regulating sexual acts. Because of this,
visions of sexual justice should center those who do not or cannot assimilate, “by
considering the unrecognized dignity of these out-casts, the ways of living they represent,
and the hierarchies of abjection that make them secondary, invisible, or deviant” (Warner
1999, 88-89). This dissertation largely affirms queer theory’s suspicion of assimilationist
politics. As the next chapters show, rejecting demands to assimilate into the realm of
“blessed” sex acts comes with severe consequences, including legal ones (Foucault 1978,
38-39; Rubin 2007, 144-48; Chan 2010, 303). Comparative constitutional law on
marriage and sex has been to the benefit of people who want to and can be part of the
charmed inner circle, and to the detriment of those who cannot or do not. As such, this
dissertation interrogates whether and how sexuality can be liberated at least in part
through the law, without assimilation.
This dissertation focuses on three contexts in which “bad” sex acts have led to
legal consequences: erotic dancing, nudity in public (often associated with paid sexual
activity) and BDSM. As the cases studied in the next chapters show, these three areas
cross into the outer limits in multiple ways, as they each involve acts that are not
monogamous, not married, not-procreative, for money, not coupled, casual, crossgenerational, not at home, with manufactured objects, and/or involving BDSM. As such,
the areas threaten blessed sexuality at many points. In the “struggle over where to draw
the line” between good and bad sex acts, these areas are often seen as the worst and are
furthest away from being let into the charmed circle (Rubin 1984, 154; Figure 2). Instead
of “major areas of contest,” like unmarried straight couples or committed gay couples,
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these areas involving fetishes and money are “way out” from healthy and normal
sexuality. They have also long been the subject of regulation and criminalization in
many countries.

Figure 2. The sex hierarchy: the struggle over where to draw the line (Rubin 1984, 154)
The regulation of BDSM, exotic dancing and nudity in public has often been
through the state’s use of police powers, in particular through appeals to public health,
morals and decency. In the U.S., state regulations have long been used to target sex
workers and LGBTQ people (Goluboff 2016, 147-150). Nineteenth century vagrancy
laws, for example, were used in the U.S. to regulate sexuality and women’s ability to be
in public spaces at all. Any women who did not (or could not, in the case of working
class and minority women) stay out of public spaces were policed by vagrancy laws.
These vagrancy laws treated as a “prostitute” and/or “lewd” any woman who danced
nude or who “roam[ed] the country . . . with a man who was not her husband.” An
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exchange of money for sex was not required for a charge of prostitution - instead, as a
1943 U.S. case stated, “the law defines a prostitute to be a female given to indiscriminate
lewdness” (Goluboff 2016, 151). Even in the 1960’s, it remained a crime in some U.S.
places to be a “woman of notorious character” and walk or ride on a street in the city
(Goluboff 2016, 151). Today, the vast majority of sex-work related arrests in New York
City are not for trading sex for money, but “loitering for the purpose of prostitution.”
Under this law, Black women, and especially Black trans women, are frequently arrested
for being outdoors in certain neighborhoods, and wearing things like “skirts” or “crop
tops” as proof of their prostitutory purpose (Goldberg 2019; McKinley 2019).
Examining “cursed” sexuality in the context of regulations that punish actors in
this area can lead to a more inclusive paradigm of erotic justice in two important ways.
Firstly, centering people on the margins who are multiply oppressed within an area is an
important tool in achieving justice. Looking to the margins, instead of the center, allows
for new theories of change based upon the lived experiences of those with less privilege
and more sites of oppression. Marginality gives a special vantage point, that can used to
criticize dominant hegemonies and to create “counter-hegemonies” (hooks 1984, 13-15).
Second, as discussed above in the context of gay marriage, when the charmed
circle admits one aspect of sexuality, it reinforces hierarchy and compounds division for
all those on their respective sides. Take Lawrence v. Texas, for example. After this U.S.
Supreme Court decision struck down anti-sodomy laws in 2003, states did not stop
policing gay sex. Instead, states turned to adultery laws to continue its regulation and
discipline of cursed sexuality (Kunzel 2011, 157). Anti-trafficking laws, often enacted
with the goal of protecting people from horrifying abuses that occur in many employment
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areas, are routinely used to police those outside of the charmed circle – as we see with the
over-policing of Black trans women discussed above or the arrests of the founders of
Rentboy.com, a social networking site that connected male sex workers with potential
male clients and promoted safer-sex (Vance 2011; Duggan 2016). Thus, only through
considering the entire circle of sexuality, and through paying particular attention to the
outer circle, can a liberatory erotic justice be achieved in a meaningful way for anyone.
Indeed, the goal of this dissertation echoes Gayle Rubin’s own political aim- in her
words, “the pressing task of creating an accurate, humane and genuinely liberatory body
of thought about sexuality” (1984, 148). How to achieve this liberatory body of thought,
and of law, about sexuality will be the subject of this dissertation.

III.

The Feminist Debates on Sex
That feminism has an intimate and debated relationship with sex should not be

surprising. As Rubin notes, “much of the oppression of women is borne by, mediated
through, and constituted within, sexuality” (1984, 173-74). Indeed, since the mid 1960s,
conflicts over sexuality, particularly among those identifying as feminists, have been
prominent in the United States. Reaching their height in the “sex-wars” of the mid 1970’s
to mid 1980’s, bitter political battles over sexuality played out in arenas of regulating
pornography, the scope of legal protections for lesbian and gay communities and people,
the funding of “obscene” art, safe-sex education (particularly as it related to AIDS
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prevention), sexual abuse of children in churches and day care, and teaching about sex in
public school (Duggan 1995, 1-2).2
However, far from an isolated decade of “sex panics,” divisions over sexuality
within feminism began in the nineteenth century and continue now, although the issues
panicked over have (in some, but not all cases) changed.3 The issues of power, violence,
danger, pleasure, representation, consent, agency, autonomy, and diversity debated by
feminists amongst themselves in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, and brought to the
mass media and high-visibility electoral and judicial politics in the mid 1970’s through
the mid 1980’s, continue to this day in debates on gay marriage, the developments and
contributions of queer thinking, and transnational efforts around the “trafficking” of
women. (Hunter 2005, 15, 26-28; Duggan 2006, xiv-xv; Rubin 2007).
Indeed, as part of larger processes of globalization and neoliberalism, the 2000’s
saw a wide-spread exportation of U.S.-style “feminist” politics across the world,
facilitating the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism and imperialism, and often with
devastating consequences for women, in particular women of color and women from the
Global South (Duggan 2006, xiii; Eisenstein 2009, 196-97; Fraser 2009).4 In particular,
the U.S.-developed feminist tenet that equates paid work outside the home with liberation
for women has been used to eviscerate state-led development and social welfare
2

Although the majority of literature discussing feminist divisions over sexuality poses the issue
as two distinct and oppositional camps, feminist and queer theorizations on this topic are often
more nuanced than binary “pro” or “anti” sex positions (Murphy 2010).
3
For a detailed timeline of the sex panics within feminism and mainstream United States, see
Nan D. Hunter, “Contextualizing the Sexuality Debates: A Chronology 1966-2005,” in Sex Wars:
Sexual Dissent and Political Culture (New York: Routledge, orig. 1995, 10th anniversary edition
2006), 15-27.
4
As Lisa Duggan discerningly noted in 2006, “[a]s neoliberal policies have widened the political
and economic gaps between rich and poor, empowered and marginalized, gains for the few have
increasingly meant losses for the many” (Duggan 2006, xiii).
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programs, while at the same time being a powerful tool for corporations seeking (and
seeking to justify) cheap labor (Eisenstein 2009, 133). In such ways, the women’s
movement, often with the consent and participation of those who describe themselves as
“feminists,” benefits white middle and upper class women in the Global North, while at
the same time removing state protections for women of color and women of the Global
South and instead forcing them into exploitative labor conditions (Eisenstein 2009, 1516). In the realm of debates over sexuality, anti-pornography and anti-prostitution
arguments have been transported into global contexts by “anti-trafficking” activists
(Duggan 2006, xiv).
Although the tensions within feminism have been varied, and many facets of
sexuality debated, the most public and bitter divide has been over sexual materials
deemed “pornographic.”5 On this issue, Duggan and Hunter’s Sex Wars anthology is
representative of pro-sex feminists in arguing that pornography should not be seen as a
single, unified patriarchal discourse with a singular misogynistic impact. Instead, pro-sex
feminists argue that the sexual representations referred to as “pornography” carry
multiple meanings, which may contradict each other, and are dependent upon context
(see e.g. Duggan 1996, 6). Not only are the meanings “elastic,” so too is pornography’s
reception dependent upon complicated and unpredictable uses by a variety of audiences
(including women) (Duggan 1996, 7). This complexity and uncertainty is increased by
the many possibilities for (re)appropriation. In short, “pornography” does not only tell
one story, and it does not only tell it to men.
5

For a summary of the 1980s U.S. feminist pornography debates see Carol Vance, “More danger,
More Pleasure: A Decade after the Barnard Sexuality Conference,” in Vance, Carol S. (ed).
Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (London: Pandora Press, 1992): xvi- xxxix.
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Further, pro-sex/anti-censorship feminists argue that anti-pornography rhetoric
itself constructs gender, portraying “potentially violent, dominant men and subordinated,
silenced women” (Duggan 1996, 7). In this way, it has been argued that antipornography feminists further entrench a rigid gender binary system, in which all women
are passive victims and all men are active aggressors.
One last concept from Duggan and Hunter’s Sex Wars anthology, central to their
analysis and to this dissertation’s, is that of “sexual dissent,” which for them “invokes a
unity of speech, politics and practices, and forges a connection among sexual
expressions, oppositional politics, and claims to public space” (Duggan 1995, 5). For
Duggan, sexual representations do not merely reflect pre-existing identities, but can
themselves construct identities. In this way, public expression of sexuality is a political
act, and regulating/restricting these expressions are forms of political repression (1995,
5). Therefore, Duggan’s strategy becomes one of advocating for expanding the right to
“sexual dissent,” as opposed to appeals for protecting privacy or ending discrimination
(Ibid.). Through this framework, Duggan sees the work of anti-pornography feminists,
and their alliances with conservative groups, as “political repression masquerading as a
safety patrol” (1996, 10). To that end, Hunter argues that we should move away from
invoking concepts of identity, privacy, and equality and instead focus on defending the
right to public political sexual expression (Hunter 1993). Although this move to
protecting sex as expression has promise, Chapter 2 explains how appeals to sex-asspeech have failed to counter sexual repression.
Another method for navigating the tensions raised by sexuality for feminism is
through a framework of pleasure and danger. Arising from a conference held at Barnard
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College in 1982, and edited by Carol S. Vance into the volume Pleasure and Danger:
Exploring Female Sexuality, the concepts of “sexual pleasure” and “sexual danger” work
towards a political understanding of sexuality which acknowledges the patriarchal
structures that cause sexuality to be a domain of restriction, repression, oppression,
violence, exploitation, coercion and danger for women, while also recognizing the
exploration, pleasure, intimacy, connection, satisfaction and agency that can also be part
of sexuality.
Working from the premise that anti-pornography feminism of the time had
developed a thorough critique of the dangers of sexuality, this conference and the
resulting papers, poems and images sought to expand the analysis of sexual pleasure, by
looking to women’s sexual experiences of pleasure and to the ways in which patriarchy
restricts women’s sexuality and causes sexuality (outside of circumscribed areas of “safe
sexuality” such as within marriage) to be seen as so dangerous. This dissertation follows
Vance’s call to “put forward a politics that resists deprivation and supports pleasure”
(Vance 1992, 23)

IV.

Comparative Constitutional Law and Core Constitutional Values
Comparative constitutional law, as a tool of interpreting and understanding

constitutional systems and the norms such systems are based and develop upon, is a
rapidly growing discipline within the United States and globally (Rosenfeld and Sajó
2012, 1-3). Comparative constitutional law has many uses for law makers, including as
an aid in creating and revising constitutions, and for scholars, including classificatory
work, historical work, self-reflection, and a search for universal or transferable principles
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of justice (Rosenfeld and Sajó 2012, 9-10; Rosenfeld 2012, 39-40; Jackson 2012; 54-55,
62). There are three main techniques for these constitutional comparisons: (1) detailed
case studies, (2) large-N studies, and (3) “conceptual functionalism,” which involves
theoretical inquiry into how and why an issue is raised and resolved in particular contexts
(Jackson 2012, 62-63). This dissertation primarily uses detailed case studies along with
conceptual functionalism to make its normative claims.
As a very brief note on constitutions and constitutionalism, constitutions are
conventionally understood as a “higher law,” which in varying ways is harder to alter
than other laws. Constitutions cannot typically be amended by a simple majority vote,
while a simple majority can change and revisit other types of law (Holmes 2012, 189191; Klein & Sajó 2012, 420-1). Although constitutions can also be methods of forming
new governments and ascribing goals for such governments (Holmes 2012, 189), this
project focuses on how constitutions and constitutional law limit the government and
provide rights for the people (often referred to in the U.S. as “civil liberties” and “civil
rights,” respectively) (Brettschneider 2013). Comparative constitutional law often sees
its units of analysis as “constitutional polities” (as opposed to countries) to recognize that
in our era of transnationalism and globalization, constitutional systems are not limited to
nation-states. For example, the European Convention of Human Rights and the UN
Charter may be sources of constitutional principles, and there are ongoing debates over
the internationalization of constitutional law (Chang and Yeh 2012), the European
Union’s unresolved constitution (Walker 2012), the constitutionalization of public
international law (de Wet 2012), and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights (Spielmann 2012).
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Whether foreign law should be relied upon by domestic courts in their
constitutional adjudication at all is controversial (see Khosla 2011, 910 fn 2 and
accompanying text, citing to major recent scholarship). Even for those who see validity in
considering foreign jurisprudence, issues of how to use case law of other countries, as
well as what cases to look to, remain. Thus far, most focus in this relatively new
discipline has been on Western liberal democracies (Khosla 2011, 911; Rosenfeld 2016,
275-276; Hirschl 2014). As discussed below, the Indian Supreme Court’s Naz
Foundation decision, in which laws against homosexuality were found unconstitutional,
is remarkable in that the Court relied on a wide range of jurisdictions, including Fiji and
Nepal, two areas routinely ignored by comparative constitutionalists (Khosla 2011, 911).
This dissertation follows this method of including the jurisprudence of non-Western
democracies in comparatively examining sexuality and constitutions, focusing on India
and South Africa, in addition to Canada and Great Britain. As discussed in the next
chapters, Canadian jurisprudence has been included here because of the striking
differences to U.S. law, and because the South African Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court of India have both extensively considered U.S. and Canadian case law in
determining the reach of their own constitutions. Canadian and South African courts
have also issued “widely acclaimed contemporary constitutional jurisprudence,” which
justifies extra attention to these jurisdictions (Rosenfeld 2016, 275).
A proper focus of comparative constitutional law is not only descriptive but also
prescriptive: What should judges be doing? Comparative constitutional law helps answer
the question of how judges can dispense justice - what are the range of available concepts
that may be relied upon, what has worked in other polities, lessons to learn from what has
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not worked, and how concepts can be differently understood to increase the chances that
justice may be achieved (Rosenfeld 2016, 278).
Privacy, liberty, dignity, equality, autonomy and freedom of speech are core
values within most constitutional systems (Barendt 2012; Espinosa 2012; Baer 2012;
Mahlmann 2012). These concepts are often referred to as “fundamental rights,” along
with freedom of religion (Rosenfeld & Sajó 2012, 21). Yet the meanings of each of these
concepts vary between (and occasionally within) their jurisdictions, and no single
definition can be identified for each of these concepts (Baer 2009, 418).
For example, what is entailed by a “right to privacy” varies greatly by location,
and is particularly difficult to define as it reflects a nation’s politics and culture (Cornell
2016, A.1(1), B. 7-8). Some constitutions explicit protect privacy (e.g. Israel, Costa Rica,
Spain, Sweden and South Africa), while other constitutional systems protect privacy
through other enumerated rights (such as “liberty” in the United States, a combination of
“human dignity” and “freedom of personality” in Germany, and through criminal
protections, “security of the person” and “informational privacy” in Canada) (Cornell
2016, D.13, 15-18).
“Dignity” is similarly resistant to uniform definition, while at the same time
“central for the contemporary architecture of human rights” (Mahlmann 2012, 371; Rao
2011, 185-86; Moore & Rodman 2019, 6-7; Daly 2013, 2-8; Waldron 2012, 201-05).
Like privacy, some constitutions explicitly name dignity as a protected area - mostly
those enacted after World War II and that are based upon the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, including Germany, Spain, South Africa, India and Mexico (Mahlmann
2012, 371-373; Shulztiner & Carmi 2014, 461). Other countries have found dignity rights
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through case law, such as the United States (Moore & Rodman 2019, 2; Henry 2011,
169). Constitutional jurisprudence on dignity displays many different conceptual
understandings and - as discussed in Chapter 4, has been used to limit access to justice in
several countries (Shulztiner & Carmi 2014, 483-489). From this, comparative
constitutional scholars have concluded that “there seems to be a widespread need for a
bundle of the same rights across constitutional cultures and a different treatment of these
rights depending on the particulars of each of the constitutional cultures involved”
(Rosenfeld & Sajó 2012, 21).
In addition to inconsistent definitions, courts use these concepts in different
relations to each other. Comparative constitutional scholarship has long been concerned
with how these concepts interact with each other when used by Courts. For example,
Susanne Baer, a judge on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, concludes from
her study of comparative constitutional decisions that courts often see liberty and equality
as opposites of each other. These courts also see dignity as either an abstract concept or
very narrowly, as only guaranteeing freedom from extreme abuse. Because of this, liberty
or equality compete as the “winner” in cases, with dignity too vague or narrow to be of
practical use (Baer 2009). As a corrective, Baer suggests that the relationship between
liberty, equality and dignity should be re-imagined by Courts. Dignity should be given a
robust meaning, as a right to respect or to equal recognition. Dignity, liberty and equality
should then all be stood as complementary values, which can work together to address
the complexities of real-life cases and lead to more-just decisions (Baer 2009, 418-421).
This dissertation takes up Baer’s call for a holistic understanding of values, and looks to
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the public, the private, liberty, dignity, equality and autonomy not as opposites, but as
values that can work together in the pursuit of erotic justice.

V.

Outline of Chapters
The following chapters proceed by each considering the promises and dangers of

relying on different conceptual methods in the project of combatting sexual repression
through the law. The first concept that I interrogate is that of “privacy,” in chapter two.
To guide my analysis, I consider two alternate conceptions of privacy: (1) a classic view
of privacy as based upon a strict separation between private and public spaces and (2) a
liberal-feminist interpretation of privacy in which the default state of individuals is in a
private domain, regardless of where they physically are or what they are doing. In this
latter view, individuals only move into the public (and therefore only lose rights to
privacy) when they choose to cause harm.
First examining U.S. constitutional case law on anti-sodomy laws, abortion, birth
control and same-sex marriage, I conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned
from both the classic and agential views of privacy. However, regardless of which
conception of privacy relied upon, I argue that U.S. constitutional jurisprudence has
found blessed sex acts as the exclusive sites for privacy protections, and has excluded sex
acts in the outer limits of the charmed circle from legal protection.
Turning to privacy case law in the uncharmed area of BDSM, and considering
decisions from the U.S. and England, chapter two argues that these decisions have largely
relied on agential privacy conceptions. Under this liberal-feminist view of privacy, we
would expect the expansive protection of people in their lives so long as they do not
cause harm. However, in applying this promising premise to cases involving BDSM,
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English and U.S. courts routinely make conclusory and vague findings of “harm” without
any evidence and determine that these baseless harms are sufficient to remove any
privacy rights. As such, I conclude that both agential and classical views of privacy can
lead to punitive demonization of marginal sexualities. Both models of privacy have, in
practice, provided only tenuous protections, which are contingent on already being a part
of the charmed circle.
I then turn to freedom of expression as a possible alternate source of erotic justice.
Analyzing case law from the U.S., Canada, and South Africa, chapter three looks to laws
against nudity in public, including where these regulations affect exotic dancers and other
sex workers. Although freedom of expression in public places is often seen as the most
fundamental of rights for every person, I conclude that public nudity case law affords
protection only for those who perform good sexuality in public. Despite espousing broad
commitments to protecting speech, and explicitly including act done for money within its
ambit of valued expression, in practice U.S. courts deny this protection to non-blessed
actors. This is done via ambiguous appeals to “morality” and “social order.” Canadian
case law, on the other hand, is explicit in its view that non-normative sexuality should not
be protected. In Canada, public nudity is not protected if it is “commercial,” “exceeds
community standards of tolerance,” or causes “harm.” Harm in the Canadian context
includes “degradation of women,” and a woman can constitutionally be arrested for
degrading herself. Lastly, I look to South African jurisprudence, which itself studied
these U.S. and Canadian public nudity cases. The South African Constitutional Court
concluded that the tensions in these opinions are due to unstated desires to regulate sex
workers, through facially neutral laws against nudity. Although providing a valuable
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analysis, the South African Constitutional Court did not advance its own affirmative
theory of what protections should exist for exotic dancers, once the façade has been
removed. Although none of these jurisdictions has protected disfavored sexuality as a
form of expression, I argue that the U.S. recognition of “emotive force” as a reason to
protect a specific act as expressive provides a possibility for courts seeking to protect
sexuality in the future.
I examine dignity as a final concept that may protect bad sex acts in ways that
privacy and expression have not, analyzing decisions from the U.S. and India. Dignity
does not have a singular established meaning. Within the U.S., the term has been
frequently used in Supreme Court cases on sex acts and LGBTQ rights, even though it
does not appear in the U.S. Constitution. I argue that the U.S. use of dignity is deeply
problematic, in that dignity is used as equivalent to state recognition. This move allows
the government to exercise greater power over disfavored sexual actors, while
simultaneously eliding its responsibility to address the structural problems that LGBTQ
people and others engaged in bad sex acts in the U.S. actually face. Unlike the U.S.,
Indian case law articulates a robust concept of dignity that explicitly sees dignity as
related to privacy and expression. Citing to a wide range of sources including domestic
law, foreign law, treaties, queer theory and subaltern studies, Indian jurisprudence
develops protections that are intended to extend to disfavored sex acts and to be used to
dismantle hierarchical social systems. This robust protection and respect for minorities
announced by India’s Supreme Court conflicts in practice with the government’s long
history of and present repression of those outside of the dominant culture. Yet considered
as a text released by a country’s highest court, this jurisprudence, with its openness to a
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wide range of legal and theoretical sources and its centering of those outside of a
charmed circle of sexuality, could be a model for other polities.
In sum, and as predicted by sexuality and queer theorists, legal cases focusing on
those whose sexuality is blessed has left disfavored sexuality open to repression.
Constitutional guarantees meant to extend to all persons have only protected those least
in need of protection. Yet by identifying constitutional concepts that center and protect
bad sex, it is my hope that this dissertation will be able to provide courts with the tools to
help achieve erotic justice through the law.
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CHAPTER 2:
SEX/LIBERTY: THE PROMISE AND DANGER OF PRIVACY

I.

An Introduction to Privacy and Sexual Laws
A major project of the U.S. feminist movement (particularly from the 1970s to

1990s) has been challenging the distinction between private and public (see e.g.
Mackinnon 1989; Zimbalist Rosaldo & Lamphere 1974; Gavison 1992; Olsen 1993;
Elshtain 1993). This feminist task of highlighting the inequality and oppression produced
by allowing people to “make their own decisions in private” without interference is
echoed in the political left’s general unease with the private sphere.
Many on the left, especially since the Twentieth Century in the United States,
have been critical of “the private” for many reasons. Concerns have included the
concentrations of power in private hands, in part because of mass accumulations of
private property; preferences for universalism (where privacy was seen as parochial and
pre-modern); the view of matters discussed in secret as illegitimate (e.g. the Vietnam
War); and a general view that matters in public view are more democratic, fair, equal, and
accountable (Wolfe 1997, 188-189).
Some persons on the liberal left do argue for private legal protections in specific
contexts - notably freedom of speech and conscience, and the framing of many legal
decisions protecting reproductive and sexual rights as rights to privacy (Wolfe 1997,
190). As discussed below, Roe v. Wade, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Griswold v. Connecticut,
Lawrence v. Texas, and Obergefell v. Hodges - the U.S. Supreme Court’s major cases
protecting birth control, abortion, gay sex and gay marriage - all find the root of their
protections in Constitutional guarantees of privacy. Yet many prominent judges and
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scholars have argued that privacy was the wrong basis for these decisions, which would
have been better based on ideas of equality, personal autonomy, or anti-slavery
Constitutional doctrines (see Wolfe 1997, 191-192 n. 26, citing works by Ruth Bader
Ginsgberg, Kathryn H. Snedaker, Andrew Koppelman, and Jean Cohen).
For example, U.S. Supreme Court judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued a decade
before being appointed to the Supreme Court that Roe v. Wade’s focus on a “medical
autonomy” view fueled the anti-abortion movement (Ginsburg 1985). Roe v. Wade
located constitutional protection for abortion in a right to privacy and in a liberty interest
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Because Roe’s mandate is protected
under this guarantee of liberty, a government complies with the Constitution as long as it
does not actively intrude. The government does not need to affirmatively help people
have abortions, because abortions are an area of privacy from the government. Ginsburg
argues that had the U.S. Supreme Court focused on equality of women (or a broader view
of autonomy, as “woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course . . ., her ability to
stand in relation to man, society and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal
citizen”), then the decision would have been much less controversial and would have led
to better access to abortion for women (Ginsburg 1985, 383).
Other feminist legal critiques of privacy rely on the assumption that privacy is
aligned with what I, following Daniela Gobetti, call the Aristotelian view, often
unquestionably repeated and assumed in western political thought, that private versus
public can be reduced to a strict division between two domains: the private household and
the public body politic (Gobetti 1997, 104). This critique has some merit, since as
described further below, privacy in the law is often found in physical places (like the
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marital bedroom) or in discrete areas of non-political activity (like marriage, child
rearing, contraception, procreation and education). These discrete areas where privacy
rights have been found map onto the charmed circle of sex acts, especially the focus on
married couples who are procreative. However, privacy can also be conceptualized
within modern political and legal theory in an alternate way. This alternate view of
privacy focuses not on places or areas to be protected, but on agency. In this view, the
default is that individuals are in a private domain, regardless of where they physically are
or what they are doing. Individuals only move into the public when they choose to cause
harm (Gobetti 1997, 106).
Using the metaphor of a bubble, Daniela Gobetti traces the development of
natural law/rights theory from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. Gobetti’s
analysis shows how Locke’s work in particular operates to insulate every individual’s
private domain. According to this approach, a privacy bubble follows every individual
around, wherever the person goes. Individuals’ bubbles interact, overlap, and grow as
they form relationships. The bubble may only be punctured when harm is threatened or
done, and can be recreated once the harm is repaired or the hurter has compensated the
injured party. Further, harm can only be done intentionally - after an actor who is capable
of assessing risks decides whether or not to injure. How easily the privacy bubble may
be permeated depends on how broadly one conceives “harm” (e.g. as physical harm for
Locke, or psychological harm for J.S. Mill). In sum, under this alternate
conceptualization of privacy in modern political theory, the private domain is every act a
person engages in, so long as they do not choose acts that harm others - and it is this
expansion of the private domain that is truly a defining trait of modern liberal society
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(Gobetti 1997, 124-25).6 As developed below in the context of case studies, this
ambulatory and agential view of privacy, focused not on discrete areas that need to be
pre-approved by a Court or in literal private spaces, could be part of a feminist recovery
of sexual privacy law. However, the cases below reveal that in practice this shift to a
more expansive understanding of privacy has not brought us closer to erotic justice.
Section II looks to U.S. constitutional law around sex acts and rights to privacy,
focusing on the Substantive Due Process jurisprudence developed in the Supreme Courts’
constitutional adjudication of anti-sodomy laws, abortion, birth control and same-sex
marriage. The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in these cases has come from both an
Aristotelian and an ambulatory view of privacy. In the case of the former, the Court’s
focus on privacy as something that occurs within the charmed circle (like marriage and
procreation) and in physical private spaces (like marital bedrooms) has led to protections
of blessed sex acts, and excluded sex acts from the outer limits of the charmed circle.
Even when using a more ambulatory view of privacy in recent decisions, the Supreme
Court stressed that the protections it identified were only within the context of marriage.
Thus, in knocking down laws against gay sex and same-sex marriage, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence has in effect reinscribed sexual oppression.
Section III moves to cases on sex acts outside of the charmed circle. The section
comparatively analyzes case law in England and the United States, in a distinctly
uncharmed area: BDSM. This analysis shows that appeals to privacy within BDSM
jurisprudence have also served to reinforce oppression of disfavored sex acts, while
protecting already-favored acts. Each of the major cases in England formally announce a
6

The bubble may also be permeated in so far as an individual required to care for the common
good (Gobetti 1997, 124-25).
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potential privacy right that might protect cursed sex acts, including ambulatory views of
privacy divorced from place and subject area. Yet in practice, privacy only functions to
protect sex acts that occur within the charmed circle. The most baseless findings of public
harm are sufficient to remove any privacy rights that might have protected those engaged
in non-normative sexuality. Only those in married, monogamous, heterosexual
relationships have found any success in claims for sexual privacy in English and U.S.
case law. As such, cases on BDSM in England and the U.S. show that the ambulatory
and agential view of privacy can be as prone to punitive demonization of marginal
sexualities as the Aristotelean spatial model.
This Chapter therefore concludes that although privacy could be a source of
protection for sex acts, in practice privacy rights are stripped in the face of unsupported
claims to individual and public harm. In practice, privacy only functions to protect
uncharmed sex acts when they occur within situations that are otherwise charmed - and
most notably within the context of marriage. Comparing U.S. cases on sex acts within the
charmed circle to cases on BDSM from England and the U.S. shows that both models of
privacy have, in practice, provided only tenuous protections contingent on already being
a part of the charmed circle.

II.

Sex & Liberty in the United States
Protections for sexual acts in the United States have been grounded in substantive

due process jurisprudence and developed through the Supreme Court’s constitutional
adjudication of anti-sodomy laws, abortion, birth control and same-sex marriage.
Deriving from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no state shall deprive a person
of “life, liberty or property without due process of law,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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modern substantive due process jurisprudence asserts that this “liberty” includes certain
rights to “privacy,” also phrased as a freedom from unwarranted governmental
interference. These “rights to privacy” have mainly developed in the context of cases
focusing on the legality of birth control (e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) and restrictions on abortion (Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___ (2016)).
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified two such rights to liberty protected by the
due process clause: decisional autonomy and bodily integrity. As discussed in detail
below, within U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, “decisional autonomy” protects certain
major life decisions, which should be made without governmental interference and has
been interpreted to include decisions such as whom to marry (Loving v. Virginia, 338
U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)), whether to
have a child (Roe v. Wade, as “re-affirmed” by Planned Parenthood v. Casey), and who
one has sexual relations with (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558), while “bodily integrity”
refers to the right to make major decisions about one’s body without governmental
interference, and has been interpreted to protect certain rights to be free from undue
burdens on access to an abortion (e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey) - although in the
case of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court declined to extend the “right to
bodily integrity” to an individual’s decision to end one’s life, (Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
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Lawrence v. Texas, and the Court’s gloss on this case in Obergefell v. Hodges,
clarifies where and how the U.S. Supreme Court finds liberty rights related to same-sex
sexual conduct, in ways that both hold promise for protecting other types of sexual acts,
and also further exclude this protection. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled its
prior case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), holding that a Texas anti“sodomy” law that criminalized sexual relations between people of the same sex violated
a constitutionally-protected right to privacy. While holding that privacy has a tangible
spatial dimension, in which consenting adults are protected in literal “private” spaces like
a bedroom, the Court held that the type of decisional autonomy protected by the U.S.
Constitution includes a more “transcendent” dimension, in which the autonomy of the
self to engage in certain “intimate” conduct is protected - “an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex” (539 U.S. at 558).
Additionally, the Lawrence Court noted that “[t]he condemnation [of homosexual
conduct] has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family” and that “for many persons these are not
trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives” (539
U.S. at 521). Yet the Court continued that “[t]hese considerations do not answer the
question before us,” as the “issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State
to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law” and
the Court’s “‘obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code’” (539 U.S. at 521, citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). Instead,
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the Court looked to one’s right to define one’s own life, holding that who one has sex
with is part of one’s personhood and identity in the world (539 U.S. at 558). At this most
abstract level, although it excluded non-adults outright, the majority opinion in Lawrence
would seem to protect other sex acts outside of the charmed circle. Cursed sexuality
might be protected under Lawrence’s rationale because the Court argues that majority
determinations of what is “bad” cannot be a legitimate basis for regulating sexual acts.
Therefore, in so far as the disapproval of some cursed sex acts (like inter-generational
sex, casual sex and sex with manufactured objects) is based solely on societal
disapproval, reading Lawrence at an abstract level might signify that these damned sex
acts deserve constitutional protection.
Indeed, in countering the Court’s argument from Bowers that there was a long
history of criminalizing same-sex “sodomy” in the U.S., the Court in Lawrence went so
far as to address histories of sexuality, noting that “[t]he absence of legal prohibitions
focusing on homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to
some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not
emerge until the late 19th Century” (539 U.S. at 568).7 Instead, the Court argued that antisodomy laws in the early U.S. were directed to both straight and gay acts, and that such
laws were meant mostly to prohibit “predatory acts against those who could not or did
not consent” but would not have been considered “rape,” including forceful acts between
adults, acts on minors by adults, and sex between men and animals (539 U.S. at 519-520).

Citing J. Katz, The Invention of Heterosexuality (1995) and J. D’Emilio & E. Freedman,
Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (2d ed. 1997), the Lawrence Court noted that
“the modern terms homosexuality and heterosexuality do not apply to an era that had not yet
articulated these distinctions.”
7
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However, despite the exciting avenues opened by the Court in some of its more
grandiose statements on sexual tolerance, the Lawrence opinion also produces and
reinforces a sexual hierarchy, through its emphasis on protected areas and places. The
Court explicitly ties its protections to persons in marriage-like relationships (committed,
non-casual, coupled), whose actual sex acts are also in their private homes. The majority
of the Court characterizes the Texas law anti-sodomy law as “touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home”
(539 U.S. at 558). The majority opinion opined that sex is not just “sex,” but conduct
which is one element in a bond that is more “enduring” (539 U.S. at 558). The Court
repeatedly referred to sex as “intimate conduct” (539 U.S. at 562, 567 and 605). In its
holding, the majority opinion wrote that
adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice. Id. at 567.
Because of this focus on intimate sex in committed relationships and in homes, Lawrence
allows certain homosexuals engaged in certain acts (i.e. couples, in private) to be let into
the charmed circle. As such, Lawrence firmly entrenches its view of privacy into subject
area (“enduring” marriage-like relationships) and physical spaces (“their homes”).
Following from Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s recent decision on same-sex
marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), held that substantive due process
guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that
analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex
couples. The Obergefell Court’s reasoning shows a move from subject matter and
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location-based privacy, to a more agential view of privacy as something that all
individuals carry around them in the many interactions of their daily lives. However,
despite this move to a more expansive form of privacy, the decision ultimately
participates in the production and exclusion of disfavored sex acts, in particular through
its focus on procreative unions of two people.
Specifically, in Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is
fundamental for at least 4 reasons: (1) because the right to marry the person of one’s
choosing is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy; (2) marriage protects the
most intimate association between two people; (3) marriage safeguards children and
families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children; and (4)
marriage has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there
are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to
these four principles of liberty, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry
(a right already declared fundamental in Loving v. Virginia) violates the U.S.
Constitution’s Due Process Clause. The Obergefell court also held that prohibiting samesex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause, following its jurisprudence begun with
Loving v. Virginia, under which marriage rights have traditionally been addressed
through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, as issues of equality and liberty. In
short, for liberty and equality to hold, marriage to the person of one’s choosing must
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
The Obergefell opinion shows a different view of privacy from Lawrence - a
privacy that follows a person so long as they do not cause harm with their actions. The
Court addresses, and rejects, the argument that gay marriage harms people in straight
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marriages. The Court here is explicit that it is looking to a harm principle, writing that
“these cases involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would
pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” Id. at 27. Instead, the Court finds
that it is people denied the ability to marry someone of the same sex who are harmed both tangibly and by being subordinated. The Court writes that
by virtue of their exclusion from that institution [of marriage], same sex couples
are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.
This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are
consigned to an instability many opposite sex couples would deem intolerable in
their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching
that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s
society. Id. at 17.
The Court later continues that “[e]specially against a long history of disapproval of their
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to
disrespect and subordinate them.” Id. at 22.
However, this no-harm-based conception of privacy is deeply woven into the
Court’s view of marriage as the ultimate public good, as has been recognized by many
queer commentators. Indeed, with statements such as the “nature of marriage is that,
through its enduring bind, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as
expression, intimacy and spirituality” (135 S. Ct. at 2584), the Court produces and
reinforces the idea that the only path to a “full promise of liberty” is state-sanctioned
marriage between (exactly) two adults (see. e.g., Ruskola 2018, 1116; Spindelman 2016,
fn 10 (string citing to queer critiques of Obergefell). As such, the Obergefell opinion is a
“heavy-handed endorsement of a specific conception of the good intimate life— one that
positions marriage, romantic love, monogamy, parenting, and the nuclear family as
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standards to which all Americans ought to aspire” (Ghosh 2018, 276). Because the
opinion endorses acts within the charmed circle, “it ends up demeaning queer-identified
and other non-assimilationist lesbian, gay, bisexual, and heterosexual individuals and has
potentially exacerbated, rather than tempered, the conflict surrounding LGBTI rights in
the United States” (Ghosh 2018, 277).
Because cases arising within charmed sex acts have not used privacy to move
closer to erotic justice, the next section turns to cases involving damned sexuality, to
determine whether working from the margins might bring us closer to a privacy that
protects sex acts on the outer limits.

III.

Privacy & Harm
Comparing jurisprudence on cursed sex acts from the U.S. and England also

highlights the possibilities and limitations of privacy-based approaches to erotic justice.
Specifically, looking to case law on BDSM shows that Courts before Obergefell have
sanctioned ambulatory views of protective privacy. However, these cases also show that
the threshold to demonstrate harm, and therefore pierce a privacy bubble, is often
overcome with unsubstantiated appeals to “public harm.” Because of the ease of using
public harm to justify legal sanctions, case law on BDSM in the United States and
England espouses a commitment to robust privacy for sexual acts, yet then denies this
privacy in practice. As such, even jurisprudence that starts with ambulatory views on
privacy ultimately reinforces oppression by consistently finding that public harm has
been caused - and that the sexual actors have therefore lost their rights to privacy.
“BDSM” is an umbrella term, referring to a large array of sexual activities
including bondage, discipline, domination, submission, sadism, and masochism. Also
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referred to as “kink,” BDSM acts may cause pain, humiliation, and other physical and
emotional sensations through the use of physical or emotional power. BDSM is
incredibly varied. BDSM activities are often referred to as “play,” and BDSM encounters
as “scenes.” The person “giving” the particular act is often called a “top,” “dominant” or
“domme” and the person receiving is referred to as a “bottom,” “submissive” or “sub.”
(Schumann 2018, 117-82; 1189-90). BDSM has recently become more mainstream, in
part because of the Fifty Shades of Grey books and movies, and inclusion in other popular
media (Schumann 2018, 1192; see also Engle’s 2017 article in Teen Vogue on BDSM).
BDSM is not explicitly illegal in the United States or England (Khan 2009, 102).
However, as the case studies below show, BDSM practices can lead to civil or criminal
liability under laws against sexual assault, assault and battery generally, obscenity,
prostitution, forced imprisonment and coercion. BDSM practices also face the legal gaze
in divorce and child custody cases.
Crucial to the discussion below as to how public harm has been used to eviscerate
the liberatory possibilities of BDSM laws is an understanding of consent. Consent
underlies both BDSM, and Western political thought and the laws crafted under its
traditions.
Consent is conventionally understood as the most important defining feature of
BDSM - what separates fun and play from “real” sexual violence (see e.g. Engle 2017).
Websites for those interested in people are titled “BDSM 101: Consent, consent,
consent,” (Barker 2016) and magazines like Glamour announce that, following a study on
the topic, “Members of the BDSM Community Are Basically Consent Experts” (Weiss
2016). Even those who criticize the foundational role of consent in BDSM still
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acknowledge its longtime primacy in alternate sexual acts and communities (e.g. Fischel
2019).8
Consent is also fundamental to Western modern political thought. Both Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke based their accounts of the social contract and political
legitimacy on consent. Locke’s Two Treatises on Government centers consent as the
necessary condition for political legitimacy. Although his meaning of “consent” is
debated, Locke’s core view is typically summarized as a government is only legitimate
where the people being ruled consented to being governed (see, e.g. Dunn 1967, 155-58).
So, too, is consent crucial to Hobbes’ political theory: both as the trait that confers
legitimacy/authority on governments and as the main reason why people are obligated to
follow laws (of legitimate governments). Indeed, the social contract, in which
individuals living in Hobbes’ dangerous and violent state of nature agree to a government
as their way out, functions because each person consented. And, like Locke, although
theorists have spent centuries criticizing and explaining the social contract, there is still
wide agreement that it was based upon at least formal appeals to consent (Martin 1980,
380-83).
Western common law, developed in England and brought to the United States as a
then-colony, followed this Lockean/Hobbesian/Millian focus on consent and the ability to
act so long as it does not harm. In the Seventeenth Century, the focus of criminal law
switched its view of primary victim from the person directly injured to society as a whole

8

Fischel argues that we should move away from the primacy of consent in sexual politics,
because of two main problems: (1) the overly (he uses the term “ridiculous”) redefinitions of
consent as only enthusiastic-type sexual experiences and (2) how this consent-as-enthusiasm
makes sex either “awesome” or “rape,” which leaves un-addressed the “immiserating sex too
many people, typically women, endure” (Fischel 2019, 3-4).
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(Bergelson 2008, 686) - which is why criminal cases are brought in the name of the
People (e.g. People v. Larry Flint) in the United States, or in the name of the Crown (Rex
if there is a king, and Regina if there is a queen at the time charges are brought) in
England. By the Eighteenth Century, all crimes in English jurisprudence had been reconceived of as public wrongs (see, e.g., Bergelson 2008, 686 and Dubber 2017, 175-6,
both citing to and explaining the continued tradition of William Blackstone’s 1769
Commentaries on the Laws of England). Along with this transition of crimes from private
to public harm, the previous default law that consent was an absolute defense was
modified - such that consent was only a defense to the extent that the public was not
injured (Bergelson 2008, 686). Explained in depth in the context of British BDSM case
law below, an injured man could not be a ready soldier for the King (or the government,
in the case of Vietnam War-era court decisions in the United States). If someone is
injured to the point that they cannot serve the state, in these cases literal military service,
the person’s private injury becomes a public harm, and threatens to weaken the entire
country (Bergelson 2008, 687).
Consent - and its limitations - remain at the forefront of contemporary English
and U.S. criminal law. First published in 1962, and left largely untouched since then, the
Model Penal Code was designed as a reference for states in the U.S. Under the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, each state has “police powers” jurisdiction to make
rules concerning the health, safety, morals and welfare of their public - resulting in
different things being legal in different states. The Model Penal Code was a decade-long
project attempting to create a uniform criminal law for the entire country, based upon its
drafters’ distillation and analysis of three centuries of U.S. criminal law in every state
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(and the English common law that U.S. jurisprudence was built upon). Since its
publication, at least 40 states have changed their criminal laws to reflect at least parts of
the Model Penal Code (Dubber 2017, 5-6).
In its definitions of “crime” and “consent” the Model Penal Code is clearly
modeled after Hobbesian/Lockean/Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century views. The
Code defines crime in part as “conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests” (Section 1.02, emphasis
added). The specifics interests identified in the Code are also predominantly focused on
the public - gambling, narcotics, alcoholic beverages, “public order and decency,” “the
existence or stability of the state,” “public administration,” etc. (Dubber 2017, 175-76).
The Code also includes an entire section on consent. As of 2019, subsection one
states that “In General” the “consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an
offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negates an element of the
offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense (Model Penal Code, Section 2.11(1)). The second subsection limits
this general availability of consent as a defense in only one substantive area: “consent to
bodily injury.” In the case of bodily injury, consent is only to be considered a defense in
three situations: (a) the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented
to is not serious, (b) the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint
participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport or other concerted activity
not forbidden by law; or (c) the consent establishes a justification for the crime (as
described elsewhere in the code, with examples being self-defense or to prevent a greater
harm) (Model Penal Code, Section 2.11(2)).
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As explained through the case studies below, the formulation of all crimes as a
harm to the public, as opposed to an individual, combined with the ease in showing such
harm, severely limits the ability of a theory of privacy founded in harm to have liberatory
possibility.
“Done for Love” or “Evil and Violent”: BDSM Law in England
BDSM practices have been litigated in several high-profile cases in England:
Regina v. Brown, Regina v. Emmett, and Regina v. Wilson. Although each of these cases
formally announces a potential privacy right that might protect cursed sex acts, in
practice privacy only functions to protect sex acts that occur within the charmed circle.
Instead, English case law allows vague and unsupported claims of “public harm” to
trump sexual privacy rights when cursed sex acts are at play. In practice, only those in
married, monogamous, and heterosexual relationships have been protected by English
privacy case law.
R. v. Brown, also known as “the Spanner Case,” began in the late 1980’s, when
the “Obscene Publications Squad,” a special unit of the British police, came across a
homemade video in Manchester, England, while investigating an unrelated matter
(Highleymann 2007). The video showed acts including piercing, whipping and cutting, as
well as acts involving excrement and branding between men. The men ranged in age,
although all were over twenty-one years of age (Khan 2009, 105). The video was filmed
at one man’s home, who was charged with (and plead guilty to) the crime of “keeping a
disorderly house” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 31, opinion of Lord Mustill).9 The
film was not made for commercial distribution, and was to be seen by those who had
9

Three other men were charged with, and plead guilty to, aiding or abetting the keeping of a
disorderly house (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 31, opinion of Lord Mustill).
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participated in it and by other people in their local BDSM scene. Despite this, one man
was charged with (and plead guilty to) publishing an obscene article (R. v. Brown, [1993]
UKHL 19, 31, opinion of Lord Mustill). Alleging that the video showed (non-consensual)
torture and that they had in their possession other films with the same persons showing
murder, the Squad launched an elaborate and expensive investigation, titled “Operation
Spanner” (Highleymann 2007). After spending years and millions of pounds,
interviewing hundreds of people, and even digging up the garden of one of the men in the
video to look for a corpse, the police concluded that all of the activities in the video had
been consensual, no-one was murdered, and no-one suffered any injury requiring medical
attention (Highleymann 2007; Khan 2009, 103-104).
However, despite finding that all acts in the film were by consenting adults who
were not seriously injured, sixteen men were arrested, charged with, and ultimately
convicted of assault (in addition to the “disorderly house” and “obscene publication”
charges), under England’s 1861 “Offences Against the Person Act.”10 This Act
criminalizes inflicting “grievous” (serious) bodily harm (Section 20) and “actual” (less
serious) bodily harm (Section 47) (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 1). By 1993, England
had decriminalized consensual sex in private between two men both over the age of 21,
under the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967.11 Sex with more than two men at a time was still
illegal under the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, as was disseminating and encouraging

Three of the arrestees were also charged with “wounding,” of which they were also convicted.
R. v. Brown [1993] UKHL 19 (11 March 1993), 1.
11
In 1994, the age of consent for men having sex with each other was lowered to 18, and was
again reduced to 16 in 2000 (making the age of consent the same for gay and straight sex).
10
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homosexual activities,12 but carried significantly lower possible jail times than the assault
provisions under which the men were charged.13
Both the tops and bottoms in the video were arrested, and convicted, for the same
charges, on the theory that the bottoms were accessories to their own assaults. At their
original trial, the judge ruled that the bottoms’ consent was not a defense to the assault
for any of the men, and the men plead guilty, some receiving fines and others prison
sentences of six months and four years (Highleymann 2007; Khan 2009, 104). On appeal,
their convictions were affirmed by the High Court, but the sentences lowered to three
months and three years - yet with a warning to future BDSM practitioners that they
would face much tougher sentencing (Khan 2009, 104).
The men again appealed, and the House of Lords affirmed that consent is not a
defense to the crimes of committing actual or grievous bodily injury, and upheld the
men’s convictions in a three to two decision. None of the judges in the House of Lords
viewed the videos at issue.14 Writing the first opinion of the Court’s judgment, Lord
Templeman focused heavily on harms to the public and the need to keep the peace.
Beginning by stating that in some cases of otherwise-lawful activity (if no injury
resulted), the consent of the person who is injured does render the action legal. For
example, Lord Templeman cites to surgery, “ritual circumcision,” tattooing, ear-piercing,
and violent sports such as boxing that are legal, despite causing injuries (R. v. Brown,

12

Almost all of the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967 was repealed by the Sexual Offenses Act of
2003, including the criminalization of sex between more than two men.
13
One possible reason why the men were not charged under the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967 is
that by the time the police concluded their murder investigation, the statute of limitations under
that law had run.
14
As Lord Mustill noted in his dissenting opinion, “The House has been spared the video tapes,
which must have been horrible” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 30-31).

45

[1993] UKHL 19, 2). Lord Templeman then continued with the long history of the
legality of dueling and sport fighting (except in the case of “maiming,” because the King
would lose the services of an “able bodied citizen for the defence of the realm”), which
was lawful because these activities “inculcated bravery and skill and physical fitness” (R.
v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 3). However, “prizefighting” was not legal in England,
because prizefighting injures the participants and the public. The public is injured in two
ways under English prizefighting precedent: “both because it is against the public interest
that the lives and the health of the combatants should be endangered by blows, and
because prize-fights are disorderly exhibitions, mischievous on many obvious grounds”
(R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 3). As such, for Lord Templeman, a person cannot
legally consent to an act that “creates a breach of the peace,” because the government has
the right to “protect the public and keep the peace” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 4).
For example, using drugs and assisting suicide are illegal because they are “harmful to
society” generally (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 7).
In determining what is “harmful to society” and should be illegal, versus what
should be legal, Lord Templeman provided a list of activities from precedent that are
(rightly) legal in England: “Nothing which we have said is intended to cast doubt upon
the accepted legality of properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or
correction, reasonable surgical interference, dangerous exhibitions, etc.” (R. v. Brown,
[1993] UKHL 19, 5, citing Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB
715). According to the prior court, these “exceptions can be justified as involving the
exercise of a legal right, in the case of chastisement or correction, or as needed in the
public interest, in the other cases” (Id). It is self-explanatory how “reasonable surgical
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interference” may be needed in the public interest, and as described above the Court
credits sports with “inculcating bravery and skill and physical fitness.” However, the
Court did not elaborate as to the public need for “dangerous exhibitions.” In fact, BDSM
could likely be understood as a “dangerous exhibition.” Further, the cited precedent
explicitly stated that “it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public” (Id.).
As such, Templeman’s own precedent would seem to support the legality of BDSM.
However, applying public interest and breach of the peace principles to the facts
in Brown, Lord Templeman found that the videotaped acts “were unpredictably
dangerous and degrading to body and mind and were developed with increasing barbarity
and taught to persons whose consents were dubious or worthless” (R. v. Brown, [1993]
UKHL 19, 7). Because the tops were “middle aged men” and the bottoms were “youths”
(although all over 21 at the time of filming), Lord Templeman quoted the High Court’s
discussion of the “corruption of youth” - including its note that happily, one of the
“youths” in the video “has now it seems settled into a normal heterosexual relationship”
(R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 7). Further, because of the “bloodletting” and
“excrement” in the video, Lord Templeman argued that there were concerns of
HIV/AIDS transmission and infections.
Most persuasive for Lord Templeman, though, is that BDSM is “violence which
is inflicted for the indulgence of cruelty,” and “sex is no excuse for violence” (R. v.
Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 8, 9). “I am not prepared,” Lord Templeman held, “to invent a
defence of consent for sado-masochistic encounters which breed and glorify cruelty” (R.
v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 8). In sum, these men were correctly convicted of assault
(including being accomplices in their own assaults) and sent to prison for years because
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of the strong public interest: “Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult
of violence. Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is
uncivilized” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 9).
Agreeing with Lord Templeman that the convictions should be affirmed, Lord
Jauncy also focused on how BDSM is against the public’s interest and has a tendency to
breach the peace. Basing his decisions on the proposition that English case law holds that
“injuries should not be inflicted in public where they might give rise to a breach of the
peace,” Lord Jauncy strained to explain how the acts on a videotape, all of which
occurred in someone’s home and without spectators present, were “public” acts that
threatened the peace. (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 10-11). In order to do this, Lord
Jauncy repeatedly characterized the sex acts as “conducted in secret” - as opposed to the
concept of in private (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 10, 18, emphasis added). Instead of
the “privacy” of a marital bedroom these men were in “secret”: hiding their shameful acts
from society, as if this “secrecy” is a tacit admission that they, too, knew their BDSM
was wrong. As such, even when sex acts occur in Aristotelian literal private spaces,
unless they are shielded by marriage or outweighed by other charmed sexualities, even
bedrooms will not qualify for protection.
Despite being conducted “in secret,” the men’s acts still threatened the public,
according to Lord Jauncy, because of possible hospital expenses (had anyone needed to
go to a hospital, which they did not), the “payment of benefits” (if someone had been
injured such that they could not work, again which did not happen), the possible spread
of HIV/AIDS (again, which did not happen) and the corruption of youth (referencing,
like Lord Templeman, the youth who was now in a “normal heterosexual relationship”)
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(R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 11, 18). These conjectural, unrealized harms were
sufficient for Lord Jauncy to constitute a breach of the peace such that these men were
justly convicted.
Lord Jauncy also likened BDSM to prizefighting and its mischievous, disorderly
character - and contrasted BDSM/prizefighting with other fighting and violent sports,
which are legal because they are “friendly encounters not calculated to produce real
injury or to rouse angry passions in either” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 12-13,
quoting Hawkins, J.). That boxing is less angry, less injurious, and more of a “friendly
encounter” than consensual BDSM strains credulity, and Lord Jauncy does not attempt to
explain his reasoning for finding BDSM to be more like prizefighting than other sports.
Regardless, because these “secret” BDSM acts somehow, possibly, could breach the
peace, Lord Jauncy voted for the convictions to be affirmed.
Taking a different approach, but still upholding the convictions, Lord Lowry
found that the correct test is whether there is “good reason” to make an exception to
assault laws for BDSM, such as is made for “manly diversions” such as boxing. Lord
Lowry answered this question in the negative in a value-laden, adjective-filled opinion:
[B]oth those who will inflict and those who will suffer the injury wish to satisfy a
perverted and depraved sexual desire. Sado-masochistic homosexual activity
cannot be regarded as conducive to the enhancement or enjoyment of family life
or conducive to the welfare of society. A relaxation of the prohibitions in sections
20 and 47 can only encourage the practice of homosexual sado-masochism and
the physical cruelty that it must involve (which can scarcely be regarded as a
“manly diversion”) by withdrawing the legal penalty and giving the activity a
judicial imprimatur. As well as all this, one cannot overlook the physical danger
to those who may indulge in sado-masochism. In this connection, and also
generally, it is idle for the appellants to claim that they are educated exponents of
“civilised cruelty”. A proposed general exemption is to be tested by considering
the likely general effect. This must include the probability that some sadomasochistic activity, under the powerful influence of the sexual instinct, will get
out of hand and result in serious physical damage to the participants and that some
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activity will involve a danger of infection such as these particular exponents do
not contemplate for themselves. When considering the danger of infection, with
its inevitable threat of AIDS, I am not impressed by the argument that this threat
can be discounted on the ground that, as long ago as 1967, Parliament, subject to
conditions, legalised buggery, now a well-known vehicle for the transmission of
AIDS. (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 29).
Because, according to Lord Lowry, homosexual BDSM did not constitute a “manly”
dimension (which, clearly, the men involved here would have disagreed with), but rather
“perverted,” “depraved,” and likely to “get out of hand” (because we all know how
sexual desire works), Lord Lowry’s duty as a judge was to ensure the activity is illegal.
The homophobia in Lord Lowry’s opinion is explicit: in addition to his constant use of
the term “buggery” in regard to legal sex between men (in 1993!), he smugly implies that
Parliament’s decision to “legalize” buggery had resulted in the spread of AIDS.
Lord Lowry also explicitly responded to the argument that criminalizing BDSM
violates privacy, especially since “buggery” was legalized in the 1967 Act. In a very short
paragraph, Lord Lowry writes that the 1967 Act does not change the fact that BDSM is
illegal under the 1861 assault laws and “there is no legal right to cause actual bodily
harm” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 29-30, emphasis in original). This narrow
framing of the rights at stake here (“the right to cause actual bodily harm”) is reminiscent
of the similarly narrow framing in the U.S. case of Bowers v. Hardwick, discussed above,
in which the privacy interest at stake in legalizing gay sex was framed by the majority as
a “right to engage in homosexual sodomy” (478 U.S. 186 (1986), 191-193).
Such framing already includes within it moral and legal conclusions - in this case,
that the sex acts are “sodomy,” which is a term defined by law and denounced by the
Bible. As would be expected by framing that classifies and denigrates the conduct at
issue off the bat, the Courts in Brown and in Bowers ruled that as there is no right to
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engage in homosexual sodomy, the sexual conduct at issue could be constitutionally
criminalized. Only in Lawrence v. Texas, ten years after Brown, did the U.S. Supreme
Court announce that it had been wrong to view the issue as “simply the right to engage in
certain conduct,” because this “demeans” individuals and because the criminalization of
those acts “touch[es] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home” (539 U.S. 558 (2003), 567). As such, it concluded that
the proper framing of the right in question should have been as a general right to liberty
and respect for private lives - and the question of whether it should be protected answered
in the affirmative (539 U.S. 558 (2003), 578).
In his dissenting opinion, Lord Mustill emphasized privacy - arguing at the very
beginning that “In my opinion it should be a case about the criminal law of private sexual
relations.” Presaging Lawrence in his Brown opinion, Lord Mustill argued that the case
should be looked at under laws around private sexual relations, and not under laws about
violence (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 30). Before turning to the privacy of sex, Lord
Mustill began his opinion by focusing on the public - that outsiders would view the video
with “horror, amazement, incomprehension, perhaps sadness,” and “very few could read
even a summary of other activities without disgust” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 30).
The sex acts at issue were “repugnant to public morality.” Yet, although these acts were
at odds with public morality, they were also not illegal in England at the time, nor should
they be made illegal - because of the right to privacy.
Lord Mustill pointed out that there was no law criminalizing BDSM in England at
the point this case arose, and indeed the men weren’t charged with any sex crimes. They
were charged with assault, under a statute about offenses against the person, precisely
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because their sex acts were legal. (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 31 (emphasis in
original)). As agreed upon in the majority opinion, the harms here were not against the
BDSM bottoms. Instead of harms against a person, any harms here were against the
public. As such, the men could only be charged with offenses against the public, and not
offenses against persons.
Lord Mustill further argued that the emphasis on whether or not consent was a
defense to these assaults was misplaced. As a threshold matter, Lord Mustill argued
against the possibility of any general theory of consent and violence, because “all the
instances of the consensual infliction of violence are special” (R. v. Brown, [1993]
UKHL 19, 31), and because there are many types of consent. Beyond that, Lord Mustill
argued that consent is the wrong way to understand why we allow some types of assault.
Instead, it is the context of the entire situation which explains legality - pointing to being
arrested, being bumped on the subway, or a child being “reasonably punished” by parent
as situations where there is no crime, but the person being injured did not consent (R. v.
Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 33-34).
Lord Mustill also probed the distinction between illegal prizefighting versus other
legal activities - with prizefighting often leading to serious injuries and to riots among the
mass of people who gathered, while “manly sports and exercises . . tend to give strength,
activity and skill in the use of arms, and are entered into merely as private recreations
among friends” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 39). Based on this, one would expect
boxing to be illegal: it is for money, not for recreation or for personal improvement, and
its aim is solely to inflict serious injury. Yet, Lord Mustill argues, boxing is legal in
England because it is a “special situation which for the time being stands outside the
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ordinary law of violence because society chooses to tolerate it” (R. v. Brown, [1993]
UKHL 19, 40).
Under Lord Mustill’s view of how society interacts with activities, the public (and
thus criminal law) “does not concern itself with these activities, provided that they do not
go too far.” In his view, what is “too far” for society, and therefore criminal, changes
over time: “as the general social appreciation of what is tolerable and of the proper role of
the state in regulating the lives of individuals changes with the passage of time, so we
shall expect to find that the assumptions of the criminal justice system about what types
of conduct are properly excluded from its scope, and about what is meant by going ‘too
far’, will not remain constant” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 42).
Here, for Lord Mustill the videotaped BDSM acts should be legal both under
English case law on violent acts (e.g. legal boxing versus illegal prizefighting) and public
policy concerns. As to the former, Mustill points to five main factors as to why the
activity in this case is legal under English assault case law: (1) there was no serious
injury, (2) the participants were in private, (3) there was consent, (4) the activities were
not for profit and (5) the acts were not based in animosity, rage or hostility, but for sexual
desire (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 48). Although a clear case for legality could be
made here under prior cases, applying these five factors to other BDSM situations or to
strip clubs would likely lead to a different result. Consider acts at a for-profit outdoor
BDSM festival, which might lead to bruising or scarring (either intentionally or
unintentionally), with crowds cheering the paid participants on. Or consider a spanking in
a strip club, leading to a large bruise. Or the U.S. cases described below, which took
place within marital homes but did result in serious injuries. Although the factors for
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consent and sexual desire/absence of rage would be in favor of legality in both, Mustill’s
other factors would not. Strip clubs are not “private” places, are certainly for profit, and
what comprises a “serious” injury is not explained. The BDSM festival example would
also be not in private and would be for profit, and also possibly involve “serious injury.”
The U.S. cases would be closer, but there injuries did result (and in the Twyman case
discussed below, the acts may actually have been performed out of animosity, and not for
sexual desire). As such, English precedent may have exonerated the men at trial in the
Spanner case, but would not help in many other scenarios.
One major reason why English assault precedent is limited in its ability to achieve
erotic justice is its tacit view of privacy as something spatial, as opposed to agential.
Although these prior cases and Lord Mustill do not identify why each case was “private,”
a review of the facts shows that private acts are ones that occur in literal, physical spaces
from which the public is restricted. In the case at issue, the acts were in a participant’s
home. The other case in Mustill’s analysis of precedent where criminality did not lie
involved a planned fight “on private land” (Id. At 38). As such, the type of privacy that
exonerates guilt in English case law is spatial.
Mustill’s reliance on Rex. v. Donovan [1934] 2 K.B. 498 and explicit discussion
of sex work that leads to injury shows how limited precedent is for erotic justice. For
Mustill, “prostitution is very different from the present case,” as “there is no pretence of
mutual affection”: “The prostitute, as bearer or beaten, does it for money.” As such,
Mustill opines that “prosecuting authorities have (rightly in my view) tended to deal with
[prostitution] cases, if at all, as offences against the public order” (Id. at 43). In the Rex
case, a man arranged with a woman to hit her sexually, in his garage. Mustill places this
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under the category of “prostitution,” although the Court was silent as to whether this was
paid activity. Mustill argues that regardless of whether money changed hands, this man
was rightfully charged under criminal law because this case was not “in a category which
is automatically innocent” (Id. at 45). Instead of love and affection, the “accused met the
complainant and immediately asked her ‘Where would you like to have your spanking, in
Hyde Park or in my garage?’” (Id. at 43). In addition to showing the absence of affection,
Mustill’s intent in quoting seems to be to highlight this fact that although the acts did
happen in a private location (the man’s garage), they could have just as easily happened
in a public park. This spatial indifference of the defendant (for either public or private) is
connected to emotional indifference (the absence of intimacy), and expels the acts from
the charmed circle. Precedent, then, in its demand for spatial privacy and home and for
“mutual affection” cannot bring us to erotic justice.
Mustill himself declares in his opinion that precedent should not control here,
because he “cannot accept that the infliction of bodily harm, especially the private
infliction of it, is invariably criminal absent some special factor which decrees
otherwise.” Instead, Mustill prefers to “address each individual category of consensual
violence in the light of the situation as a whole.” “Circumstances,” thus “must alter
cases” (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 45). There, the Court “is free . . . to consider
entirely afresh whether the public interest demands” that the BDSM acts here be criminal.
Freeing himself to reason anew and depart from prior cases, Lord Mustill
announces that this is a matter of private morality - which should not be judged by
criminal law. Instead,
if these standards are to be upheld the individual must enforce them upon himself
according to his own moral standards, or have them enforced against him by
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moral pressures exerted by whatever religious or other community to whose
ethical ideals he responds. . . . [T]he state should interfere with the rights of an
individual to live his or her life as he or she may choose no more than is necessary
to ensure a proper balance between the special interests of the individual and the
general interests of the individuals who together comprise the populace at large
(R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 48).
Thus, Mustill’s view of “private morality” is similar to Gobetti’s agential and ambulatory
view of “privacy”: a person may properly act unimpeded by the government as long as
those freely chosen acts are not out of balance with the needs of the public.
Applying his concept of private morality and an agential concept of privacy, Lord
Mustill argued that the Court should have held that although the videoed acts were
“repugnant,” they should not be made illegal due to the deference to private morality and
limited extent to which a government should invade people’s ability to live their lives
according to their own (albeit religiously and otherwise pressured) morals. From that
properly deferential place, balancing an individual’s interest with that of the public tips
the scales in favor of legalization: modern medicine reduces risks of infection, people
may be punished if things actually got out of hand (and not because they hypothetically
could have), there was no evidence here of particular HIV/AIDS transmission, the sex
between men was legal, and if young people were drawn in, there is a separate existent
crime for the “corruption of youth.” In addition, the argument that BDSM is proselytizing
and generally corruptive for adults is redundant - if BDSM is legal, then enticing others
into BDSM should also be legal (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 48-50). As such, Lord
Mustill works from an ambulatory view of privacy, and insists that any claim to harm
which might revoke privacy’s shield be substantiated. However, his opinion was a
dissenting one, and one which has not been resuscitated by subsequent cases.
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Lastly, Lord Hadley also dissented from the majority, arguing that under the
current case law, the government can criminalize some consensual acts done in private but only if they result in serious bodily harm (R. v. Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 58).
Although BDSM which did not result in serious injury was at that point not illegal, Lord
Hadley believed the public might still decide (ethically and in practice) to criminalize it:
“If society takes the view that this kind of behaviour, even though sought after and done
in private, is either so new or so extensive or so undesirable that it should be brought now
for the first time within the criminal law, then it is for the legislature to decide” (R. v.
Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, 58). As such, Lord Hadley would have the court find that a
societal determination that a sex act is “new,” “extensive” or “undesirable” is sufficient to
justify its criminalization. A majority could properly vote to take away privacy rights to
engage in BDSM acts.
On further appeal, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously affirmed
the House of Lords Decision in a brief ruling, which stated that countries may decide to
criminalize private activity if concerns of public health and safety are involved particularly when physical injury is present (Khan 2009, 105; Laskey, Jaggard and
Brown v. United Kingdom, Application no. 21627/93; 21628/93; 21974/93 (ECHR,
Judgment of 19 Feb. 1997), para. 43).
In sum, and as Michel Foucault and Gayle Rubin’s study of sexuality would
predict, R. v. Brown’s detailed re-telling of the BDSM acts underlying the case and its
ultimate finding of guilt contributes to the construction of a cursed “homosexual
sadomasochistic” identity. Instead of a public debate around the ethics and safety of
BDSM, the legal system produced a “vilified and marginalized” identity for already-
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marginalized men involved in alternative sexual practices (see Chapter 1, Section II; see
also Chandra-Shekeran 1997). As such, R v. Brown’s removal of privacy protections for
BDSM on the basis of tenuous-at-best claims to pubic harms reinforces a charmed circle
and the exclusion and repression of those outside of it.
R v. Brown remains good law, and is regularly invoked by courts and scholars.
For example, one jurist recently argued that based upon R v. Brown, cosmetic surgery
should be criminalized, especially for minors (Baker 2014). Pointing to the rapid growth
of “non-necessary” surgery, Baker argues that under R. v. Brown, consent of the person
receiving surgery does not make legal for-profit and injurious (particularly if there are
complications) elective surgery. Instead, such surgeries should be illegal because of
public harm: the resources used in cosmetic surgery could be used to cure people who are
actually ill (Baker 2014, 589-90).
England re-visited sado-masochism two years after Brown in R v. Wilson, [1996]
2 Crim. App. 241. In this case, Mr. Wilson was arrested and charged with assault for
branding his initials into his wife’s buttock with a hot knife, after her doctor reported her
scar to the police. Unlike the bottoms in Brown, Mrs. Wilson was not arrested as an
accessory or accomplice to her husband’s assault. Mr. Wilson was convicted at trial,
based upon R v. Brown. On appeal, England’s Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
reversed Mr. Wilson’s conviction, finding that he was not guilty of assault for three
reasons. Firstly, Mrs. Wilson was a “mature” woman, who went beyond consenting and
had actively “instigated” the branding, as opposed to the “youths” in Brown who had
been recruited (which was in complete contradiction to the testimony in Brown that made
clear that the bottoms had similarly initiated the encounter). Secondly, the Court held
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that the branding was not a “sadomasochistic encounter” at all - even though branding
was one of the “violent” and “evil” acts in Brown. Instead, Mrs. Wilson had sought her
husband’s assistance “in what she regarded as the acquisition of a desirable piece of
personal adornment,” much like a tattoo. The branding was thus not erotic, but a feminine
body modification. Mrs. Wilson’s branding was also not aggressive, as the acts in Brown
were, but “done for love,” as a permanent proclamation of her love for her husband.
Lastly, and of great weight to the Court, it was not in the public interest to interfere with
the privacy of marriage. Therefore, the same act - branding - is extreme, degrading,
threatens the peace and hurts the public in general when done by (unmarried) men of
different ages in a group, but deserving of privacy, and a is desirable proclamation of
love when performed by a man on his wife.
Comparing R v. Wilson and R v. Brown, Ummni Khan argues that the opinions
illustrate Rubin’s “charmed circle”: BDSM that occurs within the “Good” circle’s
“heterosexual, marital and monogamous confines” is less likely to lead to legal
consequences than BDSM otherwise positioned within the “Abnormal, Unnatural, Sick,
and Sinful” outer circle (Khan 2009, 81-82). BDSM is still seen suspiciously, but such
acts occurring within otherwise-“charmed” conditions can lead to certain BDSM
situations being seen, legally and socially, as “acceptable” (Khan 2009, 82). When under
the “legal gaze,” BDSM practitioners’ “exoneration seems to hinge on their ability to fit
into prescribed sexual and social identities” (Khan 2009, 84). Specifically, cases like
Wilson, which involve white, married, middle class, monogamous, attractive people, with
mild kinks and featuring men as tops and women as bottoms, are much less likely to lead
to legal liability than cases like Brown. In Khan’s words, “the power of hetero-marital
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monogamous hegemony to absorb and neutralize nonnormative sexual practices” is
astonishing (Khan 2009, 83, 100-103). Critical to legal acceptability for Khan is whether
the alleged conduct fits under our existing concepts of “marital privacy” and “spousal
fidelity” (Khan 2009, 84-86). The monogamous marriage in Wilson acts as a
“normalizing privacy shield,” which allows the actors to evade legal repercussions (Khan
2009, 100).
The third upper-court case on BDSM in England, R v. Emmett [1999] EWCA
1710, also involved a heterosexual couple, who got married during the legal proceedings.
Mr. Emmett was arrested for assault under the same 1861 Offences Against the Person
Act as in Brown and Wilson, for two BDSM scenes. In the first, Mr. Emmett had choked
his partner, after which she went to a doctor after experiencing popped blood vessels in
her eyes and bruises on her neck.15 In the second, a few weeks later, he poured lighter
fluid on her breasts, and lit them on fire, leading to burns that got infected (which looked
serious but did not leave any scarring). Mr. Emmett’s partner saw a doctor after each
incident at Mr. Emmett’s insistence, who called the police after the second visit. Neither
testified at trial, but Mr. Emmett told the police that he agreed that the choking and
burning scenes had not gone as planned. Mr. Emmett also informed the police that most
of the BDSM ideas were his, but that they only did things that his partner completely
consented to after discussion. Following R v. Brown, the trial judge denied Mr. Emmett a
Again, the Court provided explicit details of the facts: Emmet “covere[d] the complainant’s
head with a plastic bag,” “tie[d] it at the neck with a ligature,” “tightened to the point of
endurance,” while his partner was tied up and may also have been gagged. Then, while the lady
was enveloped in the plastic bag in this way, the defendant engaged in oral sex with her and it
became apparent, at some stage, that his excitement was such that he had lost track of what was
happening to the complainant. He eventually became aware that she was in some sort of distress,
was unable to speak, or make intelligible noises, and it was apparent that she was in trouble
because of the loss of oxygen. He rapidly removed the bag from her head.
15
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consent defense. He was found guilty of one count of assault and plead guilty to another,
and was given a suspended jail sentence.16 His partner was not arrested as an accessory to
her assault.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) upheld the conviction, and distinguished
this case from Wilson, which involved (in the Court’s view) branding that in the Court’s
view was no more painful or risky than an ordinary tattoo. Instead, based on the physical
injury Mr. Emmett’s partner suffered, and the possibility that she could have died during
the asphyxiation incident, the Court held that Mr. Emmett’s actions were indeed criminal
(despite his partner’s consent, the fact that the actions occurred in private, were not for
profit, and she was not seriously injured). Thus even monogamy, heterosexuality and
whiteness will not always be a shield to criminal liability for distinctly “wrong” sexual
acts. However, as Khan notes, “being female and heterosexual seems to absolve a woman
from participating in submissive sexual conduct” (2009, 1111), and Mr. Emmett did not
have to serve any time in jail (unlike the arrestees in Brown). Additionally, in its
relatively short opinion, the Court of Appeal goes out of its way to note that “it is only
right to recall that, since the events which formed the basis of this prosecution and since
the prosecution was launched, they have married each other.” Thus, although ultimately
finding liability, the Court still views marriage as an exculpatory factor for what it
otherwise sees as criminal, violent assault.
Appeals to privacy to protect sex acts have therefore failed in England. Baseless
findings of public harm have been sufficient to remove any privacy rights that might have

Although its precise meaning varies by jurisdiction, a “suspended” jail sentence refers
generally to one in which a person is convicted of a crime, but following good behavior for a
specific period of time will not have to serve time in prison for the offense.
16
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protected those outside of the charmed circle. Only those in married, monogamous,
heterosexual relationships (i.e. those firmly in the charmed circle) have found any success
in claiming sexual privacy under English case law.
Atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community: U.S.
Jurisprudence on BDSM
That privacy functions to protect acts within the context of marriage is also in accord
with U.S. case law. While it also hinted towards a more robust view of privacy, as
discussed in Section II above, the Court in Obergefell made clear that the strong
protections it announced were operational only within the context of marriage. So, too,
was the privacy right announced by the U.S. Supreme Court to take birth control rooted
in married couples, having sex in a marital bedroom. In the first major case on birth
control, the U.S. Supreme Court held that married people could not be constitutionally
restricted from obtaining birth control (Griswold v. CT, 381 U.S. 479, 480, emphasis in
original). The Court wrote that at issue in married people using contraceptives was “a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -- older than our political parties, older than
our school system” (Griswold v. CT, 381 U.S. 479, 486). It was not until seven years later
that the right to take birth control without undue governmental interference was extended
to unmarried people (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
U.S. cases on BDSM have also grappled with the reach of privacy. The major
case in the United States to deal with BDSM is Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819
(Tex. App. 1990), which arose within the context of a divorce case, where the wife
included claims against her husband for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.17

17

Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort - a type of civil (as opposed to criminal)
wrong, arising from “a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular
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Although the brief plurality opinion in Twyman did not reach the substance of the case,
the concurring and dissenting opinions each relied on privacy. The concurring opinions,
however, based any possible protections for the BDSM sex acts in a view of marital
privacy as completely impenetrable. The explicitly feminist dissenting opinion pierced
marriage’s veil - but did not look for other sources of privacy that might protect sex acts
after stripping away that marital privacy.
The facts of Twyman, as recited by the Court, involved Mr. Twyman having
continuous extra-marital affairs involving bondage, which Ms. Twyman did not want to
be engaged in because of a sexual assault prior to her marriage.18 Ms. Twyman saw many
therapists, including with her husband, who agreed to stop cheating on her (but continued
doing so). Throughout this period, Mr. Twyman told his wife that there was something
wrong with her for not wanting to be involved in bondage, that sex was better with his
girlfriend, and that their marriage could not continue if she refused bondage. Their tenyear-old son also found a “graphic” bondage magazine in their home (790 S.W.2d 819,
819-820)
After seeing other counselors and losing weight from the stress, Ms. Twyman
attempted bondage activities with her then-husband. The Court then continues that
relation to one another” (Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). In other words, instead of
being subject to arrest in the name of the “People” in the United States or “Regina” (Queen) in
England, one person is liable for money or other forms of relief (such as injunctive) to another
person, because she owed a duty to that person, which she violated. Of all torts, negligent
infliction of emotional distress is widely regarded as one of the hardest claims to pursue, and
many states do not allow claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress at all (Rhee 2004).
18
In a BDSM context, bondage refers to the practice of consensually tying, binding, or restraining
a partner for erotic, aesthetic, or sensory stimulation. Someone may be physically restrained in
many ways, and with the use of many materials including the use of rope, cuffs, tape, etc.
Someone can tie/restrain herself, or can be tied/restrained by another person. For some, an
important part of bondage can be that it is done in semi-public spaces where there is an audience,
who can observe the restrained (and sometimes suspended) person (Cee 2018).
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“[t]heir last encounter, however, was so rough that Sheila sustained bleeding for four
days and was treated by a gynecologist who tested her for venereal disease. She testified
the activity was so painful and humiliating that she knew she could not continue to
attempt it, and that she feared exposure to AIDS and other venereal diseases” (790
S.W.2d 819, 820). The Court does not cite to any testimony or other explanations as to
how bondage, which involves tying or otherwise restraining a person, could lead to four
days of bleeding and was intolerably painful, or how Ms. Twyman would possibly be at
risk for contracting a sexually transmitted infection from being tied up by her husband.
As Brenda Cossman notes, these facts are murky, and “told to us only through the court’s
narrative of ‘deviate sexual practices’” (2004, 862).19
Based on these facts, the trial court found that Mr. Twyman was liable for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and in addition to granting the divorce, it
awarded Ms. Twyman $15,000 in damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas
affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that Ms. Twyman had suffered a sufficient
amount of mental anguish for the tort to lie. The Court, however, refused to consider Mr.
Twyman’s argument that there was no evidence to support “the trial court’s finding that
bondage is a deviant sexual act,” because of a procedural bar since he did not raise this
issue early enough in his appeal (790 S.W.2d 819, 821-822).
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case, holding in this
and a companion case that there is no cause of action at all for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress in Texas (Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (1993). However, a

19

As discussed below, the Texas Supreme Court separate opinions re-tell the facts focusing on
other parts of the record, which further complicates this narrative and obfuscates the “truth” of
what occurred.
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plurality of the Court decided that a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress
can be brought in Texas - and that this case can be brought between married people.
Writing that a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be brought “only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of possible decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” Justice Cornyn sent this case back for a new
trial to determine whether Mr. Twyman’s alleged attempts to engage Mrs. Twyman in
“deviant sexual acts” were done intentionally (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 620-21, quoting
the Second Restatement of Torts and the lower court opinion). In a short concurrence,
Justice Gonzalez believed that the intentional tort had in fact already been proven here:
“What happened to Sheila Twyman in this case involves grossly offensive conduct which
warrants judicial relief” and “the actions of William Twyman in engaging in bondage
activities with Sheila Twyman, under the rationale that such activities were necessary to
the future of their marriage, were all intentional in nature” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 626).
In their separate opinions, the other justices each focused on marital privacy and
sex - with two opinions finding that sex acts within marriage are behind a privacy veil not
to be penetrated by the Courts. Chief Justice Philips argued that intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims cannot be brought between spouses at all: marriage is “an
intensely personal and intimate relationship,” and “[w]hen discord arises, it is inevitable
that the parties will suffer emotional distress, often severe” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at
627). As such, extreme emotional distress is a normal part of marriage - and acts
occurring within marriage should be awarded privacy outside of the reach of the courts.
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Justice Hecht’s opinion at first appears to offer more promise for the protection of
disfavored sex acts. Likening the case here to obscenity laws, Justice Hecht raised
concerns that the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action will be used
against conduct that a majority of society disfavors because of “prejudice” or “passion.”
“Outrageousness” is a poor marker of wrongdoing that should be punished by the judicial
system, because it is a “very subjective, value-laden concept.” Something that is an
outrage to one person could be completely fine to someone else. Even where there is a
consensus as to what is “outrageous,” Justice Hecht urges “the law must guard against
the danger that a consensus against certain conduct is forged of prejudice and passion
rather than indignation against intolerable behavior” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 629). As
such, Justice Hecht’s opinion in part recognizes that sexual approbation is often based on
systems of hierarchy and oppression, rather than a true sexual ethics.
Further, Justice Hecht’s study of case law leads him to conclude that although the
tort is only supposed to lie for truly the most appalling conduct, in practice it is applied
erratically, and depends on the views of the person examining the case: “[b]ecause
outrageousness is a subjective, almost personal, notion, its application is as much a
matter of who decides as of what happened” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 631). In deciding
infliction of emotional distress cases, triers of fact “can resort only to their own views and
their own prejudices.” As such, “passions of the moment” turn into law and legal
decisions are spun out of “personal attitudes” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 632-33, internal
citations omitted). Indeed, because of the moral overtones inherent in this tort, a jury is
really tasked here with deciding whether a person was “bad” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at

66

633). For Justice Hecht, such moral fact-finding is inapposite to the correct aim of the
law - a pursuit of justice (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 634).
However, despite this promising preamble, Justice Hecht ultimately grounds his
dissent in marital privacy. Hecht writes that sex is an intimate aspect of marriage - and
thus one with great sensitivity - in which partners “expect that some accommodation of
each other’s feelings will be necessary to their mutual good” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at
636-37). Other similarly “sensitive” areas of marriage include how to spend money and
how to raise children. Therefore, “the inquiry which must be made to determine whether
a spouse’s conduct is outrageous entails too great an intrusion of the marital relationship”
- and should not therefore be allowed by law (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 637). As such, Mr.
Twyman should be protected from suit primarily because sex acts in marriage are outside
the proper scope of judicial scrutiny.20 Thus, despite a promising move arguing against
societal norms, Justice Hecht’s opinion ends in the familiar call for privacy within
marriage.
Lastly, in the only opinion which fully dissents from the Court’s plurality opinion,
Justice Spector looked to the patriarchal development of law to guide her holding. Justice
Spector was the first woman to be elected to Texas’ Supreme Court, with Twyman issued
her first year on the Court. Her dissent in Twyman is still studied in family law courses,
despite the fact that the case itself is otherwise considered unremarkable by those not
studying BDSM and the law (Cruse 2008).

Justice Hecht also explicitly argued against Justice Spector’s opinion, discussed below emotional distress claims were not disproportionately brought by women. Even if this was a
cause of action used more by women, the tort’s existence was because of condescending and
patronizing views of women - not equality - or because of “a development of the law without
particular regard for gender” Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 640).
20
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In her opinion, Justice Spector traced how tort recovery for claims involving
emotional distress has developed in order to compensate women for injuries by men, who
were insensitive to the harm they were causing (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 642). Justice
Spector argued that men, implicitly including her colleagues on the Texas Supreme
Court, have a disproportionate interest in downplaying claims for emotional distress,
which are brought disproportionately by women against men. “In the judicial system
dominated by men,” Justice Spector notes, “emotional distress claims have historically
been marginalized,” because the law values property and physical security over
“emotional security and human relationships” (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 642-43, internal
citations omitted). Thus, in a system dominated by men, the emotional distress torts are
allowed to exist - to give the appearance of redress for harms suffered predominately by
women - yet are “seldom successful” in practice (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 643, quoting
Justice Hecht’s opinion in this case). Justice Spector also took issue with Justice Philips
and Hecht who would have disallowed this cause of action for married people. By
consenting to marriage, she argued, a wife does not assume the risk of physical injury and
emotional harm (Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 644).
Applying her concerns of the need for the law to right wrongs that women
disproportionately face and applying the facts here, Justice Spector would have held that
Sheila should be able to recover damages “for the years of abuse she had suffered at the
hands of her husband,” whose sexual conduct was “grossly offensive” (Twyman, 855
S.W.2d at 644). Thus, while her rebuke of her colleagues and explanation of why
emotional injury in marriage needs a remedy is incredibly important, Justice Spector
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joins the other Twyman justices finding that the alleged bondage and extra-marital affair
was offensive enough to lead to civil liability.
As such, every opinion in Twyman focused on the “deviate sexual practices” of
the fetishistic and cheating spouse, who caused Sheila emotional injury. No opinion
acknowledges that the non-BDSM sex had caused Sheila actual physical harm. Instead,
the presumably vanilla injurious sex was “ignored in the face of a sexual encounter
involving bondage that caused psychic harm” (Cossman 2004, 863-64). The Twyman
court awarded damages for emotional harm, a novel concept, but not bodily harm, which
is firmly entrenched in the law. This seeming incongruity is explained by looking to the
charmed circle. Vanilla sex within heterosexual marriage is not the reason for legal
liability, even if it is physically injurious. Instead, the harm investigated and articulated
by the court is attributed to the husband’s BDSM and extramarital sex. Indeed, the
Twyman court goes so far as to create a new cause of action in the state based on these
emotional harms, rather than allow a husband to face legal repercussions for “normal”
marital sex that injured his wife. In sum, the Twyman court’s disapproval of BDSM lead
to opinions that leave out context and obscure the ability to find a just answer to Sheila’s
claims.
Other U.S. cases involving BDSM also find that there is no relevant privacy right
on the basis of harm, as in England. Yet the harm in the U.S. context is not understood be
to a broader public but rather to the BDSM bottom. The BDSM bottom is legally
considered to be “injured” regardless of whether that person believes they were injured,
as seen in People v. Samuels and Commonwealth v. Appleby.
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In People v. Samuels, 250 Cal.App.2d 501, 58 Cal.Rptr. 439 (Cal.App. 1967), an
ophthalmologist/amateur BDSM film maker was charged with sodomy, assault, and the
production and distribution of obscene materials, as well as other related charges over
videos he had filmed and participated in. The videos came to the attention of local
California police after Mr. Samuels met with a researcher from the Kinsey Institute for
Sex Research, who was interested in obtaining these films for study at the Institute. 21
The defendant mailed the films, and the researcher had them developed at a local photo
lab. The lab alerted the police, who issued an arrest warrant for the defendant (People v.
Samuels, 58 Cal.Rptr. at 440-43). The films themselves showed Mr. Samuels and other
men engaged in BDSM activities in the defendant’s home, including hitting with riding
crops, belts and canes (Id. at 444).
Once again, testimony at trial went into incredible detail about the BDSM acts.
Mr. Samuels argued that the strikes with the implements were fairly light - the men in the
film had been coached to over-react from each hit to make them seem harder, and
makeup was applied to mimic cuts and bruises (Id. at 444). An expert medical witness
testified at trial for the defendant that the types of marks in the films, combined with the
lack of body fluids on the weapons, meant that the marks must have been made by
makeup - and not from being hit (Id. at 444).22 The prosecution’s experts instead testified
that the level of violence and effects in the videos were not fake (Id. at 446). There was

21

Established in 1947 by Dr. Alfred Kinsey, the Kinsey Institute was founded to conduct research
on human sexual behavior and “to administer research resources, including research materials, a
library, case histories, and other related materials.” Often referred to as the “father of the sexual
revolution,” Dr. Kinsey’s work has “influenced social and cultural values in the United States and
around the world.” https://kinseyinstitute.org/about/history/index.php.
22
For example, the expert doctor testified that bruises appeared immediately in the films, whereas
extensive bruising takes hours after a strike. Id. at 444.
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no evidence of injury to the men in the videos introduced at trial (Id. at 447). Mr.
Samuels was convicted by a jury of several charges, including “aggravated assault.”
On appeal, the Court upheld Mr. Samuels’ aggravated assault conviction, holding
that consent was not available as a defense in this case. Instead, the court held that
although there was no California case on point, consent is only generally a defense to
assault “in a situation involving ordinary physical contact or blows incident to sports such
as football, boxing or wrestling.” People v, Samuels at 447. Further, the court noted that
“the apparent consent of a person without legal capacity to give consent, such as a child
or insane person, is ineffective.” Id. Based upon these tenets, the appellate court
proceeded to find that it “is a matter of common knowledge that a normal person in full
possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to the use, upon himself, of
force likely to produce great bodily injury.” Because a “normal” person would never truly
want to have force used against them, Mr. Samuels was guilty of a crime (Id. at 447).
Thus, as in the English context above, the seminal U.S. case on BDSM and
criminal law looks at same sex, casual, extramarital, non-vanilla sexual activities with
implements and power exchanges and determines that it is illegal. Interestingly, the U.S.
case utilizes the liberal idea that one cannot consent to injury (unless the injury is from
boxing or wrestling). However, the Court’s opinion does not raise a public harm. The
“victim” is not society, but remains the submissive man, who could only possibly have
consented to sadomasochistic activities if he suffered from a “mental aberration.” People
v. Samuel has been followed by other courts, leading to the currently established rule in
the U.S. that “consent to assault, including private sadomasochistic activities, cannot
exculpate a perpetrator” (Bergelson 2008, 685, citing State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303
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(Iowa, 1985), Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296 (Mass., 1980), among other
cases).
Commonwealth v. Appleby also denies protection to BDSM, by focusing on the
harm suffered by a (possibly) consenting person. The case was brought by a man who
alleged that he was heterosexual and he had been forced against his will to be the live-in
boyfriend and sexual submissive of another man for two years. The other man, Appleby,
argued that he and the complainant were in a long-term relationship, that included
consensual BDSM, which the complainant had repeatedly requested that the defendant
engage in. 380 Mass. 297-303. Documented in over 700 pages of testimony as to facts at
the trial, the relationship was filled with distinctly uncharmed acts and cursed sexuality
other than the BDSM: there were allegations that Appleby met the complainant while the
complainant was “ ‘hustling’ sex for money,” their “regular sexual ritual” included
“fellatio and anal intercourse,” and the complainant was a regular drug user. The court
described their relationship as “a sadomasochistic one, as well as homosexual.” Id. at
301. At trial, Appleby was sentenced to 10 years in prison, based upon one occasion in
which he had hit the complainant with a riding crop.
The appellate court upheld Appleby’s conviction, although it “express[ed] some
reservation on the severity of the sentence,” which it claimed not to have authority to
modify. Id. at 312. The Court’s ruling echoed Samuel’s denial of consent as a defense
where injury is caused, again focused on injury to the consenting BDSM bottom, holding
that assault is always assault, “whether or not the battery was related to sexual activity”
(Id. at 311).
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Thus, in this holding, the Court alleged that physical injury within consensual sex
should not be treated differently than any other battery. Yet, the fact that this was gay sex
(at first for pay) clearly led to this case being treated differently. A sentence of 10 years
in prison for an incident in which someone was hit with a stick and suffered no injury
requiring medical attention would be unheard of in a sexual encounter that was not non
societally-cursed. Appleby, like the other cases above, thus participates in sexual
repression based on a detailed telling and ultimate finding of guilt. The case also shows
in sad and stark relief how sexual acts outside of the charmed circle can lead to immense
legal repercussions.

IV.

Conclusion

In theory, alternate accounts of privacy already existing within Western political thought
and used within English and U.S. jurisprudence on sex acts might offer the possibility of
moving towards erotic justice in the law. Specifically, a view of privacy in which the
private domain is every act a person engages in, so long as they do not choose acts that
harm others seems promising for protecting a range of sex acts. This ambulatory and
agential view of privacy, focused not on discrete areas that need to be pre-approved by a
Court or in literal private spaces, could allow for the protection of disfavored sex acts.
However, comparatively analyzing case law in England and the United States in
the distinctly uncharmed area of BDSM shows even cases using this alternate conception
of privacy have only found protections where the situation was otherwise within the
charmed circle. In the English cases, unsupported allegations of public harm were
sufficient to remove any privacy rights that might have protected those engaged in nonnormative sexuality. In the U.S. cases, a legal conclusion of harm to the bottoms
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expelled BDSM acts from legal protections. Harm in U.S. cases is established by a
judicial finding that one was wronged - even when this allegedly harmed person insists
that they were not harmed at all. In sum, only those in married, monogamous, and
heterosexual relationships have found success in claims for sexual privacy in English and
U.S. BDSM case law. In practice, privacy in U.S. and England only protects those
already within charmed spaces. Privacy, then, is a trap in the search for erotic justice.
Privacy could perhaps be rehabilitated. For example, a Court might be able to use
an ambulatory view of privacy for erotic justice, if also working within the robust
conception of equality advocated for by Ginsburg (1985), discussed above. But the
tendency of spatial assumptions, normative relationships and elastic conceptions of
public harm to curtail privacy raises doubts about rehabilitation. Additionally, many of
the sexual acts outside the charmed circle have a public dimension. The next chapters
explore what other frameworks might allow Courts to foster erotic justice, either on their
own or in combination with an agential view of privacy.
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CHAPTER 3:
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE PROMISE AND DANGER OF THE PUBLIC

I.

Introduction
Of all constitutionally guaranteed rights, freedom of expression is conventionally

understood as one of the most fundamental and necessary for a democracy - although the
United States has often been criticized for going too far in its protection of hate speech
(Rosenfeld 2003). Freedom of expression provisions have been involved in major
constitutional decisions on sexual acts, both in the U.S. and in other constitutional
democracies. As discussed below, a basic principle of freedom of expression is that it
protects public acts. For example, in the U.S. an act may be protected as freedom of
expression if it takes place in a traditionally “public” forum, but will not covered by the
Constitution if done was in a “private” forum (Inazu 2015).23

23

However, U.S. First Amendment doctrine has been critiqued as considering space to be a
neutral, static factor when regulating free speech, thus allowing restrictions on space as it relates
to political speech to be found constitutional once passing a very low bar (Zick 2006, 439 (““[t]o
the extent that ‘place’ enters constitutional discourse at all, it is as nothing more than a resource, a
parcel of property, or an inert element of the expressive background.”; Crocker 2007, 2587
(“[u]nder current First Amendment jurisprudence, public officials exercise increasingly effective
means of displacing dissent through the regulation of place. By rendering dissent invisible,
official control over the location of speech threatens a core, even romantic, value protected by the
First Amendment.”)). Indeed, legal scholars have urged that Foucault’s insights into the ability of
space, as a dynamic and active force, that controls and disciplines, be taken into account by
courts. (See, e.g., Zick 2006, 583 (constitutional law on the First Amendment “does not
adequately take into account that where a speaker or group of speakers is placed profoundly
impacts expressive message, persuasive efficacy, participation, and symbolic meaning” and
“[p]urportedly neutral restrictions on place can and do cancel expressive and associative rights”);
Crocker 2007, 2600, fn 97 (“Architectural control of place, and the spaces that constitute a
particular place, is an effective means of asserting state power without appearing to censor
speech. Nonetheless, architecture is a means of control, as Michel Foucault famously argued.”).
For example, attention has been drawn to the ways in which free (political) speech has
been “disciplined, controlled, and even suppressed through a variety of special tactics” (Zick
2006, 581). As evidence, attention has been drawn to the confinement of protesters away from the

75

Queer theory has been particularly attuned to the importance of public spaces as
sites of conflict, contradiction and resistance. Jack Halberstam, for example, has
elucidated a “queer” approach to space (and time). This approach sees space and time as
“social constructions forged out of vibrant and volatile social relations.” Halberstam’s
approach also reveals the processes of normalization involved in these spatial
constructions (2005, ch. 1).
Writing within a larger project of “queer culture building,” that is, “the changed
possibilities of identity, intelligibility, publics, culture and sex that appear when the
heterosexual couple is no longer the referent or the privileged example of sexual culture,”
Berlant and Warner discuss how public spaces can fit into this project (1998, 548).
Focusing specifically on Christopher Street in NYC’s West Village, they explain how a
street itself can become queer, in that it “develops a dense, publicly accessible sexual
culture” (1998, 562).
Perhaps most helpful to the project at hand here is their insight that an urban
space is not “a community of shared interest based on residence and property” (1998,
562). Instead, they argue that is “always a host space,” where the “right to the city
extends to those who use the city” (1998, 562). For Berlant and Warner, our
misconception of the city as a place where the relevant interests are those of property
owners is not accidental, but in fact the result (in part) of coercive gender norms and

events that they are protesting in the forms of “free speech cages,” “restricted zones,” and “frozen
zones,” and the widespread use of metal barricades, nets and laws regarding use of the sidewalks
to control the movement of protesters in general (Zick, 2006, 581-82; Crocker 2007, 2588-89).
Thus, not only is the public-ness of space central to First Amendment protections, there are
convincing arguments as to why courts should pay even closer attention to space in determining
how expressive conduct is to be protected.
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conventions. “It is not because of a fluke in the politics of zoning that urban space is so
deeply misrecognized,” they write. “[N]ormal sexuality requires such misrecognitions,
including their economic and legal enforcement, in order to sustain its illusion of
humanity” (1998, 562). Laws that target disfavored sex acts in public, such as public
indecency and anti-solicitation laws (and, as I posit in this chapter, exotic dancing clubs),
thus work to create and enforce the division and hierarchal valuation of
normal/good/blessed versus abnormal/bad/cursed sex and persons. Working from this
and other understandings of spaces as sexualized, Sara Ahmed has proposed that sexual
orientation itself be understood as “a matter of residence, of how we inhabit spaces, and
who or what we inhabit spaces with” (2006, 543).24
Vivian K. Namaste’s works also help us to understand the public dimensions at
stake in anti-sex laws and challenges to them. In writing on gendered spatiality, Namaste
argues that there is a “policing [of] gender presentation through public and private space”
(2000, 136). Spaces are themselves gendered, and this recognition casts the public/
private dichotomy into doubt. Because of the discipline and regulation at play, “commonplace assumptions of what constitutes ‘public’ space, who has the right to occupy it, and
how people should interact therein” should all be questioned (141). The law itself is thus
constructed in order to designate who may be in “public” places and what they may do
there.

24

On other queer geographies, Ahmed cites to David Bell and Gill Valentine, eds., Mapping
Desires: Geographies of Sexualities (London: Routledge, 1995); Frank Browning, A Queer
Geography (New York: Noonday, 1998); and David Bell, ed., Pleasure Zones: Bodies, Cities,
Spaces (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001).
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Namaste continues that “entrance into the public sphere is secured through the
enactment of a sanctioned gender identity, preferably within the context of a heterosexual
dyad,” such that the “demarcation of public space is intimately related to the articulation
of culturally sanctioned gender identities” (143). Thus some regulations of “bad”
sexuality, such as zoning laws for strip clubs and “loitering for the purpose of
prostitution” laws, can be understood as an attempt to ensure that only those who perform
good sexuality are allowed to remain in public places. These laws show how access to
and construction of “public” spaces are implicated by the regulation of sex acts. Freedom
of expression and the public are therefore concerns central to erotic justice.
This chapter first examines sex acts under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which protects freedoms of speech and expression. Looking to cases on
“obscenity” and “nudity” in public, Section II concludes that existing U.S. application of
the First Amendment to sex acts does not merely interpret its Constitution, but produces
and reinforces some acts as good and natural, and others as bad, wrong and sinful - by
explicitly referencing the need to police “morality” and “social order” via regulations on
sex acts.
Section II then argues that although First Amendment jurisprudence has not been
protective of “damned” sex acts, the U.S. Supreme Court does have other tools in its First
Amendment case law to aid in achieving a system of erotic justice. Specifically, the Court
could recognize the emotive force of an individual’s choice of their method of
expression. Using explicit language is protected by the U.S. Constitution because of the
power of some “dirty” words. This concept could be transplanted to the context of a
similarly dirty act - exotic dancing.
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Section III looks to Canadian constitutional law on freedom of expression and
sexuality. In Canada, sex acts are not protected if they are “commercial,” “exceed
community standards of tolerance,” or cause “harm.” Harm in the Canadian context
includes “degradation of women,” and a woman can be constitutionally arrested and
criminally sanctioned for degrading herself. Section III concludes that Canadian case law
cannot move us closer to erotic justice, or protect “damned” sex acts.
Section IV turns to the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decisions on sex
acts. Arising in the context of South Africa’s robust constitutional protections for
freedom of expression, the Court’s jurisprudence closely analyzes the U.S. and Canadian
decisions discussed in the previous Chapter and previsions section of this Chapter. The
Court teases out and highlights the complexity of this area, and how neither Canada nor
the U.S. has been able to protect (or strip protections from) sex acts in a coherent manner.
Though its analysis gets to the heart of problems in Canadian and U.S. jurisprudence on
sex acts, the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decisions do not themselves provides
tools for erotic justice.
Freedom of expression, then, offers promise for protecting sex acts, but - like the
privacy guarantees discussed in the previous chapter - in practice only sex acts within the
charmed circle have been granted protections. Instead, governments have been allowed to
regulate and criminalize damned sex acts while merely paying lip service to freedom of
expression. In particular, payment for a sex act expels it from constitutional protection explicitly in Canada and in practice in the United States.
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II.

Freedom from Expression: Sex Acts under the U.S. Constitution
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has considered whether

sex acts deserve constitutional protection under the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment to its Constitution. This First Amendment
jurisprudence has focused on two main legal theories: (1) obscenity, which the Supreme
Court has held is categorically not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantees of free
speech, and (2) case law surrounding nudity. Decided in the context of cases on
pornography and strip clubs, two distinctly un-charmed areas, the Supreme Court has
found little to no protections for sexuality.
That U.S. jurisprudence fails to protect sex acts is glaringly at odds with the
U.S.’s otherwise incredibly robust conception of symbolic and expressive acts that
deserve constitutional safeguards, and which extend to non-sexual commercial speech
(see e.g. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); Strossen 1995, 38-39). Indeed, the
international legal community is in near consensus that U.S. protections of free speech,
including hate speech and “speech” by corporations in the form of donating massive
amounts of money to political candidates, extend much too far (see Rosenfeld 2003). Yet,
as discussed below, the U.S.’s protection of sexuality is sharply circumscribed. As such,
sex acts under the U.S. Constitution would be better understood as freedom from
expression, rather than freedom of expression.
Morals and Social Order over Expression: Nudity and Obscenity under the
First Amendment
As background, the U.S. Constitution protects not just the spoken word, but many
forms of “expressive conduct.” Under this doctrine, actions ranging from burning the
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U.S. flag (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)) and the Ku Klux Klan burning crosses
(R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003))
have been founded to be acts protected by the U.S. Constitution. However, there is a twopart test for determining whether particular conduct is “communicative” enough to be
protected: (1) whether there was an intent to convey a particular message and (2) the
likelihood that someone viewing the act would understand this message (Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404). Therefore, in determining whether conduct “expresses” a
message, a typical viewer must not only understand that the actor is trying to express a
message, but understand their intended message itself.
Further, under U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are present in the same expressive conduct, the government can pass
restrictions that “incidentally” restrict the non-speech expressive conduct - as long as its
regulation is not intended to interfere with the expression (391 U.S. at 376). As such,
governments can restrict expressive conduct in the U.S. without showing a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored regulation - as long as the repression of expression is an
unintended side effect of its regulation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the O’Brien test to regulations of sexuallyoriented businesses. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the
Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that targeted adult movie theatres in a
Washington city. At issue was an ordinance prohibiting a business which “has as its
primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials” from
operating within 1,000 feet of a residential zone, church, park or school. The Court
decided that this law did not violate the First Amendment, reasoning that the law was
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“aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather
the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community” (Id. at 47,
emphasis in original).
Following Renton, regulations on sexually oriented businesses have been
routinely passed by legislatures and upheld by courts. These constitutionally-permissible
rules take the form of zoning laws as in Renton, regulation of alcohol depending on level
of nudity (e.g., in Las Vegas, New Jersey and Connecticut a club may sell alcohol if the
dancers are topless, but not if there are exposed genitals), age requirements, contact
between dancers and patrons (e.g. whether lap dances are legal), licensing laws (e.g.,
exotic dancers in Detroit have to pay an annual fee and pass a background check),
taxations (e.g. Texas requires a $5 entrance fee to every strip club, paid to a foundation
for victims of sexual assault) and nudity rules.25 Rules on how much nudity is legal are
discussed in depth below, in the Barnes and City of Erie cases.
As further background, all speech and expressive conduct is protected in the
United States, unless it falls into one of four categories: (1) imminent incitement to
violence, which is both intended to and likely to actually incite such violence under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); (2) “fighting words” in which speech is
directed to a specific person and is likely to incite a violent response from that person
under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and modified by Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)26; (3) non-obscene child pornography under New York v.

25

https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-laws-and-regulations/adult-entertainment-lawzoning-and-other-regulations.html.
26
No conviction under the fighting words doctrine has been upheld at the U.S. Supreme Court
level since the Chaplinksy case in the 1940’s. However, lower courts routinely cite the fighting
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Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (Brown 1982); and (4) obscenity. Unless speech/expressive
conduct falls into one of these four categories, the government must pass a strict level of
judicial scrutiny, by proving that it has a compelling interest in restricting particular
speech, and that its regulation is narrowly tailored to that compelling interest (Caine
2004, 1341-42). Again, this strict level of scrutiny is not applied when the regulation of
speech is a secondary effect of an otherwise constitutional law (under O’Brien). And this
high level of scrutiny is only applied to expressive (non-speech) conduct when there was
an intent to convey a particular message and likelihood that someone viewing the act
would understand this message (under Texas v. Johnson).
In the U.S., whether an act or material is “obscene,” and therefore not covered by
constitutional protections, turns on a three-part test developed in the case of Miller v.
California: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; . . .
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973)). If an action meets all three of these Miller criteria, the act is
categorically not protected by the U.S. Constitution,
The Miller case itself involved an arrest under California’s anti-obscenity law for
the mass mailing of sexually-explicit advertisements for pornographic films, after several
people who received the materials complained. Miller was convicted, and his sentence
affirmed by a lower court. In their decision, the Supreme Court rejected the earlier
words doctrine in upholding convictions for breach of the peace and disorderly conduct (Caine
2004, 547-550; Hudson 2012).
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“utterly without redeeming social value” test for obscenity from their Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) decision, which Miller had been convicted under,
and sent his case back to the lower court for review under the Supreme Court’s newly
pronounced three-part test.
The other major way that the U.S. Supreme Court has considered cases involving
sex acts is through cases deciding whether non-obscene “nudity” should be protected as
part of First Amendment guarantees to freedom of expression at all. The two landmark
Supreme Court cases to decide whether non-obscene sex acts are protected by the U.S.
constitution were both brought by strip clubs, each of which sought to overturn laws
requiring dancers to cover parts of their breasts and genitals.
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991), the Kitty Kat Lounge filed suit to
challenge Indiana’s “public indecency” law, which criminalized being in a “public place”
and “in a state of nudity.” A state of nudity was defined as “the showing of the human
male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering,
the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the
nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.”27 In

27

The entire text Indiana's public indecency statute provided:
"(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:"
"(1) engages in sexual intercourse;"
"(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;"
"(3) appears in a state of nudity; or"
"(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person;"
"commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor."
"(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered
male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." Ind.Code § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
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practice, the law meant that women could be arrested and charged with misdemeanor
crimes if they did not wear at minimum G-strings and pasties.
In its decision, a plurality of the Barnes Court held that states may
constitutionally ban public nudity. According to the Court, nude dancing can be
politically expressive. However, a ban on nude dancing could further the substantial
government interest in protecting “societal order,” “public order” and “morality” specifically the important state interest of “moral disapproval of people appearing in the
nude among strangers in public places.” (Ibid. 568-69). Doing this balancing, the Court
found that the state’s interests outweighed any freedom of expression rights that the
dancers might have.
The court supported its holding by citing the “ancient origin” of the “offense” to
the “Bible story of Adam and Eve” and the wide-spread existence (in 47 states, in 1991)
of public indecency laws (Ibid. 568). The Court also relied on the now-overruled case of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1984),28 upholding the law on the basis that “[t]his
and other public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order”
and that “the traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide
for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation”
(Ibid. 569). In short, “public nudity” is an “evil” which the state was legitimately seeking
to protect its inhabitants from (Ibid. 571). As such, Indiana could constitutionally require

28

In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) the Supreme Court held that laws criminalizing
consensual gay sex (as “sodomy”) were constitutional. Bowers was overturned by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Lawrence Court found that anti-sodomy laws criminalizing gay
sex violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Chapter 2 for an in-depth
discussion of the Bowers and Lawrence cases.
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dancers to wear G-strings and pasties, even inside of privately-owned establishments
frequently only by adults.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter agreed that states could criminalize nude
dancing based upon the “pernicious secondary effects” of nude dancing. These
secondary effects include “prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes.” Further,
the state may justify a ban on nude dancing by relying on these alleged secondary effects,
even without any “localized proof of those effects” (Ibid. Souter, J., concurring, 585).
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that laws do not have to be
predicated on harm in order to be valid. No one needs to be injured in order for a criminal
law to be valid. Instead, Scalia argued, “[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies
have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they are
considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral” (Ibid. Scalia, J.,
concurring, 575). Again citing to Bowers, Scalia gave examples of conduct that is illegal
solely because it is immoral. “In American society,” Scalia wrote, “such prohibitions
have included, for example, sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use,
prostitution, and sodomy” (Ibid. Scalia, J., concurring, 575). Although Scalia agreed that
“there may be great diversity of view on whether various of these prohibitions should
exist (though [he has] found few ready to abandon, in principle, all of them),” all of these
laws are constitutional - even though each regulates morality (Ibid. Scalia, J., concurring,
575).
The dissenting justices in the Barnes argued that fully nude dancing is expressive
speech protected by the U.S. Constitution, and therefore Indiana’s public indecency laws
are unconstitutional. However, even the dissenting justices made a distinction between
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nude dancing in theaters/strip clubs and nudity “in parks, beaches, hot dog stands, and
like public places,” which was proscribed “to protect others from offense” (Barnes, 501
U.S. at 591, White, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
would have struck down Indiana’s “indecency” statute as an unconstitutional regulation
on expressive conduct, which did not serve a compelling interest and was not narrowly
tailored (as required by general First Amendment law when it is Nazis and the Ku Klux
Klan at issue, as opposed to strippers). In so doing, the dissent argued that nude dancing
is clearly expressive conduct. Nude dancing was targeted for criminalization precisely
because of its power to convey ideas and emotions:
Since the State permits the dancers to perform if they wear pasties and G-strings
but forbids nude dancing, it is precisely because of the distinctive, expressive
content of the nude dancing performances at issue in this case that the State seeks
to apply the statutory prohibition. It is only because nude dancing performances
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the
spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity, apparently on
the assumption that creating or emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the minds
of the spectators may lead to increased prostitution and the degradation of
women.[29] But generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the essence of
communication (Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592-93, White, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.,
and Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Barnes all produce and
reinforce the boundaries of charmed/good versus bad/abnormal sex acts - explicitly
relying on the needs to keep “societal order” and uphold “morals” in stripping
commercial, public, casual, non-paired, non-procreative sex acts of any protection.30

29

As discussed in detail in the below sections, regulations on sex acts based upon a concern for
“degradation of women” has been repeatedly upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court, under its
Constitution and jurisprudence.
30
The complete oral argument in Barnes was turned into a play, titled Arguendo, in which the
entire arguments are “interspersed with bits of real interviews with the justices, the lawyers and
an exotic dancer who traveled all the way from the Déja Vu Club in Saginaw, Michigan to listen
to the argument at The Supreme Court.” https://www.elevator.org/shows/arguendo/.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that the criminalization of nudity does not
violate the U.S. Constitution in the case of City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277
(2000). City of Erie also involved a strip club, in this case challenging a newly enacted
local law which made it illegal to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a “state
of nudity” (Id. At 283). The ordinance defined “nudity” as “the showing of the human
male or female genital [sic], pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque
covering; the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any
part of the nipple; the exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the
appearance of or simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal region or
pubic hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a cover over the nipples and/or
areola of the female breast, which device simulates and gives the realistic appearance of
nipples and/or areola” (Id. at 283-84). As such, in order to comply with this ordinance,
dancers (or anyone in “public”) in Erie would need to wear, at a minimum, pasties and a
G-string, as was the case in Barnes (Id. At 284). The City of Erie stated that it adopted
the law “for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within
the City, which activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health,
safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment,
public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other
deleterious effects” (Id. at 290). 553 Pa., at 359, 719 A. 2d, at 279. Pap’s A. M., the
operator of “Kandyland,” brought suit, alleging that this law infringed the dancers’
freedom of expression.
The highest court of Pennsylvania agreed with Kandyland, and found that that the
ordinance did unconstitutionally burden expressive conduct. Looking to the Barnes case,
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the Pennsylvania court stated that nudity itself is not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment, because it does not convey a message. However, also citing the plurality
opinion in Barnes, the Court noted that nude dancing could convey messages, and
therefore is entitled to some constitutional protection. The Pennsylvania court also
determined that this law was not content neutral, and that at least part of its purpose was
to regulate strip dancing. In other words, the law was explicitly targeting one method of
expression for disfavored treatment, and was enacted with the purpose “to impact
negatively on the erotic message of the dance” (Id. at 286). As evidence that the law was
targeting nude dancing for special (negative) treatment, the Court pointed out that the
city’s lawyers had argued that the law would not apply to “legitimate” theater
productions (id. at 292).

Therefore, the Court applied the highest level of judicial

review, strict scrutiny, and found that although Erie might have a compelling interest in
stopping sex crimes, making dancers wear pasties and G-strings is not “narrowly
tailored” to this interest. The Pennsylvania court instead suggested that if Erie truly
wanted to stop “sex crimes,” as opposed to stopping “erotic dancing,” it could instead just
criminalize people who commit sex crimes as opposed to women working topless (id.).
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, in a deeply fractured decision with no
majority opinion. Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (the first woman
to be a judge on the U.S.’s highest court) noted that the Erie ordinance was an update of
the 1866 “Indecency and Immorality” law, which predates the existence of strip clubs
(although Justice O’Connor did not provide any support to her contention that strip clubs
are new phenomena). Justice O’Connor then determined that Erie’s law was about
prohibiting all public nudity, and not solely “nudity that contains an erotic message” or is
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accompanied by other “expressive activity” (id. at 290). Erie’s law, for Justice
O’Connor, was really about combatting “crime and other negative secondary effects
caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments like Kandyland and not at
suppressing the erotic message conveyed by this type of nude dancing.” Therefore “the
ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the
effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the secondary effects,
such as the impacts on public health, safety, and welfare, which we have previously
recognized are ‘caused by the presence of even one such’ establishment” (id. at 291,
internal citations omitted). Neither the Erie not Barnes Courts cited evidence that strip
clubs are actually associated with criminal activity, public health concerns, or any other
alleged secondary effect.
Barnes and City of Erie have been interpreted by lower courts in the U.S. to stand
for the proposition that nudity is protected as expressive conduct only if three conditions
are satisfied: (1) the nudity is combined with other conduct that is protected by the First
Amendment, (2) the nudity carries a particularized message related to the protected
conduct, and (3) there is a great likelihood that those who see view this conduct will
understand the particular political message conveyed by the nudity.
For example, a lower court in California upheld a law against public nudity, in a
challenge brought by the organizers of the “San Diego Naked Bicycle Ride.” The bicycle
ride in San Diego was part of nude bike rides around the world, to protest oil-based
transportation because of its effects on the environment. The first element above was
satisfied, because a street protest for a political cause is core-protected conduct. Turning
to the second factor, the organizers argued that their nudity carried a particularized
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message related to their protected conduct in seven ways: (1) Fragility of the human body
and sanctity of life, (2) Safety of bicyclists while sharing roads with motorists, (3) Effects
of vehicle emissions on human health and the environment, (4) Effects of our current
transportation system and technology on culture and the human spirit, (5) Threat to
national security due to dependence on foreign oil, (6) Beauty and inherent decency of
the human body, and (6) Use of public nudity to affect social change. The Court
disagreed. Citing to the Erie decision, the California court found that these links between
the riders’ nudity and their message was too attenuated to merit constitutional protection
(Bush v. City of San Diego, No. 10CV1188-LAB (RBB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57922,
at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2010).
These Supreme Court nude dancing cases have been widely criticized as poorly
written and poorly reasoned, and in how they turn an abstract and undefined “morality”
into an important state interest (see Adler 2005, 1122-23, citing to articles; Adler 2007,
298). The opinions do not explain how G-strings and pasties lead to less crime or fewer
sexually transmitted diseases than fully nude dancing. Indeed, in its opinions, the Court
itself seemed uncomfortable, embarrassed, and aware of the gaps in its reasoning (Adler
2007, 298). As Amy Adler has noted, in Erie v. Pap’s A.M., Justice Stevens wrote in his
dissenting opinion that the majority opinion “required nothing short of a titanic surrender
to the implausible” (2000, 323). Justice Souter wrote that the majority of the Court had
abandoned “common sense” (313 n2). And Justice Scalia, who voted with the majority in
both Erie and in Barnes wrote that he was “highly skeptical, to tell the truth,” of the
states’ stated rationale of the laws that he found constitutional regardless.
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Surprisingly, existing critiques of Barnes v. Glen Theatre and Erie v. Pap’s A.M.
have been largely devoid of a gender analysis. One scholar who has approached these
decisions through a feminist lens has argued in several pieces that the otherwise scattered,
incoherent opinions make sense in the social context of the U.S., “in which the nude
woman’s body stands for danger, debasement, crime, violence, disease, a threat to the
institution of heterosexuality, and even death” (Adler 2005, 1127). In explaining why a
G-string, a tiny piece of fabric that covers barely anything appears to be so important to
state legislatures and the Supreme Court, Adler uses Freud and psychoanalysis to argue
that these laws are about protecting people from the sight of a vagina:
The G-string conceals a very small part of the body, the sight of which is a very
big deal. It covers the hole, the evidence that the woman does not have a penis.
And . . . the sight of the woman’s “lack” ushers in the panic of castration anxiety
for the male viewer. The woman’s vagina - her bleeding hole - signifies not only a
terrifying threat of castration to the male viewer; it also signifies a hole in
language, a threat to the very possibility of stable meaning on which speech, and
thus First Amendment law, depend (2005, 1129-30).
Whether it is the sight of a vagina, or women dancing in sexually suggestive ways for
money, U.S. case law allows any expressive possibilities to be outweighed by vague and
unarticulated (yet somehow also compelling) appeals to public health and safety.
In conclusion, the current state of free expression jurisprudence entirely excludes
acts that it deems “obscene.” This test for obscenity includes whether the act is offensive
under local standards, and whether the act shows “too much interest” in sex. Even if they
are not offensive to others and are not “prurient” (and are therefore not obscene), sex acts
that involve nudity are still not afforded constitutional protections. These restrictions
against nudity are constitutional when based upon unsubstantiated appeals to morals,
order, and claims that women dancing nude leads to other crimes - including the crime of
“prostitution.” In effect, the current application of the First Amendment to sex acts in the
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U.S. legal system does not merely interpret the U.S. Constitution, but actively produces
and reinforces the idea that some acts are good and natural, and others are bad, wrong and
sinful - all while explicitly referencing the need to police “morality” and the “social
order” via regulations on sex acts.
These regulations of sex acts have been primarily focused on the regulation of
sexually oriented businesses. The major Supreme Court cases on sex acts that use the
freedom of expression framework have all been commercial - erotic dancing (Erie and
Barnes) and advertisements for pornography (Miller). All of these cases found no
protection for the paid sex acts - despite no acknowledgment in any of these cases of their
commercial nature, and the explicit protection of commercial speech in the United States.
The next section discusses how the U.S. might rehabilitate its jurisprudence to protect sex
acts outside of the charmed circle - especially paid ones.
One Woman’s Vulgarity is Another Person’s Lyric: Recognizing the
Emotive Force of Sex Acts
Although current Free Speech jurisprudence in the U.S. as regards strip clubs and
pornography has served as a method of sexual oppression, the Supreme Court could use
other tools from its First Amendment case law to aid in achieving a system of erotic
justice. Specifically, the Court could move away from its view of some sexual acts as
“minimally expressive” and re-center sexuality as core political speech, which merits the
strongest protections from governmental restrictions. This robust protection would
encompass sex acts on the outer limits - acts that are in public, are paid, and not
procreative, are not about love and involve strangers.
The logic from, and jurisprudence subsequently based upon, the seminal U.S.
Supreme Court case of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) provides one such
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avenue for correcting the course of U.S. law on sexuality. Paul Cohen was arrested at the
height of the Vietnam War for “disturbing the peace” because he wore a coat that said
“Fuck the Draft” in a California courthouse. Mr. Cohen was sentenced to thirty days in
jail. His conviction was upheld by the lower court, despite his assertion that he wore this
jacket to tell the public about how strongly he was opposed to the Vietnam War.
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed Cohen’s conviction.
The Cohen v. California decision is relevant to issues of sexuality in three major ways:
the emphasis on “expressive conduct”; the discussion of the emotive force of certain
forms of expression; and the holding that what form of expression to use is a decision for
the “speaker,” and not the government. First, the Supreme Court held that the words on
Cohen’s coat were a form of “speech” that could be protected by the First Amendment as
a type of “expressive conduct,” just as participating in a march - or, as will be discussed
later, acts such as burning the U.S. flag - would be. Additionally, the court partially
overruled its prior decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which
had held that words that by their “very utterance” inflict an injury on listeners or words
that have a general tendency to breach the peace are not protected by the U.S.
Constitution.
Rejecting this broad standard, the Court narrowed what had been considered to be
the “fighting words” exception to First Amendment protection to only words/expressions
that are (a) delivered to a specific person and (b) is likely to provoke a violent response
from that person. In so doing, the Court established its enduring presumption that speech
in the U.S. is protected, unless there is a particularized justification for prohibiting it.
The Court held that being exposed to a variety of forms of speech and expression is part
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of being in the public sphere - and this is something for the person in public to grapple
with, as opposed to the speaker/actor. Thus, the Court held that the default rule will be
that speech is protected, and that the burden lays on the people around the speaker to
avert their eyes. In other words, the possibility that people may not like, or may even be
emotionally injured by, one’s speech does not take away the First Amendment
protections given to that speech. This doctrine has been repeatedly re-affirmed by the
Supreme Court, and is the backbone of the U.S. protection of hate speech - a form of
speech not protected by most other constitutional democracies (Post 1991, X). Because
people in the court’s hallway were free to look away or walk away from Cohen’s jacket,
the Supreme Court ruled that his speech passed the above test, and could not be
prohibited by California.
The Court’s reasoning can be applied to the protection of sexual acts. Famously
noting that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” (403 U.S. at 25), the Court reasoned
that in the U.S. individuals decide what kinds of words and conduct they want to use to
express themselves. The Court also recognized that words have psychic and emotional, as
well as rational, force - they can convey a range of emotions:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often
be the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated. Id. at 26.
In Cohen’s case, the words on his jacket, and particularly the word “fuck,” had an
emotive force, which expressed the depth of his opposition to the government’s policies.
Because of this emotive potential the Court held that the word “fuck” was
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constitutionally valuable, and thus the Chaplinsky case was overruled to the extent that it
held that epithets are low-value speech. Thus, as the words on Cohen’s jacket were not an
immediate invitation to a specific brawl, he was in effect engaging in constitutionallyprotected conduct.
Sexual acts, and especially those outside of the charmed circle, often contain an
emotive force – an element of expression that the Court in Cohen recognized as more
important than the cognitive message being communicated. As discussed in depth in
Chapter 1, sexuality and sexiness have caused outrage and virulent fights, including
among those with shared interests in fighting against patriarchy and gender-based
oppression (Duggan 1995, 1-2). And as discussed in Chapter 2, cases involving BDSM
have also led to shock, outrage and disgust amongst general populations. Expressive
conduct jurisprudence in the U.S. explicitly recognizes that the type of conduct most
valuable and deserving of protection is that which invites dispute, holding that free
speech “may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger” (Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989), citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
As such, sexuality’s past and present of creating unrest and stirring people to anger and
debate should make it exactly the type of conduct considered most worthy of protecting
in the U.S.’s constitutional democracy. Further, just as in Chaplinsky, if people do not
like particular sex acts, it is their option to turn away and not look at it. It is not the
burden of the sexual actor to no longer be sexual in public. This is especially persuasive
when considering strip clubs, which people choose to purposefully enter. In short, U.S.
First Amendment jurisprudence is clear that being in public involves being exposed to
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things that one may disagree with and that may upset and anger someone, and that this is
a good thing - something that our Constitution wishes to encourage and protect. Indeed,
as Nadine Strossen argues, if sexual acts like pornography were not themselves deeply
political matters, there would not be a strong movement in the courts and legislatures to
police and penalize them (1994, 38-39).
However, in practice the doctrine of expressive conduct has allowed the
government wide latitude to infringe such conduct when it has “other” concerns, while
requiring constitutional actors to know what message they are trying to convey with their
conduct, and requiring that others understand their message. This problem becomes acute
in the area of sexuality and the systems of power in which it is enmeshed - an arena not
characterized by rational actors and audiences who necessarily know on a conscious and
articulable level what “particularized messages” their sexual acts convey. As such,
although free expression jurisprudence in the United States offers theoretical possibilities
for erotic justice, lawmakers are able to easily skirt constitutional review through
regulations targeting “secondary effects.”

III.

“Do you want to fuck?”: Money, Tolerance and Harm in Canadian Law
Case law around sexuality and nudity in Canada has followed from two prominent

fact patterns: “top nudity” in public and regulations on alcohol in strip clubs. In both
areas, the three main relevant factors to whether nudity and sexuality are protected as
freedom of expression in Canada are (1) whether nudity/sexuality in public is
“commercial”; (2) whether the nudity/sexuality at issue “exceeds community standards of
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tolerance”; and (3) whether the nudity/sexuality at issue has caused “harm.”31 As
discussed in depth below, although Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin were not
successful in implementing anti-pornography ordinances in the United States, Canadian
case law in this area has adopted many of their arguments regarding the inherent harm to
women and society that occurs when women are sexual in public - to the point where the
arrest of those women for degrading themselves is justified.
Case law on topless women in public in Canada has revolved around the
interpretation of Canada’s Criminal Code Section 173 and 174, which criminalize
“indecent acts” and “nudity” respectively. Looking to the text of the laws, Section 173(1)
generally makes liable for a criminal offense “Everyone who wilfully [sic] does an
indecent act in a public place in the presence of one or more persons, or in any place with
intent to insult or offend any person.” Section 173(2) focuses on the narrower crime of
“exposure,” which is committed by “Every person who, in any place, for a sexual
purpose, exposes his or her genital organs to a person who is under the age of 16 years.”
What comprises an “indecent” act is not defined in subsection 1, and the Supreme Court
of Canada held that because of Section 174’s explicit reference to nudity (discussed
below), “the Code clearly has dealt with nudity in a public place and ... the phrase
indecent act connotes something more active, with greater moral turpitude than the mere
state of being nude in a public place.” (R v Bennet (1975) 29 C.C.C. (2d) 403 (B.C.S.C.)
(emphasis in original).
The specific types of “harm” caused by nudity and sexuality elucidated by Canadian courts,
and the relation with feminist debates on sexuality in so defining harm, is discussed at length in
this section. As an introductory matter, the role of “harm” in this area of jurisprudence arises
from the political thought of John Stuart Mill, whose “harm principle” held that the only
justification for restricting freedom of speech and expression is if that expression causes harm to
others (Sumner 2004, 117).
31
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Section 174 of the Canadian Criminal Code outlaws “nudity,” stating that
“(1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, (a) is nude in a public place, or (b) is nude
and exposed to public view while on private property, whether or not the property is his
own, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.” For purposes of the
section, “a person is nude who is so clad as to offend against public decency or order”
(174(2)).32 The law does not define nudity with reference to specific body parts, but bases
whether someone is “nude” solely upon whether they are dressed so as to offend public
decency or order, also without defining those terms. See R. v. Giambalvo (1982), 1982
CanLII 2043 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (2d) 588, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 324, reversing 63 C.C.C. (2d)
122, 124 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) (upholding the criminal conviction of a dancer who had been
wearing some clothing but has “exposed genitalia,” finding that she had offended public
decency or order because “decent civilized standards of modesty appropriate to this time
and this community still require that all persons, male or female, who are in a public
place, at the very least, not expose their genitalia to public view.” Ibid. at 124).
The seminal Canadian case interpreting Sections 173 and 174 of the Canadian
Criminal Code is R v. Jacob (1996) 31 O.R. (3d) 350), which resulted from the arrest of
Jacob, a feminist philosophy student, under Section 173(1) “after walking through
downtown Guelph [in Ontario] and sitting on a front porch with her breasts exposed on a
particularly hot and humid day,” after a woman had contacted the police because her
child had seen Jacob topless. Jacob argued that she wanted to draw attention to the double
standard in which men could walk topless in the heat, and that she had a constitutional

As will be discussed further below, it should be noted that “nudity” under Canadian criminal
law is defined entirely in relation to “offending public decency or order” - and not with reference
to actually be in any state of dress or undress.
32
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right to also walk topless should she desire. At the trial court level, in order to determine
whether Jacob had the requisite intent to “insult or offend any person,” the judge applied
a “general community standards” test. Based on the judge’s observation that “women
generally have not chosen to be seen publicly with their breasts exposed,” Jacob was
convicted and fined $75, and her conviction was upheld on appeal.
On higher appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court noted that a Section
173 indecency arrests did not need to involve “sexual content,” and held that a
“community standard of tolerance test” should be used to determine whether Jacob had
violated the law. In applying that test, the Court found that the trial court had erred in
looking to how women choose to dress, and instead the focus should be on what the
“contemporary national community would tolerate.” In addition, the court found that
there must be some harm from the conduct, for it to be criminal. In this case, because the
Jacobs acts were “entirely non-commercial” and there was nothing “degrading or
dehumanizing,” and people could have looked away, her conduct was legal and her
conviction was overturned.33 The Court did not reference the Constitution, or Jacob’s
right to freedom of speech of expression, even though Jacob had consistently argued that
she had a constitutional right to be topless in public. Instead, the non-constitutional test
33

There were multiple events, including topless reenactment walks, to mark the 20th anniversary
of Jacob’s walk, and this subsequent victory for women’s rights in Canada. See e.g. Jenny Yuen,
“Milestone of Women’s Rights Marks 20th Anniversary,” Toronto Sun (July 15, 2011), available
at http://www.torontosun.com/2011/07/15/milestone-of-womens-rights-marks-20th-anniversary.
Speaking near the anniversary, Jacob commented: “With my hands shaking furiously, I took my
shirt off and jammed it down the back of my shorts and I can’t tell you the freedom that entailed
in that moment. . . I was scared to death, but there was a nearly euphoric sense of taking control
of my own body … what my body was about and who it was for … although it actually took five
years to win the case in court, I won right then. Ibid. Although now legal for women in Canada to
be topless in public, or “top freedom” as it is referred to in Canada, few women exercise this
right. Ibid. (Interviewing a Canadian woman, who stated “I hope one day women can do this and
feel comfortable with themselves…but probably not.”)
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from Jacob, at least in the case of “non-commercial nudity,” focuses on whether harm
was caused (in the form of degradation or dehumanization), judged by what a
contemporary national community can tolerate. It should be noted that this is in contrast
to the U.S. system described above, where the relevant community standards for
determining “obscenity” is that of the local community.
In concurring in Jacob, Justice Weiler argued that there should be a prerequisite
that any allegedly “indecent” conduct under Section 173 be sexual in nature, in order to
be criminal, out of a fear that this ruling could be used to arrest anyone who disagreed
with or lived outside of society’s norms (“If the context of the conduct is ignored and
regard is had only to community standards, there is a danger of a majority deciding what
values are important and coercing minorities to conform to those values on the basis of
avoiding perceived harm to society from non-conformity. If resort is had only to the
community standard of tolerance test without there being a context-based prerequisite,
then it is possible that discrimination arising from social stereotyping will be
legitimized.”). Because Jacob’s walk down the street topless was because she was hot,
and was not “sexual in the sense that she was exposing her breasts for the sexual
gratification of herself or someone else,” she should have been acquitted. However, as
Justice Weiler’s approach was not adopted by the majority, indecent acts are not limited
to sexual ones.
Cases arising after Jacob, followed Jacob in liberally applying the community
standard of tolerance test. These cases found that being topless does not cause harm, and
thus does not exceed community standards. For example, the Court in R v. Arnold
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acquitted a woman who was arrested for being topless at a protest against Jacob’s arrest,
writing that
Undoubtedly, most women would not engage in this conduct for there are many
who believe that deportment of this nature is tasteless and does not enhance the
cause of women. Equally undoubtedly, there are men today who cannot perceive
of woman’s breasts in any context other than sexual. It is important to reaffirm
that the Canadian standards of tolerance test does not rely upon these attitudes for
its formulation. I have no doubt that, aside from their personal opinions of this
behaviour, the majority of Canadians would conclude that it is not beyond their
level of tolerance. R. v. Arnold, Ontario Court (Prov. Div.), February 25, 1993
[1993] o.j. 471.

In other words, tolerance in Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence does not equate to
whether something is considered tasteful, whether women would engage in it, or whether
men can even conceive of it. As such, even though breasts may be only sexual to most
Canadian men and most Canadian women wouldn’t walk around with their breasts out,
being topless is tolerable in Canada- and is therefore protected conduct.
Therefore, in Canada it is established that “top freedom” for women is legal unless, in striking difference from the U.S., the reason for being topless or otherwise
“nude” is commercial. The seminal case drawing this distinction is R v. Gowan [3 March
1998] Doc. Ottawa 97-20544 (Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial Division). As noted
above, the court in Jacob stressed that her conduct was entirely non-commercial in
acquitting her. In Gowan, a sex worker who believed that it was legal for her to be topless
in public following the then-recent Jacob ruling, was arrested also under Section 173(1),
for allegedly standing at an intersection topless, while motioning to her breasts, and
asking “Do you want to fuck?”. The Court upheld Gowan’s conviction, finding that
being topless as a form of protest and free speech is legal, but being topless while
engaging in a commercial purpose is illegal. Applying the Jacob test of what a
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contemporary national community can tolerate and harm caused, the Court held that it
“cannot find that the community would tolerate the use of a woman’s bare breasts in
public in order to sell any form of service or product” as “[s]uch conduct would appear to
promote the objectification of women and the accompanying social harm” and Gowan’s
toplessness and actions “portray women in a humiliating manner as sex objects, with the
resulting loss of dignity.” The Court thus fined Gowan $250, without engaging in the
very problematic result that a woman can be arrested for harming in society by
objectifying herself and losing her own dignity (even if one agreed that those harms had
flowed from Gowan’s actions).
The Court’s reasoning in Gowan, in which sex work objectifies women and
causes a social harm, neatly follows the legal arguments of Catherine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin (see, e.g. MacKinnon 1985; and the Dworkin-MacKinnon
Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance drafted by Dworkin and MacKinnon in 1983).34
Jacob’s acquittal and Gowan’s conviction are part of the feminist debate regarding
pornography and sex work. Jacob, a student of philosophy, was found not guilty, as her
acts were “entirely noncommercial.” Gowan was convicted largely upon the evidence
adduced that she was “known to work as a prostitute” (Valverde 2009, 40). Therefore,
although Section 174 of the Canadian Criminal Code states that one is guilty if they do
not have a “lawful excuse” for being nude, “the very women who have the best ‘lawful
excuse,’ as law puts it, to go around topless are expressly forbidden from doing so”
(Valverde 2009, 40). As such, the Jacob and Gowan cases seen together have been
Note that attempts to enact into law Dworkin and MacKinnnon’s anti-pornography ordinances
were found unconstitutional in the context of the United States, as violating First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech. See American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
34
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interpreted as drawing a line “between the speaking, rational, political woman, who can
now bare her breasts even in the presence of unsuspecting children, and the whore of old,
who must be covered while outdoors” (Valverde 2009, 40).35 In practice, the Jacob and
Gowan cases mean that the “generous interpretation of the risk of harm test” developed in
Jacob and subsequent cases is “useful to any other feminist who wants to protest” but
“unavailable to the hundreds of women who perhaps most need to have the
representations of their bodies governed by a risk of harm test rather than an offences to
morals test” ” (Valverde 2009, 41).
The law of indecency in Canada was clarified most recently by the Canadian
Supreme Court in the case of In R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, 2005 SCC 80. In
Labaye, which resulted from the arrest of an owner of a swinger’s club under Section
173, the Court held that the harm (or risk of harm) necessary to sustain a conviction for
conduct under this law is one that “undermines or threatens to undermine a value
reflected in and thus formally endorsed through the Constitution or similar fundamental
laws by (a) confronting members of the public with conduct that significantly interferes
with their autonomy and liberty, (b) predisposing others to anti-social behaviour, or
(c) physically or psychologically harming persons involved in the conduct.” If such harm
is found, the Court then asks if that “harm or risk of harm is of a degree that is
incompatible with the proper functioning of society.”
In this case, the Court held that Labaye must be acquitted as none of the three
types of harm had been shown: (1) the autonomy and liberty of the public were not

Valverde further relates the Jacob and Gowan cases to Alan Hyde’s theories of the “sacred,
noncommodified body,” which co-exists with the completely commodified body, such that gene
patents are protected under law, while sex work is not (Valverde 2009, 41).
35
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affected because the only people present were people who had paid to get into the club
and “only those already disposed to this sort of sexual activity were allowed to participate
and watch”; (2) there was “no evidence of anti-social acts or attitudes toward women, or
for that matter men. No one was pressured to have sex, paid for sex, or treated as a mere
sexual object for the gratification of others”; and (3) the only possible harm to the
participants was catching a sexually transmitted disease, but this was unrelated to
indecency. The case did not do away with the distinction of protected noncommercial
acts and unprotected commercial acts, reasoning that the “fact that the club is a
commercial establishment does not in itself render the sexual activities taking place there
commercial in nature,” and that the “membership fee buys access to a club where
members can meet and engage in consensual activities with other individuals who have
similar sexual interests.”
In sum, Canadian constitutional decisions have taken a very limited view of
nudity and sexuality in public. Commercial sex acts are explicitly not protected. Nor are
sex acts that under the standards of “community” are harmful - including the
community’s decision as to whether something “objectifies a woman,” with the
community’s tolerance taking precedence over that woman’s decision as to what
objectifies her.

IV.

Tipples and Nipples in the Constitutional Court of South Africa
Like the major cases in the U.S. and Canada, the Constitutional Court of South

Africa has considered whether nudity is a protected form of expression within the context
of liquor laws, most recently in the case of Phillips and Another v. Director of Public
Prosecutions and Others ([2003] ZACC 1). Specifically at issue was Section 160(d) of
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South Africa’s Liquor Act 27 of 1989, which made it a criminal offense for a business
owner with a liquor license to “allow[] any person (i) to perform an offensive, indecent
or obscene act; or (ii) who is not clothed or not properly clothed, to perform or to appear,
on a part of the licensed premises where entertainment of any nature is presented or to
which the public has access.” As such, the South African liquor act combines Canadian
Criminal Codes provisions on indecency and nudity into one statute - yet only applicable
to business serving alcohol, in striking to difference to Canada’s law, which contemplates
any place open to the public.
In Philips, the statute was challenged as violating South African constitutional
rights to freedom of expression, an issue which the Constitutional Court of South Africa
explicitly addressed, in contrast to the Canadian courts’ side-stepping of the
constitutional issues. Specifically analyzed were two provisions from the Bill of Rights
(Chapter 2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights, which includes rights to freedom and security of the person, including
protection against arbitrary detention and Section 16 of the Bill of Rights, which
guarantees rights to freedom of expression and freedom of speech.36
Writing for a majority of the Constitutional Court, Judge Yacoob found that
Section 160(d) of South Africa’s Liquor Act was unconstitutional for two main reasons:
(1) the law is “vague and does not convey the prohibited conduct clearly enough to any
licence holder” and the statute (2) “infringes section 12 of the Constitution because it has
the effect of depriving people of freedom without just cause” (para. 7). In so holding, the
Court performed a two-part analysis, first considering whether the law restricted freedom
36

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is available at
http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996.
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of expression, and if so whether the law was justified in such a restriction. The majority
found that Section 160(d) did indeed restrict freedom of expression, because the law
prohibited any performance by anyone “improperly” clothed, and any performance
involving offensive, indecent or obscene acts. The law “covers dramatic performances
including plays and concerts irrespective of whether they represent serious works of art
or the communication of thoughts and ideas essential for positive social development,”
and as such “limits the freedom of artistic creativity and the freedom to receive and
impart information and ideas” protected by the South African constitution (para. 15).
As freedom of expression had been restricted, the Court proceeded to determine
whether the limitations were justified, using a “proportionality test.” Specifically, the
Court looked to “the extent of the limitation of the right considering the nature and
importance of the infringed right, on the one hand, and the purpose, importance and
effect of the infringing provision, taking into account the availability of less restrictive
means available to achieve that purpose” (para 22).
Looking to the first factor, the Court held that freedom of expression is an
incredibly important right, particularly given South Africa’s political history, stating:
[23] The right to freedom of expression is integral to democracy, to human
development and to human life itself. It must be all the more zealously guarded
because the infringement of this right was used as an instrument in an effort to
achieve the degree of thought control conducive to preserve apartheid and to
impose a value system fashioned by a minority on all South Africans. . . . 37

37

The Court further cited its Islamic Unity, which noted:
[26] Notwithstanding the fact that the right to freedom of expression and speech has
always been recognised in the South African common law, we have recently emerged
from a severely restrictive past where expression, especially political and artistic
expression, was extensively circumscribed by various legislative enactments. The
restrictions that were placed on expression were not only a denial of democracy itself, but
also exacerbated the impact of the systemic violations of other fundamental human rights
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However, after this sweeping pronouncement of the importance to freedom of expression
in democracy, in an echo of the U.S. holding in Barnes and Eerie, the Court continued
that not all types of free speech are equally important to “human development,” and how
important the speech at issue is to democracy should be a relevant consideration in
determining whether it can be restricted (Philips, para 23).
Moving on to the purpose of the law infringing free expression, the Court
recognized the state’s interest in mitigating the negative effect of alcohol, including
“lapses in judgment, false courage, lack of discernment, lack of discipline and a measure
of vulnerability” (Philips, para. 24). Moving to the last part of the analysis, the Court
found that the statute was far too broad, too vague38 and too much of an infringement of
free expression to balance the need to lessen effects of alcohol, and thus found the law
unconstitutional (Philips, para. 29).

in South Africa. Those restrictions would be incompatible with South Africa’s present
commitment to a society based on a ‘constitutionally protected culture of openness and
democracy and universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and
colours’. . . .
‘Having regard to our recent past of thought control, censorship and enforced conformity
to governmental theories, freedom of expression — the free and open exchange of ideas
— is no less important than it is in the United States of America. It could actually be
contended with much force that the public interest in the open market-place of ideas is all
the more important to us in this country because our democracy is not yet firmly
established and must feel its way. Therefore we should be particularly astute to outlaw
any form of thought control, however respectably dressed.’ Islamic Unity case, citing S v.
Mamabolo.
38
Note that in dissent, Judge Madala argued that the statute was not vague, writing that:
[45] Furthermore there can be no vagueness as to what the phrases “not clothed” or “not
properly clothed” connote for purposes of this section. “Not clothed” means in the
context of this section to be in the nude or totally exposed; “not properly clothed” means
scantily dressed or insufficiently dressed, so that a portion or portions of the private parts
of a female or male or breasts of a female are exposed.
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Although the Court suggested that the conduct of nude dancing might be less
important than other conduct, because the law was so vague and broad, the majority did
not reach whether a narrower law (perhaps one directed only to strip clubs) might be
constitutional. Judge Ngcobo, in a concurring opinion, explicitly addressed whether a law
that targeted solely strip clubs would be constitutional. He argued that “I have grave
doubts whether there is any connection between the striptease dancing involved in this
case and the constitutional right to freedom of expression” (para. 54) and that “Even if
artistic creativity went that far, it may well be that a statute which limits it in such
circumstances would be justifiable. . .” (para. 55).
In an additional concurring opinion, Judge Sachs explicitly analyzed the U.S. and
Canadian cases discussed in the previous chapters of this dissertation. As an initial
matter, Judge Sachs found that even if the law in question had been narrower and solely
targeted exotic dance establishments, there would still be an important constitutional
issue to be decided:
[62] … [E]ven if one could, with any degree of constitutional confidence, draw
bright lines between the erotic exposure of indlamu, can-can and striptease, and
even if from the words of the provision exact operationally manageable standards
of permissible cleavage in or transparency of dress could be divined, the
substantive questions would remain: to what extent and in what way may the state
dictate dress and undress in off-the-street places to which the public has access?
Looking to case law of the United States and Canada to answer this question, Judge
Sachs observed the varied opinions of both jurisdictions, noting that while “nudity may
be self-evident, what amounts to near-nudity is not,” that the “harm or offence that either
nakedness or near-nakedness may in themselves cause to consenting adult eyes in places
secluded from the unsuspecting public, is far from axiomatic” (para. 63), and that the
“problem of whether it is constitutionally permissible to prohibit the combination of
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tipples and nipples has divided judicial minds in many open and democratic societies”
(para. 64).
In analyzing the Canadian cases discussed above, Judge Sachs noted that although
these cases referred to what national society in Canada would tolerate, and each involved
significant evidence, it is still a difficult task for a judge to determine where this border
between what a society will and will not accept lies (para. 64). In the U.S. context, Judge
Sachs noted that “[a]fter battling for decades to establish a workable definition of
obscenity, [Justice] Brennan finally decided that the quest was futile” until a narrow
majority provided the standard of nudity as minimally expressive, and able to be
prohibited if such regulation was narrowly tailored - as requiring that dancers wear Gstrings was to William Rehnquist (para. 65). In sum, Judge Sachs’ read of Canadian and
U.S. case law on balancing freedom of expression with laws against obscenity,
indecency, and nudity (be it in terms of tolerance of society or least restrictive
regulations), is that the entire field is incredibly complex - and even more difficult for a
judge to apply. As such, Judge Sachs concurred with the judgment of the court, relieved
that “such perplexities [could] be resolved another day” (para. 67).
The Constitutional Court of South Africa thus explains how and why applying
constitutional protections to sex acts has led to conflicting and uncomfortable decisions in
the U.S. and Canada - without, however, providing solutions as to how this area could be
improved. As such, freedom of expression offers promise for the protection of cursed
sexuality, but in practice only protects acts already within the charmed circle.
As with privacy, freedom of expression could perhaps be rehabilitated. Given that
the U.S. and Canadian cases deny protections to commercial sex acts (explicitly or in
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practice), future judicial efforts should focus on how commercial sex has been
constructed and reinforced as a “damned” form of sex acts. That sex acts involve the
exchange of money should lead to increased constitutional protection - not a removal of
all rights. Because sex for money is firmly on the “bad” side of sexuality, and therefore
more likely to lead to repression, constitutional courts wishing to protect minorities
should be more protective of people engaging in paid sex (than people engaged in good
sex acts and who are not similarly targeted). Canadian jurisprudence in which women are
sanctioned for their (non-charmed) sex acts because they are degrading themselves and
other women could also be reformed. This could be accomplished if courts (and
feminists) are open to alternate understandings of degradation as well as alternate
responses to self-degradation.
Courts could also give weight to how zoning laws in general are used to enforce
normative sexuality (per Berlant and Warner). Indeed, the regulation of exotic dancers at
issue in Erie and Barnes show precisely how these regulations work to create and enforce
the division and hierarchal valuation of normal/good/blessed versus abnormal/bad/cursed
sex and persons. In this way, resistance to norms of proper sexual behavior in public is a
challenge to the entire system that ranks sex acts - and as such should be protected as an
expressive, political act.
However, absent these major shifts in the conception of harm to women and the
value of non-blessed sexuality, it is unlikely that freedom of expression guarantees will
extend to cursed sex acts. Therefore, the next Chapter explores the promises and dangers
for erotic justice of another concept - dignity.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE PROMISE AND DANGER OF DIGNITY

I.

“Stained by Overuse and Misuse”: An Introduction to Dignity
The term “dignity” has exploded in legal use since the Second World War. Before

1945, dignity was only mentioned in the constitutions of five countries. By 2012, dignity
was included in 162 countries’ constitutions - 85% of the 193 countries that are members
of the United Nations (Shulztiner & Carmi 2014, 461). Conducting a qualitative and
quantitative study of all constitutions and constitutional documents of the U.N. members
states, Shulztiner and Carmi found that post-World War II uses of dignity have shown
significant variance. Although highlighting the positive uses of dignity in several
constitutions for addressing practices that discriminate against women and minority
groups, Shulztiner and Carmi warned that dignity jurisprudence can be dangerous.
Because it is a broad concept, decisions based on dignity have been charged with judicial
activism (2014, 489-490). More worryingly, dignity jurisprudence has been used to limit
human rights. For example, decisions limiting freedom of expression in Israel, Canada
and Germany have relied on dignity concerns (Shulztiner & Carmi 2014, 483-489).
Scholars of comparative constitutional law are in agreement that while courts around the
world increasingly treat dignity as an important value, there is far from one accepted
meaning of “dignity” (Rao 2011, 185-86; Moore and Rodman 2019, 6-7; Daly 2013, 2-8;
Waldron 2012, 201-05). This situation has led prominent U.S. scholar Ronald Dworkin to
write shortly before his passing that the “idea of dignity has been stained by overuse and
misuse” - yet that dignity is too important of a concept for the attainment of justice to be
abandoned (Dworkin 2011, 204). This chapter takes up Dworkin’s call for attention to
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dignity by focusing on case law of the United States and India as it relates to decisions on
sexuality.
I first look to dignity jurisprudence in the United States. Despite not appearing in
the U.S. Constitution, the term “dignity” has been widely used in Supreme Court cases on
sex acts. Indeed, the recent Obergefell opinion based its finding that disallowing same
sex marriage violates the Constitution on dignity. However, the use of dignity by the U.S.
courts is deeply problematic. Keeping in line with the U.S.’s typically liberal
jurisprudence that does not focus on structural issues, dignity is used as a synonym for
state recognition. This move allows the government to exercise greater power while
simultaneously eliding any responsibility to address the structural problems that LGBTQ
people in the U.S. face. In this way, the Obergefell opinion serves to further marginalize
those who refuse to or cannot join in the charmed act of marriage. Dignity jurisprudence
in the U.S. thus reinforces a system of blessed versus cursed sexuality, and allows for
oppression and penalization of those on the “wrong” side of sex acts.
I then turn to India, a jurisdiction that has explicitly tackled the complexities of
sex acts and constitutional rights. It has done so through articulating a robust concept of
dignity that is based on autonomy, and envisioned as a negative right. The robust Indian
jurisprudential concept of dignity explicitly includes the concepts explored previously in
this this dissertation: dignity as privacy and dignity as freedom of expression.
Specifically, the Supreme Court of India has found that its Constitution requires the
government to foster a robust concept of identity with dignity, which is violated when
disfavored sex acts are criminalized. Looking to queer theory and subaltern studies, the
Court focused on how heteronormativity in India has been produced in and through
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British colonialism, and how the Indian Constitution’s protections extend to disfavored
sex acts and can be used to dismantle patriarchal social systems. As such, this Chapter
concludes that Indian constitutional jurisprudence, from a purely formal reliance on the
text judgments, could perhaps move us closer to erotic justice.
As an important qualification, the potential for justice that I identify in Indian
jurisprudence is not an endorsement of the brutal and repressive acts of the Indian
government, or of the way in which the Hindu-majority court has used claims of
feminism in other cases to exploit Islamophobia and further oppress minorities in India.
The Hindu right regularly uses secularism and human rights discourse to silence and
disempower minorities (Jain 2005). For example, in the highly publicized Shah Bano
case, an all-Hindu bench of the Indian Supreme Court found that Muslim women are
entitled to alimony after a divorce under India’s general laws, despite contradiction with
constitutionally-guaranteed rights for Muslim communities to have separate private laws
and Sharia courts. Although on its face this case appears as a win for women, the Court’s
decision was widely seen as a move by the Hindu right to consolidate its power, through
disingenuous appeals to feminism based on Islamophobia (Jain 2005; Cohen & Mancini
2019). Similarly, the removal of Kashmir’s special status this August by India’s Hindu
nationalist government and subsequent brutal lockdown, including curfew, prohibition of
cell phone and Internet use, detentions, abductions, and killings, that is still ongoing as of
the writing of this chapter, has been justified by calls to “save” Kashmiri (Muslim)
women (Zahoor 2019; Mushtaq 2019; Kaul 2019; Kanjwal 2019).39 My project should

39

This alleged desire to save Kashmiri women has been accompanied with official propagation of
the misogynistic and racist idea that with the removal of special status for Kashmir, Indian men
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not be seen as part of this Indian pinkwashing. Instead, this chapter should be read as
identifying tools that courts have at their disposal to advance erotic justice, one of which
is Indian jurisprudence taken at its word.

II.

“Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness”: Dangers of
Dignity in U.S. Jurisprudence
Dignity is not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, nor has dignity been

read into a specific Constitutional Amendment. This is in distinction to “privacy,” which
does not appear in the Constitution but has been recognized through the 14th and 4th
Amendments guarantees of “liberty.” However, the term dignity is frequently invoked in
U.S. Supreme Court cases, with its already frequent use further on the rise in recent
decisions (Moore & Rodman 2019, 2; Henry 2011, 169). The Lawrence v. Texas and
Obergefell v. Hodges opinions, discussed in the previous chapters, were both replete with
multiple references to dignity. Indeed, a recent piece following the retirement of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, who authored Lawrence and Obergefell,
declared that his favorite word was dignity (Toobin 2018). Indeed, the Obergefell opinion
ends with the pronouncement that the Constitution gives gay couples a right to “equal
dignity in the eyes of law” (576 U.S. __, 28 (2015), discussed in Moore & Rodman 2019,
2). However, former Justice Kennedy’s use of dignity has been criticized as unclear,
inconsistent, and without substantive content (Moore & Rodman 2019, 2; Henry 2011;
Becker 2001).

will now be able to easily marry the “light-skinned” (and therefore superiorly beautiful) Kashmiri
women (Mushtaq 2019; Kaul 2019; Siddiqui 2019).
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Reflecting on recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on gay sex and marriage,
Moore and Rodman argue that the Court’s use of dignity jurisprudence in these cases is
deeply problematic. It serves to increase state control while increasing the oppression of
marginalized people. This is so because the Court has moved away from a view of
dignity as autonomy, and instead announces that dignity is achieved through state
recognition of inherently needy individuals. This in turn hides how harm to dignity can
actually originate with the state. The solutions become state assistance, vis a vis state
control, rather than “addressing deeper structural barriers to substantive autonomy.” The
effect of recent dignity jurisprudence is the U.S. is thus to “maintain many existing
inequities while simultaneously introducing the potential for new and insidious modes of
injustice” (2019, 2, 12).
Moore and Rodman argue the use of dignity by the majority harms LGBTQ and
other marginalized people in a number of ways specifically within the Obergefell
decision. Firstly, the Court’s rhetoric around marriage both expands the state’s power
and continue to discipline individuals who cannot (or will not) join in the circle of
blessed sexuality, which now includes married gays and lesbians: “Marriage’s
disciplinary function is that it makes orderly citizens, shaping and regulating individual
character to more closely resemble a certain human model more desirable to the state”
(2019, 14). As Moore and Rodman note, the Obergefell Court explicitly acknowledged
the primacy of marriage to state governance, writing that “Confucius taught that marriage
lies at the foundation of government” (576 US _, 8 (2015); Moore and Rodman 2019,
14).
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Secondly, within Obergefell individuals are depicted by the majority opinion as
lonely and needy - “unable to reach the higher echelons of the human experience” unless
they can (and implicitly do), marry” (Moore and Rodman 2019, 13). People who are
unmarried cannot have “full possession” of dignity - or expression, intimacy, or
spirituality. As Moore & Rodman argue, Obergefell reinforces the idea that “[h]uman
beings, once married in a state-recognized ceremony, are able to experience the fullness
of what it means to be human” (Moore and Rodman 2019, 13). In this way, Obergefell
reproduces the concept that people who do not marry are considered unable to achieve
full humanity.
The Obergefell Court’s pronouncements that “marriage is essential to our most
profound hopes and aspirations” and that “[f]rom their beginning to their most recent
page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage” (576
US _, 15 (2015)) are not statements of objective fact, but an act of promoting and
producing this laudatory view of marriage - and negative view of those who do not marry
(Moore and Rodman 2019, 13). In this system, people are not only rewarded for
marrying, but also punished for not marrying. Individuals who cannot or choose not to
marry do not get to receive the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage:
“Marriage confers legal status and economic privileges, it institutionalizes and regulates
relationships through recognition, and it is inherently inegalitarian. It denigrates
individuals who do not marry as lacking” (Moore and Rodman 2019, 14). Punishment of
unmarried lesbian and gay people has increased since the Obergefell case, as not
marrying has become seen as an active choice of not to be involved in this mostrewarding of institutions. For example, many states and corporations that offered civil
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union and domestic partnership benefits to non-married couples stopped offering these
alternative methods to access rights after Obergefell (Sullivan 2015; Wilkinson 2016).
Further, those who do not or cannot marry are often already otherwise
marginalized. This is clear if we look outwards from the perspective of Rubin’s charmed
circle. Those who have multiple partners, are unpartnered, are in casual relationships, or
are related to each other are all outside of the charmed circle, and all face serious
obstacles in marriage. With the exception of perhaps Utah,40 polyamorous people in the
U.S. cannot be married to more than one of their partners. Cousins cannot marry in many
U.S. states, or are subject to extra regulations in order to marry (Ottenheimer 1996;
Stritof 2019). Clearly those not in a relationship or in a casual relationship are not likely
to be married (and if they are, not in the “intimate” sense considered by the Court). As
such, the Court’s reinforcement and production of marriage as a prerequisite to a
complete humanity is disproportionately harmful to those outside of the charmed circle,
whether they choose to stay outside it by not marrying or by not being allowed to marry.
Further, this use of dignity by the U.S. Supreme Court lets the state use an
institutional fix for a structural problem. In effect, this gives the government greater
power, while also allowing the government to not address the underlying issues. This is

40

On recent contestations to anti-polygamy laws in Utah, brought in the context of Mormon
relationships (and by stars of the TV show “Sister Wives”), see Lisa Fishbayn Joffe, “What’s the
Harm in Polygamy: Multicultural Toleration and Women’s Experience of Plural Marriage.”
Journal of Law and Religion, volume 31 (2016): 336-353. Although a lower court found portions
of Utah’s anti-polygamy law unconstitutional in 2013, a higher court reversed this decision on
procedural grounds. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, leaving Utah’s
anti-polygamy laws technically on the books, but in an unclear legal posture. See Nate Carlisle,
“Polygamy Remains a Crime as U.S. Supreme Court Won’t Hear Case from ‘Sister Wives,” The
Salt Lake Tribune (January 23, 2017), available at
https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=4848475&itype=CMSID .
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so because dignity-as-state-recognition views the state “as the solution to the indignities
of misrecognition rather than as the cause of rights violations and structural harms”
(Moore and Rodman 2019, 17). As such, rather than actually address social and legal
discrimination against LGBTQ people in multiple areas, such as employment and
housing, the Court simply extended the benefits of marriage to one additional category of
persons. This ability for two same sex people to marry paints the U.S. government as
granting gay people “full humanity” - while allowing many discriminatory laws by the
same government to continue to be enforced against LGBTQ people. Many states have
laws that explicitly discriminate against gay and/or trans people, including in adoption,
employment, housing, access to bathrooms, health care, immigration and identification
documents.41 Even New York, widely considered one of the most progressive U.S. states,
only enacted an anti-LGBT discrimination law this year (2019), and still enforces a
variety of laws that discriminate against LGBT people (Cuomo and Cohen, 2019). All of
these remained untouched by the Obergefell decision. This is not an accident or an
oversight. Instead, Obergefell’s narrow view of dignity as state recognition allows for
discrimination in all areas that the government has not recognized - e.g. everywhere
except for marriage.
Indeed, the Court’s reliance on this form of dignity limits the ability that the
Obergefell decision may have for future cases to challenge these laws and practices that

41

The ACLU maintains a database of legislation affecting LGBT rights in the U.S., which is
updated the first day of every month, and is available at: https://www.aclu.org/legislationaffecting-lgbt-rights-across-country#antilgbtq. The National Center for Transgender Equality
maintains and updates a timeline of anti-LGBT actions taken by the Trump administration,
available at https://transequality.org/the-discrimination-administration.
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discriminate against LGBTQ people. This is so because the Court’s use of dignity
allowed the Court to avoid giving sexual orientation a heightened level of scrutiny. For
example, laws that discriminate against people on the basis of race receive the highest
level of scrutiny, called “strict scrutiny,” in which a government seeking to treat people
differently because of their race must show a compelling interest and that their means are
narrowly tailored (see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S 214 (1944)). Laws that
discriminate on the basis of gender are judged by the Court with an intermediatelyheighted level of scrutiny, requiring an “exceedingly persuasive” justification from the
government (see Craig v. Boren 428 U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996)).
However, in prior cases considering discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that laws that disfavor gay people should not be
subjected to a heightened standard of review at all.42 In Romer v. Evans, the Court
confronted an amendment to Colorado’s state constitution, which precluded any
legislative, judicial or executive action to protect people from discrimination based on
their “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships”
(517 U.S. 620 (1996)). In other words, the amendment precluded any branch of
government in Colorado from taking any action to protect gay people.
Although the Court ultimately found that the Colorado amendment violated the
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, they explicitly rejected any consideration of
sexual orientation as a protected class. Instead, the Court applied its “rational basis” test
in Romers, which is the test used to determine the Constitutionality of laws that do not
42

The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly considered whether laws that target disfavored
sexual acts should receive a heightened level of scrutiny.
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target a “suspect” class. A law will be found constitutional and upheld in nearly every
case in which the rational basis is the test applied, in deference to majority-backed laws
in the absence of suspected illegitimate discriminatory motives. Under this test, a law is
constitutional if the government has a legitimate reason for the law, and the law is
rationally related to this interest. Although this is a very easy standard for the government
to meet, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that Colorado did not have a
legitimate reason for its amendment: “If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection
of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” As
such, singling gay people out for disfavored treatment violates the Constitution - but only
where the government has no other legitimate reason for its law besides animus. In cases
where the government can proffer another reason, the law at issue discriminating against
LGBT people remains. Although many hoped that the Court in Obergefell would
announce that sexual orientation is a suspect class (like race) or a quasi-suspect class (like
gender), the Court completely sidestepped this important task. As such, in announcing the
right for gay people to marry based on “dignity” and on the specifics of the institution of
marriage, the Court left untouched and unprotected all other areas in which gay people
are discriminated against.43
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As of October 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court was set two hear two groups of employment
cases- one on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Bostock v. Clayton County,
Georgia and Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda), and one regarding discrimination on the basis of
gender identity (R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission). The decisions in these cases may - or may not - find that gay or trans people are
suspect classes.
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III.

A Skeleton With Spirit: Robust Dignity in Indian Jurisprudence

Indian jurisprudence has also relied on dignity in its jurisprudence on sex acts. As seen
below, Indian case law has developed a robust conception of dignity that is based upon
the text of its Constitution, is theoretically consistent, explicitly articulated, and based on
autonomy. Combined with a robust conception of a right to form one’s own dignified
identity, Indian constitutional jurisprudence avoids the major pitfalls of U.S. dignity
jurisprudence. As noted above, this analysis is limited to the text of the Indian Supreme
Court decisions, and not meant to indicate that the Indian government has in practice
afforded to its minority citizens lives with dignity.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of privacy was crucial to the cases that
resulted in the decriminalization of same-sex sex acts in the United States. As Dinusha
Panditaratne explains, a focus on privacy may not be easily transferable to India and
other countries where there remains a “prevalence of strong extended family networks
and multigenerational households” (Panditaratne 2016, 174).44 Indeed, India’s current
constitution does not mention “privacy.” Instead, in finding protections for sexuality,
Indian courts have focused on equality, non-discrimination, freedom of expression, and
dignity - with the latter being the Court’s most recent focus. In other cases, Indian courts
have read a right to privacy into their Constitution - focusing on a person’s right to
privacy regardless of place, rather than a spatial right to privacy in “intimate” or “private”
44

In addition to different norms of privacy, Panditaratne identifies four other factors that have
contributed to the intractability of laws criminalizing same sex relations in Asia: “(i) a common
but misleading assumption that the statutory provisions are ‘unenforced,’ which tempers any will
to repeal them; (ii) a widespread misconception that the statutory provisions are necessary to
prevent child abuse, (iii) a popular and political desire-steeped in the collective memories of
colonization-to assert ‘cultural’ and ‘moral’ independence from the West, (iv) a public discourse
and legal framework that focuses on addressing religious and ethnic divisions, at the expense of
gender and other inequalities” (173-174, internal citations omitted).
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places. However, as discussed below this focus on privacy became very controversial,
both for conservative and queer activists, and was part of the Court’s reasoning in
initially overturning one of its major decisions protecting sex acts.
In India, same-sex legal issues have been tied to anti-sodomy laws, which are a
legacy of British colonialism. Indeed, until 2018, it remained a crime to engage in at
least some forms of same-sex sex acts in every former British colony, with the exception
of Hong Kong (see Panditaratne 2016, 176-77, citing to laws of Bangladesh, India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore that implicitly or
explicitly criminalize same sex relations). Constitutional protections of sexuality in
India, including the recent overturning of anti-sodomy laws, have developed over the past
decade through five major cases: (1) Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and
Others WP(C) No.7455/2001, a 2009 case in which the Delhi High Court found that laws
against same-sex sex violated the Indian Constitution; (2) Suresh Kumar Koushal vs. Naz
Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 OF 2013, in which a two-judge panel of the
Supreme Court of India overruled the Delhi High Court case and laws against same-sex
sex were reinstated; (3) Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016
D. No. 14961/2016 in 2018, in which a five-judge panel of the Supreme Court of India
overruled Koushal vs. Naz Foundation and same-sex sex became legal in India again; (4)
Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 2 SCR 925, in which the Supreme
Court of India found in 2011 that the Constitution requires certain protections for sex
workers; and (5) National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (“NLSA v. UOI”),
in which the Supreme Court held that transgender people are covered under the
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Constitution and ordered the government to better protect and enable the advancement of
transgender people in India.45
Importantly, all of these cases were “Public Interest Litigations,” or “PILs,” which
are a special type of cases created by the Indian judiciary to increase access to the courts
for public interest matters. If cases meet the criteria for a PIL, the standing rules are
relaxed and anyone can file a suit, and the suits can even be filed by a postcard or letter to
a judge (Akali 2016, 130-31).46 Once a case is considered a PIL, different procedures
and remedies attach, including a more investigative role for the Court; a more
collaborative and problem-solving approach for the parties; more judicial involvement in
areas usually left to the legislative and executive branches; short term orders, usually
against the government, and court supervision of its orders (Akali 2016, 1301-31).
In 2009, the Delhi High Court looked to the Constitution of India of 1949 in
invalidating an 1860 law47 that criminalized “carnal relations,” which included oral and

45

The advancement for the rights of trans people in the Global South is by no means limited to
India. For example, in 2018 Pakistan’s Parliament approved the “Transgender Persons (Protection
of Rights) Act, 2018”:
In doing so, Pakistan affirmed that it must respect “a person's innermost and individual
sense of self as male, female or a blend of both, or neither; that can correspond or not to
the sex assigned at birth.” The law allows citizens to have this identification recognized
on all state documents, such as passports and drivers' licenses. What's more, the Pakistani
government will be required to provide protection centers and safe houses for those who
feel at risk, and trans citizens will have the right to inheritance, to run for office and to
assembly. In short, Pakistan is extending the full protection of rights to trans people as
equal citizens (Khan and Greene 2019).
Pakistan’s increased recognition and protection of trans people is in marked contrast to the attacks
on trans people in the U.S. under Donald Trump’s administration.
46
A list of the criteria set up by the Supreme Court of India for a PIL are available at
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/circular/guidelines/pilguidelines.pdf .
47
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code stated in full:
Unnatural offences.—Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of
nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
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anal sex and penetration of other non-vagina orifices by penises, as “unnatural offences”
(Naz Founation, para. 1).48 Beginning by tracing the British and Colonial roots of the law
at issue, the Court noted up front that England had repealed its law that the Indian one
was based on, and decriminalized “sodomy” and consensual homosexual sex in the
1960’s (paras. 2-4). Looking to the realities of gay men and trans people in India, the
Court also stressed throughout its opinion that Section 377 of the Penal Code had become
a tool for extreme police abuse, extortion and assault; and had stigmatized the LGBTQ
community in India, which had lead in part to the community moving underground and
being at higher risk for HIV/AIDS, with the state less able to reach and treat them (paras.
6, 8, 19-22).
After identifying the colonial nature of the law at issue, and the harm it has caused
to minorities in the country, the Court looked to several articles of the Constitution of
1949, including Article 21, “Protection of life and personal liberty,”49 Article 14,
“Equality before the Law, ”50 Article 15, “Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth,”51 and Article 19, “Protection of certain rights
regarding freedom of speech etc.”52

Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to
the offence described in this section. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1836974/.
48
Note that the case, brought by a foundation that supports people with HIV/AIDS and does
prevention work, had been dismissed by the High Court for failing to have an injured party. The
Court was ordered to reconsider the case by the Supreme Court of India, which determined that
the case was a PIL and therefore the Naz Foundation could bring suit (Akali 2016, 132).
49
Article 21 states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law”.
50
Article 14 states: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”
51
Article 15 states:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them
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The Indian government was split in the case: the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
advocated for the repeal of the law, while the Ministry of Home Affairs urged that the
law should be retained (para. 24). The Ministry of Home Affairs argued that the law was
Constitutional as “homosexuality is abhorrent” in India, and as such under Article 19(2)
the government was allowed to criminalize these acts against “public order, decency, or
morality.” Homosexual sex was only legal in other countries because “in the western
societies the morality standards are not as high as in India” (para. 24 (ii)).
Focusing first on dignity, the Court noted that dignity is included in the preamble
of the Indian Constitution. The court further explicated its view of dignity:
the constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and
worth of all individuals as members of our society. It recognises a person as a free
being who develops his or her body and mind as he or she sees fit. At the root of
the dignity is the autonomy of the private will and a person’s freedom of choice
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
women and children
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
52
Article 19 states in part:
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) [repealed]
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any existing law,
or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence
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and of action. Human dignity rests on recognition of the physical and spiritual
integrity of the human being, his or her humanity, and his value as a person,
irrespective of the utility he can provide to others (para. 26).
As such, Indian jurisprudence explicitly sees the dignity guaranteed to every individual a
matter of autonomy - of freedom of choice, freedom of expression, and intrinsic selfvalue.
As for privacy, although the Court noted that the term is not in its Constitution,
India had signed on to many conventions guaranteeing it, and had developed a right to
privacy under Article 21 through its case law (paras. 35-39). In giving substance to
constitutional guarantees of “privacy,” the Court cited U.S. Supreme Court substantive
due process case law extensively, including Griswold v. CT, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v.
Wade, Bowers v. Hardwick, and Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S.
438 (1928), in which he famously argued that privacy includes a “right to be let alone,” to
“secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness,” to recognize “the significance
of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and intellect,” and “to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations” (paras. 31, 36). After tracing
Indian case law, the Delhi High Court concluded that the Indian constitution does protect
a type of right to privacy of “persons and not places” to be left alone (paras. 37-38, 40
italics added). Putting together the dignity rights explicitly in the text of its Constitution,
and the privacy rights as developed by Indian and foreign courts, the Delhi High Court
found that India’s penal code violated Article 21 of its constitution, reasoning that
The sphere of privacy allows persons to develop human relations without
interference from the outside community or from the State. The exercise of
autonomy enables an individual to attain fulfillment, grow in self-esteem, build
relationships of his or her choice and fulfill all legitimate goals that he or she may
set. Section 377 IPC denies a person's dignity and criminalises his or her core
identity solely on account of his or her sexuality and thus violates Article 21 of
the Constitution. As it stands, Section 377 IPC denies a gay person a right to full
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personhood which is implicit in notion of life under Article 21 of the Constitution
(para 48).
Again, this reasoning explicitly ties dignity to autonomy, as well as to negative rights - a
freedom from state interference, as opposed to a right to state recognition. As opposed to
needy individuals in the U.S. context, Indian jurisprudence (at least from a theoretical
perspective as described by the Court, and not necessarily in practice as applied to
minority members) sees dignity fulfilled by the state staying out of the way, such that
people can achieve whatever goals they set for themselves.
The Court returned to a notion of spatial privacy, in finding that the law violated
equality guaranteed in Article 14, as it arbitrarily criminalized “consensual sex between
adults in private” which “does not cause any harm to anybody” (para. 91). This violated
equality guarantees, because although the law’s stated target was only acts, it actually
targeted gay people. The Court explicitly held that
When everything associated with homosexuality is treated as bent, queer,
repugnant, the whole gay and lesbian community is marked with deviance and
perversity. They are subject to extensive prejudice because what they are or what
they are perceived to be, not because of what they do. The result is that a
significant group of the population is, because of its sexual non-conformity,
persecuted, marginalised and turned in on itself. (Para 94).
Lastly, the Court found that Article’s 15 prohibition on discrimination based on sex
includes discrimination based on sexual orientation, which it found to be an “analogous”
form of discrimination, looking to Canadian and international law (paras. 99-104).
Because discrimination on the basis on sexual orientation is protected under Article 15,
not only can the government not discriminate, but under Article 15(2) private persons
cannot restrict access to public accommodations.
Like the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Delhi High Court in the Naz
Foundation opinion explicitly looked to foreign jurisprudence in determining how the
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reach of its constitution into protecting or penalizing sexuality. The Naz Court’s focus on
foreign law, and in particular the laws of Fiji, Nepal and Hong Kong, served several
functions, including to counter the idea that homosexuality is a Western concept although the Court’s decision was denounced as falling prey to Western “decadence” and
immorality (Khosla 2011, 918-919). The Delhi High Court likely did have foreign policy
considerations, as well as its international image and its desire to project itself as a leader
in Asia, in mind in its decision. As Madhav Khosla explains, India “prides herself as
being the world’s largest democracy, and this gives her considerable currency within the
international community.” By legalizing homosexual sex, India could “solidify [its]
India’s image as a freedom-loving nation” (2011, 926).
Interestingly, in one fairly brief paragraph, the Delhi High Court also explicitly
looked to political theory and how the law can construct “regimes of surveillance” that
shape one’s identity - this context, working to “embed illegality” into a LGBTQ person’s
view of themselves. Citing Ryan Goodman’s 2001 work on sodomy laws in South
Africa, the Court seemingly agreed that “[i]ndividuals ultimately do not try to conform to
the law's directive, but the disapproval communicated through it, nevertheless,
substantively affects their sense of self-esteem, personal identity and their relationship to
the wider society” in eight main ways: “(a) self-reflection, (b) reflection of self through
family, (c) verbal assessment and disputes, (d) residential zones and migrations, (e)
restricted public places, (f) restricted movement and gestures, (g) ‘safe places’ and (h)
conflicts with law enforcement agencies” (para. 49, citing Ryan Goodman, “Beyond the
Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms and Social Panoptics,” 89 Cal. L.
Rev. 643 (2001)). Although the Court did not do a deep dive into theories of the

130

panopticon, it did acknowledge that among the ways in which anti-sodomy laws hurt
people are the law’s ability to generate morally acceptable versus unacceptable behaviors
- and to penalize through legal, social, and cultural apparatuses those whose sexual
behavior is deemed unacceptable.
In sum, the Delhi High Court decision in Naz is an incredibly thorough, detailed,
and lengthy opinion, spanning 105 pages. The opinion cites Indian law, international
law, and the law of multiple foreign jurisdictions. It cites health studies, first-person
accounts of discrimination and assault, and political theorists. In finding India’s antisodomy laws unconstitutional, the Delhi High Court addressed every objection raised by
the government with precision and a wide variety of textual support. As such, it was a
deep disappointment for many that the India Supreme Court overturned the decision in
2013 in Suresh Kumar Koushal vs. Naz Foundation (see, e.g., Abeyratne & Sinha 2014;
Acevedo 2017; Boyce 2015; and Akali 2016).
In stark contrast to the Naz Foundation decision, Suresh Kumar Koushal contains
very little legal analysis, is mostly block quotes without an explanation of how the cited
material applies, and is the last of nineteen opinions that the judge wrote in the thirty days
before he retired (Akali 2016, 135).53 No parties in the Naz Foundation decision wanted
to appeal. The named plaintiff Koushal is an astrologer, who was joined by other
religious individuals and groups opposed to homosexuality (Akali 2016, 133). Finding
that the Delhi High Court relied too heavily on foreign law, which the Supreme Court of
India regularly does, and that the Court had not explained how this law was relevant to

53

The Koushal Court also mistakenly cites to its jurisprudence where it struck down British
colonial laws, as examples of when the court granted deference to laws. See Akali 2016, fn 93
and accompanying text.
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India, which it certainly did, the Supreme Court found that Section 377 of the Penal Code
was indeed constitutional. Its sparse reasoning included that judges should exercise more
restraint, which is also an odd critique in the context of PILS in which, under the
Supreme Court’s rules, judges have very active, quasi-legislative roles.
The Kousal decision was framed mainly as a critique of the privacy rights read
into the Constitution by the Delhi High Court. The Kousal court even cited to a 1973 U.S.
law review criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision (para. 26, citing
Ely 1973). Citing this critique of Roe within a block-quote from a previous Indian
Supreme Court case (without providing any analysis of its own), the Kousal court wrote
that an individual’s privacy can be restricted for good cause. As privacy is not explicitly
in the Constitution of India, the Naz Foundation court had been wrong to strike down
Section 377 on the basis of privacy (para. 47).
Both the government and the LGBTQ activists filed petitions asking the court to
do an “immediate technical review” of the Kousal decision because of the legal errors in
it, which were denied. LGBTQ activists in India then filed another petition, asking for a
review because of a “larger, gross miscarriage of justice” (quoted in Akali 2016, 136).
Review was granted, and the Naz Foundation decision overturned, in 2018, in the case of
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, which I discuss below.
In the interim, the Supreme Court of India decided the case of National Legal
Services Authority v. Union of India (“NLSA v. UOI”). The case was brought by the
NLSA, a governmental legal services organization for disadvantaged people in India, the
NGO Poojya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji Women Welfare Society, and a well-known Hijra
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activist, Laxmi Narayan Tripathy.54 The case asked that transgender people be recognized
in India generally, and that Hijra be recognized as a third gender in India. From the
outset of the case, the government agreed with NLSA and Tripathy and the relief they
requested, and the case was not contested by the parties to it. That the need to address
oppression of trans people in India was shared by all parties is reflecting in the Court’s
opinion. Indeed, the Court began its decision in NLSA by recognizing that “[s]eldom, our
society realizes or cares to realize the trauma, agony and pain which the members of
Transgender community undergo, nor appreciates the innate feelings of the members of
the Transgender community, especially of those whose mind and body disown their
biological sex.” Instead, Indian society “often ridicules and abuses the Transgender
community and in public places like railway stations, bus stands, schools, workplaces,
malls, theatres, hospitals, they are sidelined and treated as untouchables.” This treatment
of trans people in India is a “moral failure” of “society’s unwillingness to contain or
embrace different gender identities and expressions”- and this is “a mindset which we
have to change” (para. 1).
Like the Naz Foundation court, the NLSA Court turned to the Constitution’s
Article 14 on “Equality before the Law,” Article 15 on the “Prohibition of discrimination
As explained by Akali (2016), the NLSA Court wrote that Hijras “are people who were
assigned male at birth, or were born with male intersex variation, but reject their masculine
identity.” Id. at 480. They “identify either as women, or ‘not-men,’ or ‘in between man and
woman,’ or ‘neither man nor woman.”’ Id. While Hijras may be compared to “the western
equivalent of transgender/transsexual (male-to-female) persons,” they are also different because
“Hijras have a long tradition/culture [in the Indian Subcontinent] and have strong social ties
formalized through a ritual called reet (becoming a member of Hijra community).” Id. at 480-81.
The Court acknowledged that “Hijras may earn through their traditional work: Badhai (clapping
their hands and asking for alms), blessing new-born babies, or dancing in ceremonies.” Id at 481.
Other Hijras may “engage in sex work for lack of other job opportunities,” and “some may be
self-employed or work for non-governmental organi[z]ations.” Id. Hijras in Delhi may prefer to
use the term Kinnars, and in Tamil Naidu, Hijras prefer the term Aravanis. Id.
54
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on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth,” Article 19, on the “Protection of
certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.” and Article 21 on “Protection of life and
personal liberty” and found that both provisions required the legal recognition of
transgender and Hijra persons. Under Article 14, the Court noted the discrimination that
transgender and Hijra people face in terms of assaults and police violence, as well as in
“all spheres of society” including employment, education and healthcare (para. 55). As
such, the Court forcefully held that “Discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation
or gender identity, therefore, impairs equality before law and equal protection of law and
violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India” (para. 55).
Turning to Article 15, the Court explicitly held that the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex in the Constitution of India includes discrimination
based upon gender identity, including Hijra: “The expression ‘sex’ used in Articles 15
and 16 is not just limited to biological sex of male or female, but intended to include
people who consider themselves to be neither male or female” (para. 59). The Court did
so through reasoning that
Constitution makers, it can be gathered, gave emphasis to the fundamental right
against sex discrimination so as to prevent the direct or indirect attitude to treat
people differently, for the reason of not being in conformity with stereotypical
generalizations of binary genders. Both gender and biological attributes constitute
distinct components of sex. Biological characteristics, of course, include genitals,
chromosomes and secondary sexual features, but gender attributes include one’s
self image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and
character (para. 59).
As such, the non-recognition of the gender identity of all persons in India violated its
Constitution - and this long and systematic history of governmental discrimination meant
that the transgender/Hijra people in India were entitled to affirmative action and
reservations (para. 60-61).
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Under Article 19, the Court also held that India’s laws violated transgender/Hijra
people’s freedom of expression, noting that gender is “expressed through dress, words,
action or behavior or any other form” and as such the “State cannot prohibit, restrict or
interfere with a transgender’s expression of such personality, which reflects that inherent
personality” (paras. 62-66). Lastly, the Court found that transgender and Hijra peoples’
rights under Article 21 to personal liberty were also violated by the Indian government,
as “[r]ecognition of one’s gender identity lies at the heart of the fundamental right to
dignity” (para. 68). Concluding their thorough discussion of the Constitution and the
historic and present treatment of non-cisgender people in India, the Court directed the
government to take nine types of affirmative measures, including to recognize a third
gender, to allow people to self-identify as the gender of their choosing, to address health
issues including social stigmas, to provide appropriate toilets and other facilities, to create
other schemes for the betterment of their lives, “create public awareness so that TGs will
feel that they are also part and parcel of the social life and be not treated as
untouchables,” and “take measures to regain their respect and place in the society which
once they enjoyed in our cultural and social life” (para. 129). Although the ability of the
national and local governments to achieve these tasks is uncertain at best, the breadth and
depth of understanding of the NLSA decision is striking.
Also before the re-hearing in Naz Foundation and Kousal, the Court announced
protections for sex workers in the case of Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal,
(2011) 2 SCR 925. Understandings of sex work, and its criminalization in India, is tied to
British colonialism in similar ways to penalizations of same sex relations (Jain & Rhoten
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2017, 416).55 In the Budhadev Karmaskar case, the Supreme Court transformed an appeal
by a person convicted of murdering a sex worker into a Public Interest Litigation/PIL on
behalf of sex workers.
In the case, the Court also looked to Article 21’s “Protection of life and personal
liberty.” Under this provision, the Court held that sex workers “are also entitled to a life
of dignity,” reasoning that
Sex workers are also human beings, and no one has a right to assault or murder
them. A person becomes a prostitute not because she enjoys it but because of
poverty. Society must have sympathy towards the sex workers and must not look
down upon them.
In its decision, the Indian Supreme Court further noted that “physically and sexually
abused women” are “commonly known as prostitutes” and that “a woman is compelled to
indulge in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty.” The Court
reasoned that “[i]f such a woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or
vocational training, she would be able to earn her livelihood by such vocational training
and skill instead of by selling her body.” As such, the Court dismissed the criminal
appeal, and directed the government to create technical and vocational training to
“rehabilitate” “sex workers and sexually abused women.” Although the Court explicitly
states that all sex workers are also appropriately understood as “physically and sexually
abused women,” this opinion also focuses on a robust concept of dignity. This dignity
involves a right to be free from physical harm - and also a right to not be looked down
upon. However, because this right not to be demeaned begins with the assumption that all
sex workers are abused victims who demean themselves by selling their bodies, it seems
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For example, temple dancers, courtesans, and monogamous concubines were all accepted
within in Indian society before British colonial legislation (Jain & Rhoten 2017, 416).
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doubtful that this robust dignity jurisprudence will lead to respect for Indian sex workers
in practice.
In 2018, the Supreme Court of India granted reconsideration of the Koushal case.
On September 6, 2018, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, a five-judge panel
overruled Koushal, and struck down the parts of India’s penal law that criminalized
consensual sex acts between people of the same sex. Beginning with quotations from
John Stuart Mill, Johann Wolfgang van Goethe, Arthur Schopenhaeur and Shakespeare,56
the Court synthesized the findings and reasoning in the original Naz Foundation case and
its NLSA and Budhadev Karmaskar decisions to posit that the Constitution of India
protects people and their sexual orientations and identities in four major ways: (1)
“individual autonomy and liberty”; (2) “equality for all sans discrimination of any kind”;
(3) “recognition of identity with dignity”; and (4) “privacy of human beings” (para. 3).
Although the Court identifies four areas of constitutional protections, the decision largely
focuses on the right to “identity with dignity.” The Court notes that an individual’s
identity is “absolutely essential” to one’s being and to the enjoyment of any other
constitutional right:
Destruction of individual identity would tantamount [sic] to crushing of intrinsic
dignity that cumulatively encapsulates the values of privacy, choice, freedom of
speech and other expressions. It can be viewed from another angle. An individual
in exercise of his choice may feel that he/she should be left alone but no one, and
we mean, no one, should impose solitude on him/her. Para. 4.
Dignity, thus conceived, is not simply autonomy. It is the ability to choose whether or not
to be in a relationship, without ostracization or becoming a social outcast. Dignity also

Including that “which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet!”. Navtej Singh
Johar v. Union of India, para. 2.
56
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encapsulates the concepts explored in the previous chapters of this dissertation: dignity
here is a form of privacy and freedom of expression.
The Navtej Singh Johar opinion continues to repeatedly stress the importance of
individual identity, in general and constitutionally. The court writes that “[t]he idea of
identity of the individual and the constitutional legitimacy behind the same is of immense
significance” (para. 84), and that “this guarantee of recognition of individuality runs
through the entire length and breadth of this dynamic instrument” (para. 86).
The Court emphasizes that it is not just identity that is protected by its
Constitution, but “identity with dignity”: to “be respected and not despised and not
looked down upon” (para. 4). Such identity must be able to be expressed, in order to be a
full, dignified, self-identity (para. 9). As such, the Kousal court was wrong to find that
India’s penal law was constitutional. The Kousal court displayed “non-recognition in the
fullest sense” and “denial of expression by choice” (para. 9). Instead of fostering this
robust identity with dignity, Indian Penal Law and the Kousal decision “corrodes the
desire to express one’s own sexual orientation as a consequence of which the body with
flesh and bones feels itself caged and a sense of fear gradually converts itself into a
skeleton sans spirit” (para. 106).
Justice Khanwilkar’s concurring opinion makes clear that this active right to make
choices consistent with a dignified identity identified by the Court is not limited to issues
of sexual orientation or gender identity. Instead, the Court argues all branches of
government have a duty to “to curb any propensity or proclivity of popular sentiment or
majoritarianism” (Khanwilkar, J. concurring, para. 116). The government must use its
powers, and the Court must interpret the Constitution, to allow for a robust expression of
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identity - especially if this identity does not conform to the prevalent norms of society.
“Any attempt to push and shove a homogeneous, uniform, consistent and a standardised
philosophy throughout the society,” the Court writes, “would violate the principle of
constitutional morality” (Khanwilkar, J. concurring para. 116). The Hindu-majority
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that pushing homogeneity in society is unconstitutional
must be viewed in light of the current prominence of right-wing Hindutva fascism in
India (Banaji 2018). Indeed, Hindutva is by its definition “an ideology seeking to
establish the hegemony of Hindus and the Hindu way of life” (OED Online, 2019).
Returning to the Navtej Singh Johar decision, in a section of the index to the
judgment dedicated to “deconstructing the polarities of binary genders” (section E.2,
under the framework of “Beyond physicality: sex, identity and stereotypes), the Court
notes that this “goes well beyond the concern for the gay community.” The Penal law at
issue, and the criminalization of gay sex, is actually about creating and reinforcing
patriarchy:
In a patriarchal context, some of the most serious transgressors are thus: a woman
who renounces a man sexual partner or an individual assigned female at birth who
renounces womanhood, thereby rejecting the patriarchal system and all other
forms of male supervision and control, and an individual assigned male at birth
who embraces womanhood, thereby abandoning privilege in favor of that which is
deemed subservient, femininity. (Index to the judgment part E, para. 105).
In a section of the index to its judgment replete with political theory citations, the
Navtej Singh Johar Court ties a “natural” right to privacy to individual dignity rights
(Index section F.1, “deconstructing the heteronormative framework,” under “Confronting
the closet”). Here, the Court labels and defines heteronormativity, and quotes at length
from Eve Sedgwick’s 1990 work Epistemology of the Closet, including on how the closet
can hide both stigma/oppression but also pleasure. The Court also quotes from Sedgwick
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on how “sexual relations between consenting adults” must be seen as natural acts, such
that “the refusal to accept these acts amounts to a denial of the distinctive human
capacities for sensual experience outside of the realm of procreative sex.” From this, the
Court concludes that
the right to sexual privacy must be granted the sanctity of a natural right, and be
protected under the Constitution as fundamental to liberty and as a soulmate of
dignity. Citizens of a democracy cannot be compelled to have their lives pushed
into obscurity by an oppressive colonial legislation. In order to ensure to sexual
and gender minorities the fulfilment of their fundamental rights, it is imperative to
confront the closet and, as a necessary consequence, confront compulsory
heterosexuality, . . . [which] would entail reclaiming markers of all desires,
identities and acts which challenge it . . . and ensuring that individuals belonging
to sexual minorities, have the freedom to fully participate in public life, breaking
the invisible barrier that heterosexuality imposes upon them. The choice of
sexuality is at the core of privacy (Index, section F.1, internal citations omitted).
The Court explicitly refutes the idea that “privacy” means within homes and private
places, and that constitutional protections of “privacy” only extend to literal “private
places.” To do so, the Court builds upon Danish Sheikh’s 2017 article “Queer Rights and
the Puttaswamy Judgement” to challenge the meaning of public versus private. The Court
writes that “[t]he home is often reduced to a public space as heteronormativity within the
family can force the individual to remain inside the closet,” such that “even the
conception of a private space for certain individuals is utopian.” Even without oppression
within a family, privacy creates a hierarchy between “reputable” and “disreputable” sex,
and only protects “acts behind closed doors.” Instead, because “public places are
heteronormative,” sexual protections must be expanded to public places. (Index to the
judgment, section F.1).
The Court’s expansive reading of privacy to include much more than spatial
resonates with other queer interventions into Indian constitutional law. For example, in
the wake of the Kousal decision, Siddharth Mohansingh Akali argued that the Supreme
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Court of India and decriminalization activists should not focus on sex in “private” in a
country where nearly 100 million people live in slums, where the ability to have sex in
“private” is not an option (2016, 164). Instead, to truly protect the rights and improve the
lives of lower-class and lower-caste queers, scholars and queer activists urged that the
Court should examine “patriarchy and gender binaries, or any of the other ways in which
power operates to oppress subordinate subjects in India” (Akali 2016, 166, discussing the
work of Ratna Kapur) - a call that the Court in Navtej Singh Johar heard and followed.
In this way, the Court was able to move towards unearthing and protecting the
“sexual subaltern,” a term used by Ratna Kapur to discuss the non-charmed “sexual
identities and sexual practices in India” (Kapur 2009, 385).57 Focusing on how
heteronormativity has been produced “in and through the colonial encounter”, the sexual
subaltern both “includes all those practices and identities excluded or marginalised by
sexual normativity,” and “is also an analytical device intended to unearth, expose, and
challenge these very norms” (Kapur 2012, 41). The Navtej Singh Johar Court’s explicit
and repeated stress that the law at issue was not just about “gay people,” but was instead
about maintaining a patriarchal social system, also reflects Kapur’s (and other’s) insights
into these specifically post-colonial identities and acts. Yet this decision’s comprehensive
understanding of how hierarchical social systems oppress those outside of the dominant
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Kapur defines the “sexual subaltern” to include:
gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, transgendered, khush, queer, hijra, kothis, panthis and many
more. They have also included sexual practices and behaviours such as adult and
consensual pre-marital, extra-marital, nonmarital, auto-erotic/ masturbatory,
promiscuous, and paid-for sex, as well as MSM (men who have sex with men). It is this
diversity of identities and range of practices that cannot be captured within the acronym
‘LGBT,‘ and why there is a need to articulate the politics of sexual subgroups from
within a postcolonial context rather than to borrow theories or politics from elsewhere, a
move that is both decontextualized and dehistoricised (2009, 385).
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culture is in stark contrast with the Indian government’s push to punish those outside of
its dominant culture.
However, taken purely as a text released by a country’s highest court, the Navtej
Singh Johar decision is remarkable - and is a valuable tool for future courts, academics
and activists. As an initial matter, the Court chooses as its inquiry on people whose
sexuality has been seen as outside of good and healthy Indian sexuality. Secondly, the
decision seeks a comprehensive understanding of the politics and history that led to
sexual actors being seen as bad and not normal. In so doing, the decision looks to a wide
scope of sources – legal decisions from its own country, foreign legal materials, treaties,
law reviews, and contemporary queer theorists. The result of centering disfavored sexual
actors combined with looking to a wide range of legal and non-legal sources allows this
decision to see the structural factors at play in repressing sexuality and to develop a
concept that might truly lead to erotic justice.
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CHAPTER 5:
THE HOPE OF ESCAPING: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON COMBATTING
SEXUAL REPRESSION THROUGH THE LAW

These avenues forward for erotic justice that I have identified through
constitutional concepts are not purely an academic exercise. Laws repressing those
whose sexuality is deemed bad continue to be passed, and their validity continues to be
tested in courts around the world. Yet resistance is possible, and resistance is happening.
As Foucault noted, “[t]here are no societies which do not regulate sex and thus all
societies create the hope of escaping from such regulations” (1973, quoted in Warner
1999). One major site of resistance currently in the courts in the U.S. is the treatment of
trans people. This fight is raging at the Supreme Court, which has just heard its first case
dealing with discrimination against trans people and at local levels, with a legal challenge
in New York City to its anti-loitering law that disproportionately targets Black trans
women.
In New York City, a fight is being mounted to a state law that criminalizes
“loitering for the purposes of prostitution.” As of early 2019, 94% of people arrested
under this law in recent years were Black women (Goldberg 2019). Under this law, Black
women, and especially Black trans women, are frequently arrested for being outdoors in
certain neighborhoods in the City, with their charging documents noting that they were
wearing “skirts,” “tight black pants” or “crop tops” as proof that they were soliciting sex
(Goldberg 2019; McKinley 2019). New York police officers have admitted under oath
that they would look for “Adam’s apples” when deciding whether or not to detain
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someone for suspected prostitution (Rayman 2019). Trans immigrants in New York are
also routinely targeted by this law, often leading to negative immigration consequences.
Stories such as the trans woman arrested while leaving a grocery store with shopping
bags after being catcalled by men and put into deportation proceedings as a result of the
arrest are common (Pyo 2016; Goldberg 2019). These “walking while trans” laws are
not limited to New York. Monica Jones, a Black trans woman and activist, was arrested
in Arizona under a law that deemed engaging a passerby in conversation as evidence of
intent to engage in prostitution (Strangio 2014). In Australia, where sex work is
decrimizalized, trans women (including trans sex workers) are routinely harassed by selfdescribed “concerned citizen” groups who seek to limit the presence of these women in
public spaces (Easterbrook-Smith, 2019).
In New York City, this push to de-criminalize Black trans women in public is
taking place at multiple levels. One is the move to decriminalize sex work in New York
altogether, on the premise that if sex work is legal, then (in addition to other benefits)
Black trans women will not be arrested on suspicion of being sex workers (McKinley
2019; decrimny.org). This decriminalization push includes a separate bill to repeal New
York’s loitering for the purposes of prostitution law (decrimny.org/advocacy; Assunção
2019). As the New Zealand example above demonstrates, these measures alone may not
be enough to stop the harassment of trans people in public places.
A lawsuit was brought against this loitering law on behalf of the women of color,
and especially trans women, who are targeted under it. The suit was recently settled, with
the New York Police Department (NYPD) agreeing to change its patrol guide to instruct
officers that they should no longer rely on gender, gender identity, clothing or location to
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enforce the law. The NYPD also agreed to instruct police officers to provide more
detailed narratives of why they believe someone was engaged in prostitution (Rayman
2019).
Yet is likely that this law will return back to the courts, if the attempts for outright
appeal do not first succeed. As is common knowledge and supported by the chapters of
this dissertation, the targeting of disfavored sexual subjects does not end because police
are told to stop overtly profiling them. The hierarchical system in which Black trans
women are seen as bad remains firmly intact- and therefore so will their repression. If this
law continues to be used to target societally disfavored people and the case returns to
court, a court attempting to end this injustice could use lessons from this dissertation. The
court could be explicit in its telling of the history of this law, which in practice has been
used almost exclusively against women of color.
The court could also recognize the dignity issues involved here, framed as rights
to privacy and to expression. As this dissertation has shown, a classic conception of
privacy where people are protected in private spaces (like bedrooms) and within blessed
areas (like marriage) will not help women who are targeted while alone on public streets.
A feminist conception of privacy where people are protected as they go about their lives
so long as they do not cause harm might be able to protect these women. As explained in
the previous chapters, this alternate view of privacy will only be able to help overpoliced
trans women suspected of sex work if the court rejects baseless allegations of public harm
or claims that these women are degrading (and thus harming) themselves.
It would also be hard to address this injustice under freedom of expression
guarantees as traditionally understood, because the presence in public of disfavored
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sexual actors has not been recognized as a politically valuable manner of expression. Yet
protection could be found if the court recognizes the emotions that are invoked by trans
women of color, who are often also immigrants, merely existing in public as their correct
gender identity. Their presence in public spaces arouses intense emotional responses –
from police and also from many in the general population. Black trans women surviving
in public carries an emotive force, and should thus be protected expressive activity. At
core, these expressive rights and privacy rights are claims to dignity, to lives that are
treated with respect. A court that recognizes this robust right to dignity for trans women
of color would be able to use the law to truly fight their repression.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recently heard oral arguments in the first case
before it to discuss the rights of trans people, with a decision expected in the summer of
2020. The case centers around Aimee Stephens, a trans woman who was fired from her
job as a funeral director when she transitioned (R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. __. Supreme Ct. of the US., case
pending). The precise legal issue relies on the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, a federal law intended to counter discrimination in employment, and
cases under that law related to protections for people who do not conform to gender
stereotypes. Yet within its analysis the Court will also have the opportunity to consider
the lives of trans people in the country, including their ability to present as the correct
gender when at work. The dignity, privacy and expressive needs of trans people could be
recognized by the Court, who might weigh these needs and find that trans people are
protected in their workplaces.
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In crafting their decisions, courts seeking justice for trans people could also take
methodological lessons from this dissertation. Courts that engaged in comparative
constitutional analysis, such as the Navtej Singh Johar and Philips courts, produced better
opinions. These decisions displayed fuller contextual understandings and appreciation of
the stakes and rights at issue. For example, to address the discrimination of trans women
discussed above, courts in the Global North could look to legislation like the Pakistan’s
recent Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, discussed in Chapter 4, and to the
recent court victory for trans people in Botswana (Graham 2017). In contrast to the
attacks on the rights of trans people in the U.S. under Donald Trump’s administration,
legislatures and courts in South America, especially Argentina, Colombia and Brazil,
have fought against their (colonially-imposed) histories of LGBTQ discrimination to pass
laws and hand down important judicial decisions protecting trans people (Blitzer 2015;
Brigida 2018; Armario 2019). As such, comparative constitutional law should be kept
within the toolbox of courts seeking to protect the rights of their inhabitants, and
especially where the dominant culture disfavors the acts of those persons. Additionally,
courts that considered theory, and in particular queer and other postmodern theories, also
produced opinions more likely to protect those outside the charmed circle of sexuality.
Of course, courts pronouncing that people should be protected will not translate
into instant justice and the end of repression. Even if the Supreme Court decides that
federal anti-discrimination law covers trans people, much of the societal (and legal)
repression they face will remain. Although the law is a possible source of societal change,
the law has also been a tool of erotic injustice. As this dissertation shows, many legal
opinions that have been heralded as massive wins for some disfavored sexual actors have
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actually served to further repress those even further away from “good sexuality.” For
example, Obergefell v. Hodges, so lauded by the media and some activists as a complete
victory in the fight for gay rights, benefits people in monogamous and committed
relationships, to the detriment and further marginalization of those who cannot or do not
marry.

Indeed, nearly every case analyzed in this dissertation only granted protection to

those closest to good sexuality – in other words, to those already protected and least in
need of further protection. As Audre Lorde wrote,
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of acceptable
women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference -- those
of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who are older -- know that
survival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to take our differences and
make them strengths. For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s
house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will
never enable us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to
those women who still define the master’s house as their only source of support
(1984, 112).
Certainly erotic justice will not be found solely through the law. For social change to
occur, public opinion must be altered and new norms of behavior accepted. Yet legal
decisions can have important roles in legitimating the claims made by those seeking this
comprehensive social change (Coglianese 2001, 86). Thus, although social practices and
institutions will continue to perpetuate injustice, the words of a court still matter. As
Michael McCann argues, the law “can be, in the hands of defiant citizens, a source of
disorder and egalitarian reordering” (1994, ix). Further, in part because queer theory has
traditionally been skeptical of the ability of law to meet the needs of sexual minorities,
voices of queer theorists are rare within the legal struggle for erotic justice (Valdes 1995,
345).
Yet queer legal theory does exist, with the aim of ending sexual oppression but
also in urging the law to be examined and understood through ideas of queer spaces and
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queer temporalities (Cossman 2019, 37-38). Indeed, this dissertation is a work of queer
legal theory- even if it does not explicitly label itself as such throughout. Queer legal
scholarship often operates in this manner- in Brenda Cossman’s terms, with a “queerness
that refuses taxonomy: legal scholarship with queer sensibilities that does not expressly
identify under the sign of queer” (2019, 24). This work is queer because it critiques and
resists oppressive structures of sexuality, because it engages in reparative readings, and
because it operates from the position of considering alternative conceptions of an ethics
of sexuality.
Following the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, this dissertation has engaged in
what she terms “reparative readings.” Academic, popular and legal debates around
sexuality are often filled with “paranoid readings,” in which “to theorize out of anything
but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious or complaisant” (Sedgwick
2003, 126-27). Reparative readings allow for closeness instead of maintaining a critical
distance, and for the possibility of being surprised, and for hope. In the law, reparative
readings are “in the search of pleasure, positive affect, and ameliorative possibilities”
(Halley 2017, 132). In approaching the case studies in this dissertation, I attempted to
begin not from a critical place, but instead searched for possible sites of resistance and
erotic justice in existing case law- for the threads of liberation that a so-inclined judge or
attorney could build on. However, reparative readings are a method, not a result.
Although I read these opinions with love and hope, my analyses often concluded without
me finding the hope that I was searching for. Instead, cases that looked promising
revealed themselves under that hopeful surface to yield more of the same repression- the
promise searched for in the concepts of liberty, equality and freedom of expression in
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Chapters 2 and 3 resulted in the identification of dangers. Yet all of the analysis herein
urges towards a queer legal goal: to remain open to unknown futures, where repression
will likely continue but so will resistance.
Lastly, this dissertation provides paths for a queer ethics of sexuality. As shown
throughout the chapters herein, sexual acts are hierarchically sorted and valued based
upon those rankings and exclusions. Laws and legal opinions in turn reflect these
oppressive categorizations. A queer explication of erotic justice requires a system of
analyzing sex acts and the law truly based on ethics, instead of a system of oppression. A
true sexual ethics could look to factors such as how partners treat each other, how the
person or people involved feel after the sex act, whether mutual consideration is present,
whether coercion is present, how voluntary the sex act is, whether people are informed of
possible risks (e.g. from BDSM or of STDs or pregnancy), and the pleasure provided to
the persons involved (Rubin 1984, 154; Halwani 2018; Soble 2020).
Consent would not be a primary factor in this ethical analysis. As discussed in
Chapter 2, consent has functioned within modern political theory to repress. An original
and imagined “consent” to social contacts has been at the foundation of liberal thought,
and the primary reason why subjects of a jurisdiction must submit to all of its laws,
however unjust. As applied to sex laws, consent is both over and under inclusive. Some
sex acts engaged in without consent should be left outside of the realm of the law’s reachsuch as Rubin’s example in the introduction of someone having sex with a (nonconsenting) shoe. Other consensual acts might be un-ethical, and possibly within a proper
scope of the law- such as someone consenting to a BDSM act known to lead to physical
pain, but without the consenting person being aware of that.
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Instead, factors like coercion, voluntariness, pleasure and awareness of risks are
all better suited to an ethics of sexuality, which in turn could inform criminal laws. Under
any of these rubrics, laws criminalizing rape and sexual assault would remain. However,
the prohibitions against BDSM, exotic dancing and nudity in public discussed in this
dissertation would need to be re-thought. Stripping, breasts in public and consensual pain
during sex could all possibly be valued under a true sexual ethics- depending on the
coercion, respect, voluntariness, and awareness of risk shared by the participants. The
task of teasing through the contours of a queer ethics of sexual acts remains to be
completed. Yet this dissertation provides guidance in that endeavor, to the lawyers,
judges, academics and activists who wish to achieve erotic justice.
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